The year 1983 was called a “decisive year” by the Western European mass media. This was because, in that year, public opinion in Europe was split over the acceptance of U. S. Intermediate Nuclear Force missiles.
Antinuclear rallies that drew more than 100, 000 demonstrators in various parts of Europe created a phenomenon aptly named the “hot autumn”.
After five years, the peace movement in Europe has become tranquil. There are voices that oppose the decision of the United States and the Soviet Union to eliminate all of their INF missiles.
What has brought about such a major change? Has Europe itself changed? This paper aims to explore the answers to these questions. It will discuss the controversies over nuclear weapons that occurred at the time in Great Britain, and the results of public opinion surveys that were conducted then in that country.
The paper focuses on the unilateral discussion to abolish nuclear forces, which constituted a major force in the debate of the “decisive year”. I have chosen to do so because I believe that therein lies the key to the understanding of Europe's nuclear umbrella mentality, and to some of the misinterpretations and errors that occurred at that time in evaluating the events of 1983.
The paper will not focus on the nuclear arguments of the left and the right wings, as they are obvious, but instead it will delve into how these arguments of the supporting bodies of the peace movement unfolded inside each organization, and how they were eventually appeased under their individual power structures.
These organizations are: 1) the CND (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament); 2) the Labour Party; and 3) the Anglican Church.
The paper is not merely a reevaluation of the incidents of the past 1983, as I believe they continue to affect the current minds of the British citizenry.
I will suggest that the controversies that developed within the CND and the Anglican Church will continue to demand attention.
The 1982 schism in the CND was considered to be owing to the activities of the Trotskyists. If so, have those militants disappeared suddenly after the “hot autumn”?
Were not these people—who are not professional Labourites, much less professional Tories, and who could perhaps best be called the non-politiques—the main creators of the “Geldof Phenomenon”, having sympathized with and supported the Band Aid and the Sports Aid of Bob Geldof, who stood up for the relief of the African refugees after the INF missiles were deployed in Europe?

抄録全体を表示

This article attempts to examine the present situation of the strategic nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. The analysis starts with the SALT I agreement signed in May 1972, because it is this agreement that provided with the framework of the ongoing U. S. -Soviet arms race.
First, section 1 examines the significance of the SALT I agreement, which fixed the number of ICBM and SLBM launchers. In so doing, special attention will be given to how the agreement relates to the concept of “assured destruction.” Then, we look at the fact that the Soviet efforts to modernize its strategic nuclear forces by deploying MIRV-ed heavy missiles within the ceiling of SALT I led to the signing of the SALT II agreement; it was signed in July 1979 and set quantitative limits on MIRV-ed ICBM's.
Next, section 2 analyzes the evolution of the U. S. strategic theories from Robert S. MacNamara's “flexible response strategy” to Richard Nixon's “realistic deterrence strategy”; each of them proposed the way to utilize MIRV-ed delivery systems in practice, the focal point of the U. S. -Soviet nuclear arms race in the 1970s. The close examination of each year's Report of the Secretary of Defense published during the 1970s will reveal how the United States gradually revised its strategic doctrine to adjust it to the new MIRV technology. First it introduced the concept of “strategic sufficiency, ” then “targeting system, ” and lastly completed its doctrinal revision by adopting “countervailing strategy.”
Finally, section 3, taking up the concept of “damage limitation, ” another major element in SALT I, shows what ideas brought about the agreement restricting the deployment of ABM's. Based upon this analysis, we also discuss the implication of President Ronald Reagan's initiative, i. e., the SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) program.

