Public opinion in Okinawa has rallied around the goal to restore normalcy of daily life that has been menaced and virtually destroyed by the noise created, accidents caused, and crimes committed by soldiers from the US bases. The US bases have been stationed on Okinawa since the beginning of the US occupation in 1945. In order to improve relations between the bases and the local communities, the Okinawa Prefecture government has petitioned for a revision of the Japan-US Status of Forces Agreement.
The US bases in Japan and Okinawa are justified in Article 6 of the Japan-US Mutual Security Treaty, signed on January 19, 1960. Under Article 6, both governments then signed the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) on the same day. The new Mutural Security Treaty was a revision of the original Japan-US Security Treaty, signed in Tokyo on February 28, 1952.
Article 5 of the Mutual Security Treaty excluded Okinawa from the arrangement that both countries would act jointly for the common defense against an armed attack. Indeed, the United States insisted on full control over Okinawa in order to maintain the free use of bases to launch attacks, including the use of nuclear weapons. Thus, Okinawa fell under the sole control of the United States. In 1972, when the administration of Okinawa was reverted back to the Japanese government, the Mutual Security Treaty ensured that the United States could retain its US bases under conditions of the SOFA that applied to US forces in mainland Japan.
This essay will analyze the negotiation process of revising the Japan-US Security Treaty, Administration Agreement, and related agreements. It also intends to review the role of US bases on Okinawa in terms of security questions in East Asia and Southeast Asia. Moreover, this essay will assess the decisions made at the time of the reversion. This essay will conclude that the US bases on Okinawa, were placed on Okinawa in order to address legitimate security concerns of the time. As such, the US has been assured of free and unlimited use of the bases and, at least theoretically, the right to establish nuclear weapons on Okinawa. The agreement—under the auspices of SOFA—between Japan and the US continues to ensure the freedom of action by the US military.

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While the Japanese Peace Treaty of 1951 has been analyzed extensively, the Administrative Agreement of 1952 governing the status of U. S. forces stationed in Japan following the Peace Treaty has not been so adequately analyzed, perhaps due to the relative lack of primary sources. In recent years, however, U. S. documents, in which some important Japanese documents are included, have been released. The purpose of this article is to analyze the making of the Agreement by using these U. S. documents, thus filling the missing chapter in Japan-U. S. relations. The article focuses on interactions among U.S. officials rather than on bilateral interactions, though it does briefly analyze them whenever sufficient materials are available.
Part 1 traces the process of drafting the first U. S. draft by analyzing NSC 60/1 (September 8, 1950), impact of the Korean War, and the Dulles Mission's visit to Tokyo in early 1951. Part 2 deals with interactions among U. S. officials, particularly among the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the State Department, which led to the final draft presented to Japan in early 1952 as the basis of negotiation. The issues analyzed rather extensively are articles on criminal jurisdiction, areas and facilities, and the joint U. S. -Japan command. Part 3 analyzes the bilateral negotiations in Tokyo in early 1952, but it limits its analyses to the joint command issue, not only because it was the only article that was revised due to persistent Japanese requests, but also because the two other important articles (criminal jurisdiction, and areas and facilities) have been adequately analyzed by Kumao Nishimura who, as a member of the Japanese negotiating team, participated in the negotiation.
Major findings are: 1) an often disputed proposition in the bureaucratic politics model that “stands depend on positions” seems largely relevant in this case, of particular interest in this respect being the stands taken by CINCFE in Tokyo, who was responsible for defending Japan from external attack, thus demanding the maintaining of the status quo, but was also compelled to honor Japan's integrity as a sovereign nation; and 2) the major articles mentioned above were outcomes of much bargaining among U. S. officials, which resulted in compromises in which none was fully satisfied; and 3) the fact that the article on the joint command was revised in the Tokyo negotiations was due largely to Dean Rusk's strenuous and skillful coalition-building both in Tokyo and Washington as well as skillful negotiation on the part of the Japanese.

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This article reviews the Okinawa reversion negotiations from the standpoint of Japan's “shared responsibility” issue in the context of the Japan-U. S. security relations. It was during the 1960s that the Japanese government began to be aware of Japan's growing international economic role in the Asian Region. The issue of Japan's security role also became salient during the Okinawa reversion negotiations.
Prime Minister Sato first raised the Okinawa reversion issue in a meeting with President Johnson in January 1965. However, the Johnson administration was not in favor of tackling the issue at that time. Okinawa was an essential staging area for U. S. forces engaged in the Vietnam War. On 14 November 1967, Johnson requested that Japan be ready to take over the responsibilities for its defense. Furthermore, the U. S. indicated that Japan must permit U. S. military operations in Okinawa which might require nuclear weapons to be placed there as well as U. S. combat operations conducted from there.
Japan entered into negotiations with the U. S. in 1969. Sato insisted that Okinawa should be treated the same as the “homeland” when the reversion took place. The U. S. government claimed that Japan had to accept more responsibility for regional security if Okinawa was to be reverted back to full Japanese control and covered by the Japan-U. S. Security Treaty. The U. S. government had already accepted the reversion in NSDM 13 on May 28, and set down the conditions for the reversion: the first was that Japan accept maximally free conventional use of American military bases specifically with respect to Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam, and the second was that Japan approve storage and transit of nuclear weapons in Okinawa by the U. S. during emergencies.
The U. S. position was that Japan had to accept the above conditions as part of Japan's new responsibility in the “Free World” after the reversion of Okinawa. The Sato administration accepted these conditions. In the summit meeting held on 19 November 1969, PM Sato and President Nixon reached an agreement on the reversion. They also signed the secret minutes in which Japan accepted the storage and transit of nuclear weapons by the U. S. in Okinawa during emergencies.
After the agreement on the reversion, Japan and the U. S. went on to plan for SDF deployment in Okinawa. Through the Okinawa reversion negotiations, Japan and the U. S. reached an understanding about Japan's shared responsibility in the “Free World.” Future Japanese actions were to be taken within the ambit of the Japanese Constitution and the Japan-U. S. Security Treaty. This understanding basically was sustained up to the end of the Cold war.

