田中義一内閣下の第56議会(1928年12月∼1929年3月)において,与党•政友会と新党倶楽部が共同提案した選挙法改正案は,選挙区を小選挙区制に戻すことを骨子としていた。しかし,政友会•新党倶楽部ともに,小選挙区制採用を焦眉の急と考えていたわけではなかった。政友会にとっては,将来の議会対策上,新党倶楽部を吸収する必要から,また新党倶楽部とそれを率いる床次竹二郎にとっては,より有利な政友会復帰への道筋をつける思惑から,成立するか否かは度外視して提出されたものであった。

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本研究は, 大正末期の軍教問題のうち, 特に従来の体育史的研究で見落されていた"在村青年"の軍教問題にその焦点をあて, 大正15年4月20日, 勅令第70号「青年訓練所令」の公布に至る迄の経緯を, 明治末期から大正末期にかけて問題となった国民精神統一問題, 国民思想善導問題, 壮丁体力問題, 軍縮問題等と青年団体との関係から把らえたものである. 政府は, 前述の問題を解決する一手段として青年団体を掌握, かつ統制し, その活動を奨励した. そして大正末期に軍縮問題が起こるに至って, 従来の青年団統制では不十分となり青年訓練所を設置した. 同訓練所は, 初等学校修了から徴兵検査に至る迄の中等学校に進まない男子に対して, 教練を主とした軍事訓練を施すことを目的として設置されたものである. 大正末期の軍教問題を考える場合, 青年訓練所令と大正14年4月に公布された「陸軍現役将校学校配属令」とを並べることにより, その組織の全貌が明らかとなる. 本研究の体育史的意義はここにある.

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This manuscript is part of a series of works studying the reality of Japanese weapons exports in the pre-World War II. In that context, this manuscript aims to analyze the reality of Japan’s export of weapons to Russia, which got into full swing after the start of World War I, and investigate the background and the reasons for it. From the start of World War I in 1915 through 1916, The reason for this was the Japanese government’s political and diplomatic policy, which was aimed at strengthening its relations with Russia so as to achieve independence from European society centred on Britain and France and establishing its position in Asia. That is to say, Japan, while responding to Russia’s request for the provision of weapons, strengthened its own domestic weapons production system. This led to the establishment of Japan’s national security in the 1920s and furthermore, in my opinion, led to a long-term strategy of building a system for total war. By investigating the reality of weapons exports to Russia, which was not always regarded as important in previous research, this manuscript emphasizes the deep connection between weapons exports and the issues of national security.

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本論文は、日本の新宗教「大本教」と中国の宗教・慈善団体「道院・世界紅卍字会」の「連合運動」（1923–1935）に着目し、その初期の活動として1925年に北京で両団体を中心に結成された世界宗教連合会を取り上げる。「宗教統一」という理想を掲げた宗教活動でありながら、日本のアジア主義者らによる「満蒙権益」獲得のための政治的手段でもあった世界宗教連合会は、連合運動における宗教／政治の関係性を考察するうえで極めて重要である。にも関わらず大本教・紅卍字会双方の先行研究においては等閑視されており、活動実態の解明やその思想的位置づけが不十分である。したがって本論文では、その結成に至る過程や活動内容などを大本教機関紙誌や政府公文書などの史資料に基づいて解明したうえで、世界宗教連合会の宗教／政治目的の交錯・相克を論じる。以上のことにより、当時の日中間において、「宗教統一」思想とアジア主義がどのように関わりあったかを明らかにすることを目指す。

