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　This paper summarizes the evolution and background of the European Union’s （EU） Free Trade Agreement （FTA） strategy, which focuses on economic objectives, since October 2016 when the EU published its “Global Europe” strategy. It also considers the substantive impact of the Lisbon Treaty on the EU’s trade agreements, the current status of the outcomes of the EU’s FTA strategy by setting targets and introducing an effective monitoring mechanism, and the role of the European Commission, particularly in trade. As a result, the analysis clarifies the following points.

　First, when the Lisbon Treaty entered force in December 2009, the EU’s exclusive competence extended to the trade of services, trade aspects of intellectual property rights, and foreign direct investment. However, the mechanism to pursue economic effects is currently limited to traditional trade-related tariff-saving effects. The topic of the negotiations of the EU-wide investment protection agreements is still being explored. On the other hand, having the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement （EPA） enter into force as a non-mixed agreement is a new step from the perspective of EU integration.

　Second, to promote economic gains through the FTA strategy, the EU established trade-related KPIs and created a mechanism for monitoring progress through annual activity reports and FTA implementation reports. However, cooperation from partner countries is indispensable, such as by collecting data on preferential tariff utilization rates by FTAs. This data exchange provision was introduced with the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement （CETA） with Canada, and the EU is forming a mechanism by which future agreements will reflect the improvements discovered to date. In addition, the accumulation of expertise in the European Commission contributed greatly to the creation of this mechanism.

　Third, this mechanism has progressed, and the EU-Korea FTA is regarded as the “first sample” of “new generation FTA,” and certain effects, such as tariff reduction, have been confirmed five years after the provisional application started. However, FTAs for which the negotiations began after the Global Europe Strategy did not achieve satisfactory outcomes in line with their initial goals, except the EU-Korea FTA. It is not yet possible to confirm the effects of the CETA and the EU-Japan EPA.

　Based on the discussion above, I believe that I was able to show that the EU adopted a target-management type evaluation method in its recent FTA strategy and clarified its policy of pursuing more economic effects using this method.

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目的：小児肥満が深刻な青森県下北地域において，下北ブランド研究所では，母親と子が健康意識を大きく変えなくても小児肥満を予防できる食環境の整備を目的とした健康中食のマーケティングを実施した．本稿ではPDCAサイクルを用いた評価内容を示した．

事業／活動内容（PLAN・DO）：保育園保護者へのインタビュー（n＝11）や質問紙調査（n＝441）等から，当地域では親子向け健康中食の市場創出機会ありと判断した（推定市場規模6,200万円）．ターゲットを「中食の摂取頻度が高く，子にヘルシー中食を食べさせたいと考える母親」，ポジショニングを「親しみ」と「手軽さ」と設定した．保育園給食メニューを中心に5品を発売した．

事業／活動評価（CHECK）：業者は健康中食を安定的に製造せず，ターゲット層の利用は推定市場規模の0.1％で，当地域での小児肥満予防に与える影響は極めて限定的であったと推測された．消費者ニーズがあったにもかかわらず業者を製造へと動かせなかった原因を「業者の心理を十分考慮しないまま戦略設計し，業者に事業の魅力が伝わらなかったため」と分析した．

今後の課題（ACT）：改善策として，業者と消費者が直接対話できる場を設定した．この策はナッジ（強制を伴わずに行動を促す仕組みやシグナル）によるものであり，業者は健康中食への愛着が高まり，製造へと一歩踏み出すことが期待される．

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我が国では国産農産物は輸入品より「安全・安心」であるとの見方が根強い．しかし，安全性が国産品の品質優位な状況を確立するのか否かを検証した分析は見当たらない．本稿ではWTO/SPS協定を考慮しつつ，二国間貿易モデルにより安全性と品質競争力の関係を検証した．理論的な余剰分析からは，輸入国が科学的根拠に基づき食品安全に関する措置を変更する場合，総余剰最大化の観点から，輸入品について国産品と同水準の主観的安全性を確保する必要があることがわかった．日米間のBSE事案からも主観的安全性の平準化の傾向を確認できる．こうした状況は，安全性は国産品の品質競争力を確立する要因にはならないことを示唆している．