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日本国内では1950年代半ごろまで, 日本の自衛力建設が進めば日米

の相互防衛条約化と駐留米軍の撤退を米国政府に対して要請できるようになると考えられていた。相互防衛条約という形式と基地の提供は不可分ではないし, 米軍駐留と自衛力建設とのトレード・オフ関係が条約で規定されているわけでもない。にもかかわらず, 2国間の安全保障関係の態様と米軍への基地提供と再軍備がなぜ, このような関係でとらえられたのだろうか。本稿は, 1951年に調印された日米安保条約の形成過程と日本国内の批准過程に焦点を当て, 条約が法的に意味した範囲とその日本における解釈を明らかにする。北大西洋条約 (1949年7月) やANZUS条約と米比相互防衛条約 (1951年) とは異なり, 旧安保条約が基地提供に関する条項と2 国間の安全保障関係を一つの条約で規定したことと条約が暫定的な性格をもっていたことに注目し, なぜそうした方式が選択されたのか, それによって条約にどのような構造が生じ, いかなる解釈を可能としたのかを考察する。

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In the early 1950s the United States concluded with various non-Communist countries Mutual Defense Assistance Agreements (MDAAs), which have constituted the very basis of Pax Americana. However, albeit their importance and voluminous amount of works on the Cold War, studies on the MDAAs are still at an initial stage.
Under the MDAAs, aid recipients promised in return for US military assistance their military cooperation such as the increase of indigenous military forces, transfer of raw and semi-processed materials to the United States, or export controls against countries which threaten their security.
Among them the role of the MDAAs on global anti-Communist export controls has been neglected due to scholars' focus on COCOM. The dual structure, i. e., COCOM on the upper level and the export-control network through the MDAAs on the lower level, gave a solid basis to the export controls even at the time of relaxation of COCOM controls.
Unique feature of the US-Japan MDAA under Article Nine [renunciation of war] of the Japanese Constitution is also a focus of this essay. Due to Article Nine the “economic interpretation” of military issues has prevailed in Japan, which gives a unique tinge to the US-Japan MDAA. Yet, the demise of the USSR makes such an economic interpretation no longer feasible.
So far Japanese analysis on security matters goes mostly to Article Nine and the US-Japan Security Treaties of 1951 and 1960. This essay insists that we should pay more attention to the MDAA network especially when military relations are drastically changing on a global scale today.

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The Georgian conflictoccurred in 2008, and on that occasion Russiamade military campaigns in order to protect its own national interests. Also Russia announced its “Initiative in Foreign Policy”before the conflict started and “Five Principles of Foreign Policy” after it ended. In accordance with these strategic measures, recently Russia adopted a strong policy towards the United States and Western countries. In this thesis, the present Russian “Initiative in Foreign Policy” and “Five Principles of Foreign Policy” are closely examined in order to make clear why Russia has taken strong oppositions to the US and Western countries. Through this analysis the author will consider the background against which the Georgian conflict took place and what problems the conflict has put on Russia in terms of its security.

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American policy toward Korea, as followed by the administrations of Presidents Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower, was shaped in the face of a continuous dilemma caused by the two distinct evaluations of the situation in the Korean Peninsular. One of these was a strategic evaluation of the necessity for a reduction or elimination of the US military commitment to South Korea based on the belief that Korea was not strategically important in terms of the overall struggle with the USSR, and the other was a political evaluation of the need to avoid the adverse political ramifications in the Far East and the rest of the world should Korea fall to the communist bloc following an American withdrawal.
Following the outbreak of the Korean War, the Truman administration entered the war as part of the UN forces under the terms of the UN's collective security system. This decision was a reflection not only of a political necessity to prevent the Korean Peninsular from falling to the communists but also of the American Government's desire to avoid an independent US military commitment in Korea. In addition, the subsequent decision of the Eisenhower administration to conclude a mutual defence treaty with South Korea, which resulted in an expansion of the US military commitment in Korea, was designed to achieve the participation and cooperation of the administration of Syngman Rhee in the armistice negotiations, a process the South Koreans had been opposing.
Meanwhile, Japan assumed a position of crucial importance in US Far Eastern policy as a bulwark against futher communist expansion. America sought Korean neutrality as this would make it possible to reduce or terminate its military commitment in the peninsular. However, at the same time, by negotiating the Japan-US Security Treaty, America aimed not only to guarantee Japan's place in the anticommunist world but also to open up the possibility of Japanese rearmament and hopefully to obtain Japanese contribution to the defense of freedom in the Pacific region.
However, the Japanese government refused American requests to build up its military potential because of factors such as its economic fragility and the contemporary domestic political situation. Ultimately America was left with no choice but to adopt a policy of emphasizing political and economic stability in Japan instead. Meanwhile, the political conference with Communist China and North Korea broke down and the plan for a neutral Korea collapsed, with the result that the division of Korea into North and South remained unchanged. As a consequence, the US started to consider, instead of Japan, South Korea, which was developing into a military power, as a potential contributor to the security in the Far East.
As a result, it could be argued that South Korea has taken on Japan's security obligations, while Japan now tends to consider South Korea essential in terms of its own security. At the same time, relations between Japan and S. Korea have become susceptible to any change in the US military strength in the Far East.

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