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  • 平川 幸子
    アジア研究
    2008年 54 巻 1 号 95-99
    発行日: 2008/01/31
    公開日: 2014/09/15
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 佐藤 宏, Norimichi Narita, Chikayoshi Nomura, Yu Sasaki, Kyoko Matsukawa, Kazuyo Sakaki, Nabin Aryal, Kazuyo Minamide
    南アジア研究
    2005年 2005 巻 17 号 250-257
    発行日: 2005/12/26
    公開日: 2011/03/16
    ジャーナル フリー
  • ―日ソ間昆布採取協定と高碕達之助―
    村上 友章
    国際政治
    2012年 2012 巻 170 号 170_93-170_108
    発行日: 2012/10/25
    公開日: 2014/10/26
    ジャーナル フリー
    The Soviet Union invaded the Kuril Islands after the end of the Pacific War and Russian border guards had often apprehended Japanese fishing boats on the sea around these islands for the invasion of “Soviet territorial waters”. These numerous incidents by Russian authorities in capturing Japanese fishing boats and their crews seriously damaged the livelihood of the Japanese fishermen involved. They continued to demand the Japanese government to secure the safety of fishing on the sea especially around the Habomai and the Shikotan islands. In June 1963, a part of their earnest wish was realized. The Japan Fisheries Association concluded a private agreement with the Soviet government. This agreement allows seaweed harvesting by the Japanese fishermen in a small area within “Soviet territorial waters”. This article will examine the negotiation process of this agreement.
    It took a long time since the restoration of diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union in 1956 to reach the agreement because it involved an intractable territorial dispute over a Russian-held chain of islands. The Soviet Union proposed to Japan to conclude a Peace Treaty in which Japan world accept to have only two of the islands (Habomai and Shikotan) returned as part of the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration. However, the government of Japan could not accept this condition and asked the Soviet Union to return not just the two islands but also Kunashiri and Etorofu. Therefore, in order to secure the safety of the Japanese fishermen on the sea, either the Soviets would drop the condition, or Japan would accept the proposal and conclude a Peace Treaty with such provisions. However, both countries exhibited an uncompromising attitude to each other. In addition, many Japanese were indifferent to this local problem.
    The individual who resolved this difficult problem was the Chairman of Japan Fisheries Association Takasaki Tatsunosuke. He was a famous conservative political leader known for his contribution in signing a private trade agreement with the People’s Republic of China in 1962. When he participated in the Japan-Soviet Negotiations on Fishery, he personally tried to lead both countries to conclude a Japan-Soviet Peace Treaty by making Russia recognize “residual sovereignty” of Kunashiri and Etorofu and return Habomai and Shikotan. However, the Soviets took a stern approach toward the government of Japan because of the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The government of Japan was not sympathetic to his initiative either. Hence, Takasaki decided to adopt a stopgap measure and sought to conclude a private agreement with the Soviet government in order to avoid the territorial issues. His proposal succeeded in gaining concessions from both countries and in securing the safety of the Japanese fishermen in the given small area. But as a result, ironically, the stability of the Japan-Soviet relations reduced the need for a Peace Treaty and Takasaki’s “residual sovereignty” plan.
  • 日本外交史研究 日中関係の展開
    川崎 一郎
    国際政治
    1961年 1961 巻 15 号 134-149
    発行日: 1961/03/25
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 地学雑誌
    1923年 35 巻 3 号 182
    発行日: 1923/03/15
    公開日: 2010/12/22
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 金子 芳樹
    アジア研究
    2014年 59 巻 1.2 号 1
    発行日: 2014/07/31
    公開日: 2014/08/07
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 岩下 明裕
    ロシア史研究
    2007年 80 巻 45-59
    発行日: 2007/05/15
    公開日: 2017/07/25
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper focuses on the Soviet attitude towards border delimitation between the Soviet Union and Japan before/during negotiations on normalizing relations after WWII. The so-called "four island" issue, e.g. Japan's strong territorial claims on Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and Habomai islets, was then not mentioned. The name of "northern territory" was given to the four islands in the 1960s only after the Soviet Union and Japan failed to sign the peace treaty. The normalization process between the Soviet Union and Japan in the 1950s presents the essential items for academic inquiry: Did the Soviet leadership have an option to return the four islands to Japan? Why did Nikiita Khrushchev suddenly propose to hand back the two islands, Shikotan and Habomai, to Japan during the London negotiations in 1955? Was there really a possibility that Japan would accept the two island proposal and sign the peace treaty? Why did the Soviet Union and Japan finally agree to sign the joint declaration in October of 1956 as proof of normalization and put a clause onto the declaration that stated the two islands would be transferred to Japan after the peace treaty was signed? Russian President Vladimir Putin has renewed Khrushchev's early position. Many hints for breaking the deadlock over the "northern territorial" disputes between the Soviet Union/Russia and Japan are furnished there.