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Japan's entry into World War I is often said to have been at the behest of its ally, Britain. The First World War began on 28 July and Britain entered the war on 4 August. Three days later, Britain requested Japan to remove the German fleet from Tsingtao (Qindao) in China as Britain wanted protection for its merchants ships sailing the coast of China.
However, even before that, Japan had already begun to believe that it would become involved in the war after learning on 2 August that Russia, with which Japan had concluded an entente, would be going to war with Germany. The Minister of the Navy had sent an order to the commander of the Second Fleet to prepare for deployment. The “strategic plan” for the removal of the German fleet from Tsingtao was already being hammered out by the next day. The army also had begun preparing its own battle plans. From 4 August, the entire navy had already begun concrete preparations for fighting the Germans in Tsingtao. Preparations for the Second Fleet were completed along with those for the expeditionary force on the tenth day of that month. The request from Britain came when these preparations were already underway. It is, therefore, clear that Japan's entry into the war was not simply a result of the British request.
The army, the navy, the bureaucracy of the Foreign Ministry and powerful politicians were all as eager to join the fight with Germany as the Foreign Minister. Leading politicians from the older generation and elderly statesmen (genro) were more cautious, but this proved to be more of an exception. It was the hope of the Foreign Minister and those that agreed with him that by chasing Germany out of China Japan would be able to establish hegemony over the Far East, strengthen its cooperative relationship with China, and furthermore, be able to improve its international standing by maneuvering to be one of the victor naitions after the war. Japan was given a concrete excuse for participating a war in Europe with the appearance of the British request. It is said that the Foreign Minister at that time tried to keep the genro out of the decision process. However, what was more important than anything for him was not the elimination of the genro from this process but to enter the war as quickly as possible.
Until now, opposition voiced by part of the navy has been cited as evidence of the entire navy's reluctance to joining the war. However, it is not possible to understand the events after 2 August through that kind of interpretation. Furthermore, since the navy were busying themselves with plans forestablishing a central headquarters, it is difficult to say that Japan's entry in the war was a passive event. Although there was some disagreement among the genro and part of the navy, the Japanese-German war in Tsingtao was a war that was unanimously advocated by the cabinet and that was voluntarily started with the same purposes, ambitions and plans as any other war. The war did not happen because of coincidental request from a foreign government; the Japanese government was able to make use of the British request to further its own aims. Even if the Tsingtao war had not occurred, there can be little doubt that Japan would have taken on Germany at some point given Japan's intentions.

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This essay is based on the diary kept by General Suzuki Teiichi (1888- ) from September 27,1933 until August 29,1934. At the time Lieutenant colonel Suzuki (promoted to colonel in December 1933) served as the chief of the press section of the Army until March of 1934 when he resigned to become secretary of the research department of the Army Staff College, Suzuki was close to General Araki Sadao who was the Army Minister until January of 1934. Thereafter, Suzuki became one of the important members of the Kodo-ha which was centered around General Araki. This essay uses the informatibn from Suzuki's diary to analyze four important topics involving the army during the 1933-1934 period. First, we have looked at the different army factions which became politically influential after the Manchurian Incident. In particular, we have examined the process by which the anti-Ugaki party headed by Generals Araki, Mazaki, Hayashi divided into the Kodo-ha and the Tosei-ha after General Araki's resignation in 1934. Secondly, we have examined Suzuki's relationship to those in the inner circle around Genro Saionji, in particular Harada Kumao, Kido Koichi, and Konoye Fumimaro. The third topic covered in this essay involves the relationship between the army and the cabinet. Finally, we have closely examined and analyzed the role of the chief of the Army press section. By using this diary, we have been able to examine the inner structure of the army as well as analyze some of the actions involving high army officers during this crucial 1933-1934 period.

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The Minseito cabinet under Hamaguchi came to government in April 1929. Hamaguchi appointed Shidehara as foreign minister and Inoue Junnosuke as finance minister. Hamaguchi carried on the 'internationalist' policy of Shidehara and at the same time he adapted the domestic policy such as lifting the embargo on gold and arranging a rationalization of industry. Hamaguchi started with combining industries and organizing unions. He was making the Japanese economy competitive enough in the international market through mechanization and expansion of productivity. He was trying to seek for an international policy of 'sound finance' by reintroducing the gold standard and was activating Japanese industrialists' trades and business in China. He supported the Japanese economic expansion in China in order to realize the development of domestic industries, the stability and improvement of the people's life. Hamaguchi favored disarmament and took an action over the London naval treaty. The Sumistu-in was against his idea, but he controlled it by force because he had a great support from the public and the Elder Statesman, Prince Saionji. Hamaguchi's purpose at that time was to cut military expenditures and to take on the leadership over internationalism. His vision collapsed after the Wall Street crash of autumn 1929. Hamaguchi was assassinated on the platform at Tokyo railway station in 1930. He recovered to resume his position as prime minister but died the following year.