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Stance on Genetically Modified Organisms (“GMOs”) differs from country to country.
Divergences in safety standards, labeling regulations and other policies may even lead to international disputes.
In the late 90s, cultivation of GMOs commenced in the United States, and importation to Japan also started.
The Japanese government was tolerant on GMOs at this time.
Accordingly, safety examinations were optional and labeling was said to be unnecessary.
However, with the revision on the regulations in 2001, the Japanese government changed course to take a relatively strict position.
Safety examinations became mandatory, and to some extent, obligations were borne to label products as GMOs.
The U.S. government and food manufacturers were opposed to these strengthened regulations, but the consumer groups welcomed it.
Nevertheless, neither allegation was fully reflected in the policy - the assertions by the advocacy groups were adopted in the overall outline of the policy, whereby the claims of the opposing groups were incorporated in the details.
How, then, was such a policy decided?
In this article, I take the perspective that the process of policy-making on this issue was a difficult choice under the influence of the other countries'policies, especially the U.S., on one hand, and on the other hand, responding to internal oppositions led by the consumer groups at the same time.
Here, the decision made by the government was required to be allegedly “appropriate.”
The elements necessary to support the “appropriateness” was scientific justification and civic justice.
Initially, the U.S. policy was adopted as I mentioned on the grounds of scientific justification, but once the issue of GMOs was linked to the consumers'rights of choice, the process to strengthen regulations became determinative backed up by civic justice as support.
However, in case of deciding the detailed rules on labeling, the discussions centered around the limits on detection during monitoring which led the decision to relax the rules based on scientific judgment.
The background of why the U.S. policy was not adopted in Japan in the end was affected by sifting the point of dispute, that is to say, from scientific one to personal right's.
In many environmental problems, it is extremely difficult to offer scientific justification and civic justice at the same time.
Studies on the process of such conflict are essential to consider contemporary environmental politics.

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The purpose of this paper is to clarify the basic character and structure of that the international negotiation and trade rules on "Food Safety issue". In this paper, we focus on "safety of US-beef" in eminent agricultural exporting country United Sates of America in the world. Chapter 1 shows that define of "Political Economy approach", and that problem establishment of this paper. Section 2 shows that reviewing about the relation between "Food Safety issue" and globalization. In terms of trade and "Food Safety issues", The SPS (Sanitary and Phytosanitary) measures are so important that its have an influence on risk related to food safety and ecological safety. Section 3, we consider the characteristic of international negotiation and trade rules on "Food Safety issue". In this section, we examine about "the Japan-U.S.BSE negotiation". Section 4 shows that structure and character of the WTO trade rule (especially SPS agreement). And, as the case study of trade rule of WTO, we examine "the U.S.-EU growth hormone beef case". Lastly, in section 5 shows that opinion of Jagdish Bhagwati as Neo-Classical international economist, his policy recommendation for trade and food safety issues is labeling. We describe that some critique against this policy recommendation. And we conclude this paper and point out some additional study subject. The main conclusions in this paper about international trade negotiation/rule and "Food safety issue" are the following four points. 1. To set an analysis framework from "Political Economy approach". 2. Explicit understanding of structure that interaction between "Food Safety issue" and the WTO regime. 3. Having confirmed a position of the U.S. Government, which gave priority to trade promotion over food safety security from "the Japan-U.S.BSE negotiation" and "the U.S.-EU growth hormone beef case". 4. To point out that "Non- neutrality" of the decision of the international rule about the trade and "Food Safety issue", and that the "fluctuation" of WTO.

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The number of food trade disputes is increasing as countries are enforcing more stringent food safety measures. Since the WTO started in 1995, many of the traditional trade barriers such as tariff have been abolished. Instead, other protection regulations, such as non-tariff barriers, are increasing and becoming much complex. Now it is questioned whether food safety improvement is compatible with food trade expanding. This study examines two food trade disputes over beef safety under the WTO: the EU ban on U.S. hormone beef and the Japan-U.S. conflict over BSE beef. The paper analyzes the arguments and resolution process of the two cases and identifies problems of the system ensuring food safety improvement is compatible with food trade expanding. Findings suggest that classification of the causes and the resolution process of food safety-related trade dispute, analysis of the role & characteristics of SPS agreement, highlighting the arguments of the Beef Hormones dispute through scrutinizing the WTO dispute panel & Appellate Body reports along with the arguments and process of the Japan-US dispute over BSE beef in relation to the SPS agreement & OIE code, and clarifying remaining or unsolved problems in the WTO from the viewpoint of food safety and food trade are key.