抄録全体を表示

Russia, perceiving the U.S. political actions in Eastern Europe as threats to its vital interests there, developed the concept of ‘Strategic Deterrence.’ According to Russia’s ‘Military Doctrine’ of 2014, this concept means countering non-military and military threats to Russia’s interests by non-military, conventional, and nuclear means. Nuclear weapons can serve three purposes within this concept: ultimate means, conflict localization means, and narrative offensive means. Russia officially shows its readiness to use strategic nuclear forces as ultimate means to counter conventional threats to the existence of the state, and to develop conventional forces for local conflicts. When Russian officials mention the use of nuclear weapons, it serves as a narrative offensive means, which they expect will incite fear among the adversaries’ populations and weaken their united will to confront Russia, and thus fulfill the role of a non-military means of the ‘Strategic Deterrence’ framework. Russian military might think of what I call ‘conflict localization means’ in this paper, popularly known as an ‘escalate to de-escalate’ doctrine, a posture of using nuclear weapons to persuade adversaries to cease further military actions in a local conflict. ‘Military Doctrine’ of 2014 and other factors show little evidence of the existence of such a posture, but do not necessarily exclude the possibility. Partly to enhance a nuclear ‘narrative offensive,’ the possibility of use of nuclear weapons as a conflict localization means is made deliberately ambiguous. The Russian military did officially seek to realize the conflict localization means in the 2003 reform document, and debates on this matter continue. The ‘Grom-2019’ military exercise in October 2019 showed a possibility of forming a unified command and control not only of strategic nuclear forces but also of local-level weapons such as Kalibr and Iskander cruise missile systems with nuclear warheads. The issues of the nuclear threshold and strategic stability will depend on further development of forces and doctrines of Russia and the United States.

抄録全体を表示

The nuclear umbrella of the United States has provided to Japan 1) deterrence against nuclear attack and 2) deterrence against non-nuclear attack by the Soviet Union since 1945. The question now arises whether the umbrella is still as effective against non-nuclear attack as in the past, mainly because the Soviets have achieved parity with the U. S. in strategic nuclear forces.
The system of nuclear umbrella includes 1) the U. S. nuclear forces, 2) conventional forces of the allies (protege of the U. S. nuclear umbrella) and 3) the reliable interdependance between the U. S. and the allies.
The nuclear umbrella of the U. S. has been extended to Western Europe and the Far East, including Japan, South Korea and the Philippines since the U. S. forces have been stationed in these three countries.
Observing the post-INF era after 1991, the situation of Far East is basically different from that of Western Europe as far as the credibility of nuclear umbrella is concerned. That is mainly because there has been no INF deployed on the ground of the Far East countries. We have no urgent task in the Far East countries like in NATO which now faces in compensating the abolishing INF system with modernization of battle ground nuclear weapons.
What we face in the Far East countries are 1) to cope with the constant build-up of the Soviet forces in Asia-Pacific Ocean area in both theatre nuclear forces and conventional forces and 2) to cope with the Soviet proposal to inspect all SLCMs (not only nuclear SLCMs but also conventional SLCMs) in the current U. S. -Soviet disarmament negotiation, which affects the U. S. nuclear policy (“Not Affirm, Not Deny” of the nuclear presence) and the non-nuclear policy of Japan and other Asian countries—a problem of the reliable interdependance.
To discuss the U. S. nuclear umbrella and Japan's role to keep deterrence effective in the future, we can use two scenarios.
One is a near-future scenario, in which we see an appropriate mix of nuclear forces and non-nuclear forces like in NATO to keep nuclear umbrella effective as a deterrence. What is neccessary in this scenario are:
a. Keeping the U. S. nuclear umbrella effective—mainly to deter the Soviet nuclear attack,
b. Ensuring and strengthening of the Japan's conventional forces—mainly to deter the Soviet conventional attack,
c. Strengthening Japan's defense sharing-1, 000 miles sea lane defense and air defense on the ocean,
d. Keeping the U. S. forces stationed in Japan safely,
e. Increasing Japan's ODA to the strategic countries, and
f. Reviewing Japan's Three Non-nuclear principles where neccessary—to accept the U. S. ships and aircrafts with nuclear weapons entering Japanese water and airport and to allow prior consultation on the deployment of the U. S. nuclear weapons in case of neccessity with the U. S.
The other scenario is for the 21st Century, in which we see more emphasis on high technology conventional weapons than nuclear weapons as a deterrence. In the 21st Century, we will see the still constant “relative decline” of the U. S. power and the still remarkable uprise of Japan's economic power. What is neccessary in this scenario are:
a. Still keeping the U. S. nuclear umbrella effective, but the role is relatively dimishing,
b. Enlarging dramatically Japan's role as mentioned above in b., c. d. and e.,
c. Seeing the motives of Japan's three non-nuclear principles diminishing as the role of nuclear weapons is diminishing, but we must allow consultation on such subject as the introduction of the long-range conventional high technology weapons on Japanese territory, where neccessary, and
d. Growing neccessity of development and deployment of the conventional high technology weapons as a deterrence.

抄録全体を表示