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本稿は「産米増殖計画」期(1920〜34年)における朝鮮殖産銀行(以下,殖銀と略記)の資金運用(朝鮮農業金融)と資金調達(日本植民地投資)の実証的検討をもとに,同行への大蔵省預金部による資金供給の意義を再検討することを課題とする。殖銀は1918年に農工銀行6行が合併して設立された特殊銀行であり,債券(殖産債)を発行して貸出原資を調達し,朝鮮内銀行貸付の過半を担った。その融資先構成では「産米増殖計画」関連の農業金融が中心で,無担保・長期の水利組合融資の比重が高かった。「産米増殖計画」は1926年に改められ,事業資金として預金部低利資金の供給が決まる。ただし実際には計画外の,昭和恐慌下で破綻に瀕した水利組合の救済により多く充当され,これにより殖銀は多額の債権の不良化を回避することができた。殖銀にとって預金部資金の供給は救済的な意義を持っていたのであった。またこれは同時に殖銀の資金源泉であった地方金融機関や財閥系金融機関,都市銀行,生保,個人投資家などの投資家層が,殖産債への投資リスクを肩代わりされたことを意味したと言える。

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This article studies the number of military officers among Imperial Diet members and their influence in prewar Japan. The first half explores the number of officer MPs on the basis of biographical dictionaries edited by the House of Representatives and the House of Councilors. The author finds that 1) their number was not very large, except during World War II ; 2) their number among members of the House of Representatives increased after the fourteenth general election (1920) ; 3) many generals and admirals were made barons after the Russo-Japanese War, and some of these were elected as a member of the House of Peers. The second half of the article analyzes the activities of officer MPs after the year 1920. They did share common interests with the military authorities as servicemen ; however, a conflict of interest arose between ex-servicemen and active-servicemen. Therefore, they were not always loyal supporters of the military authorities. In conclusion, officer MPs had considerable influence as military specialists, representatives of ex-servicemen and supporters of the military authorities in the Diet despite their position as a minority. It was often the case that they were detrimental to parliamentary government due to their anti-liberal and anti-party government tendencies.

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In this note the author attempts to classify the 44 Japanese Cabinets in the pre-war period from the first one headed by Ito Hirobumi to the Higashikuni Government of August-October 1945, according to the prime minister's military position. His conclusions may be summarized as follows. Japanese pre-war Cabinets can be classified into two categories. One is headed by a general or an admiral of the Army and Navy and the other is not. The former may be called 'Military Prime Minister Cabinet' (MPMC), and the latter a 'Civilian Prime Minister Cabinet'. Of the pre-war 44 Cabinets, 20 were MPMC's. The MPMC can also be divided into two sub-categories. In type A the prime minister was on active duty in the Army or Navy. In type B he was in the reserves or retired. According to an edict on army and navy officer position and service decreed in 1888, officers appointed to the civil service must have been discharged from military service. However, if the Emperor ordered or permitted by the special decree, a civil servant could remain in military active service. Type A is further divided into 'Yamagata Style', 'War and Surrender Cabinet' and 'Other'. The First and Second Yamagata, the First and Second Katsura, the First Yamamoto, the Terauchi and the Kato Tomosaburo Cabinets are all of the 'Yamagata Style'. The Tojo arid the first half of the Higashikuni Cabinets form the 'War and Surrender Cabinet Style'. 'Other' includes the first half of Kuroda Cabinet (before the prolamation of the 1888 edict). Type B contains 4 sub-groups. The first is 'Katsura-Tanaka Style' (a party cabinet but its Premier was a military general). The Third Katsura and the Tanaka Giichi Cabinets belong to this subgroup. The second is 'Elder Admiral Prime Minister Cabinet' consisting of the Second Yamamoto, the Saito, the Okada and the Suzuki Kantaro Cabinets. The third is 'Army Reserve General Prime Minister Cabinet' which includes the Hayashi, the Abe and the Koiso Cabinets. The Yonai and the latter half of Kuroda and the Higashikuni Cabinets can't be put into any group mentioned above, and therefore should be thought of as exceptions. Using the chronological distribution of the MPMC as an index, a new periodization scheme can be introduced into Japanese cabinet history. The first period is from the First Ito to the First Okuma Cabinet, during which the MPMC form is rarely seen. Its time share is below 25%. The second is from the Second Yamagata to the second Yamamoto Cabinet. In this period the MPMC, especially type A dominated the others. Its time share is 55.0% (type B's is 2.3%). It may be called 'the Age of Type A' or 'the Age of Yamagata Style'. The third is from the Kiyoura to the Inukai Cabinet. The MPMC's time share decreased to 26.0% during this interval. This period overlaps 'the Time of Party Government'. The last is from the Saito to the Higashikuni Cabinet. The MPMC is again dominant. The time share of type A is 21.1% and that of type B is 45.3%. Therefore it may be called 'the Age of Type B'.

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