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In the process of the end of the Cold War, President George H. W. Bush announced that the United States, as a “European power,” would maintain significant military forces in Europe as long as its allies desire U.S. presence as part of a common security effort. This image of the U.S. at the Cold War’s demise might contradict its classical self-image in the context of U.S.-European relations. Traditionally, the U.S. took measures to avoid power politics on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. This paper explores why the U.S. decided to engage in the future of Europe, revealing its image as a “European power.” To this aim, first, this paper classifies theories of U.S. foreign policy into four types: 1) primacy, 2) isolationism, 3) offshore balancing, and 4) selective engagement. Furthermore, it examines as a case study the Bush administration’s foreign policy toward Europe on the basis of declassified primary materials located at the Presidential Library in Texas, memoirs by the former officials, and secondary sources. In this section, the way the U.S. managed the “German Question” at that time in collaboration with neighboring countries including the Soviet Union will be investigated. From 1989 to 1990, many in Europe were concerned about the scenario that the unified Germany became militarily and economically powerful, followed by a European imbalance of power. In this context, many neighbors in Europe, including the Soviet Union, welcomed U.S. military presence in the future of Europe as a “stabilizer.”

This story provides us with an answer to the question why the U.S. redefined its self-image as a “European power” at the ending of the Cold War. The Bush administration followed the cooperative principle in both areas of the bilateral U.S.-Soviet relationships and the Western alliance. The I-I.S. tried to treat the exhausted Soviets as still “superpower” to avoid political crisis that would lead to subversion of the Gorbachev-Ied Soviets regime. In terms of Atlantic relations, the U.S. always sought its strong leadership within the alliance to strengthen the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) solidarity at the time of turbulence. President Bush and his national security advisor Brent Scowcroft recognized that the drastic development in Europe would lead to European imbalance of power as shared by many countries in the continent. To avoid this scenario, the U.S. adamantly denied the return to isolationism, and as a “stabilizer” in new European order, it decided to continue to maintain significant military forces. U.S. military presence never retreated offshore.

In sum, when Germany unified and Europe transformed, the U.S. employed the strategy of selective engagement in new European order. The reason the U.S. redefined itself as a “European power” is to show the denial of isolationism and the continuation of stationing significant military forces to manage the European balance of power in the post-Cold war era.

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Disciplines on fisheries subsidies have been discussed continuously even after the breakdown (2008) of WTO Doha Round. Specially after USA participated in all TPP fields, TPP has been paid hot attention all through the world. Recently lots of states have made attempt to create new international trade rules through the formation and accumulation of Free Trade Agreements (FTA) and/or Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA). TPP consisted of 12 states since Japan participated in TPP in 2013 has occupied approximately 40% economic scale in the world. That's why TPP could be a symbol of FTA and/or EPA. TPP is trying to create a new policy including ambitious non-trade concerns such as an independent chapter 'Environment.' It contains disciplines on fisheries subsidies. This article aims to examine the significance of disciplines on fisheries subsidies in the draft chapter 'Environment' referring to confidential but partially revealed information relating to TPP. "Whether such provisions could take the opportunity to proliferate at the whole international level" will be examined. In addition, what a kind of paradigm shift is emerging in the context that disciplines on fisheries subsidies have been continuously argued and negotiated among states will be explored.

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平成10年度の国内醤油生産量は, 最盛期よりほぼ10万キロ少ない約110万キロリットルと言われる。平成10年度の研究業績を見ると, 醤油そのものに対する研究業績の数は, 生産量と同様に減少傾向を示し, 残念ながら, 目を見張るような成果は数少ない。しかし, 困難な時代にこそ, 画期的, かつ創造的な研究開発が実るものである。醸造産業界のためにも, 醤油研究の一層の発展を願ってやまない。

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