  • 日本外交の非正式チャンネル
    植木 安弘
    国際政治
    1983年 1983 巻 75 号 81-97,L10
    発行日: 1983/10/20
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Postwar Japanese diplomatic negotiations with the Soviet Union have involved informal contact-makers in certain significant ways. Their roles and functions, however, have changed over time. Two major diplomatic negotiations involving the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries in the mid-1950s and the continuing territorial dispute in the 1960s and the early 1970s are examined to illustrate the case in point.
    The initial contacts to start negotiations on normalizing bilateral relations were made through informal channels. Fujita Kazuo, a journalist, and Majima Kan, the chief administrator of the National Conference to Restore Diplomatic Relations with China and the Soviet Union, became instrumental in the successful Soviet bid to open a direct communication link with Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichiro (1954-1956) at quite the displeasure of the Japanese Foreign Ministry. Once the formal negotiations set off, informal channels were, nonetheless, still utilized, but this time at the highest negotiating levels and mostly by Japan.
    Hatoyama's visit to Moscow in October 1956 culminated in the Joint Declaration to establish diplomatic relations but the territorial issue was left unresolved. Subsequently. Japan made repeated efforts in vain to break through the deadlock, including the informal diplomatic maneuvers in the 1960s and Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei's tête-à-tête negotiations with the Soviet leadership in Moscow in 1973. The Soviet Union used non-diplomatic channels to probe Japanese thinking and in turn to convey to Japan some of its own thinking on outstanding issues. The maneuverability of informal contact-makers, however, narrowed in the 1970s as both the Japanese and the Soviet negotiating positions on the territorial dispute hardened.
    Several other factors restricted the use of informal contact-makers as back channels of negotiations in the 1970s. The Foreign Ministry took the view that the ultimate resolution of the territorial issue squarely rested with the political judgment of the highest Soviet leadership. The hierarchical and closed structure of Soviet foreign policy-making also limited the maneuverability of Japanese informal contact-makers. The Foreign Ministry did not favor using politicians and other prominent individuals with political clout as emissaries, nor did it favor seeing individuals without official credentials approaching Moscow. This stemmed in part from the Ministry's belief in conducting a unified foreign policy, and in part from the Ministry's elitism in handling foreign relations. It was distrustful of Japanese who with unofficial capacity would volunteer to seek contacts with the Communist power.
  • 志鳥 學修
    国際政治
    1995年 1995 巻 108 号 200
    発行日: 1995/03/20
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 地学雑誌
    1912年 24 巻 11 号 801
    発行日: 1912/11/15
    公開日: 2010/12/22
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 日韓関係の展開
    木村 修三
    国際政治
    1963年 1963 巻 22 号 110-127,L7
    発行日: 1963/07/25
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Korea, whose independence was promised by the Allied Powers during World War II., witnessed the division of the country into two as a result of American-Soviet disagreement. Moreover, in 1948, each section took necessary steps for independence while the country remained disunited.
    Japan formally recognized Korea's independence when the Peace Treaty became effective. She had, however, acknowledged the existence of independent Korea even before the Peace Treaty was concluded. Furthermore, the Japanese Government was ready to accept the government of the Republic of Korea as the legitimate regime in Korea in view of American wishes and the resolution adopted by the Third General Assembly of the United Nations. Subsequently, as soon as the Peace Treaty was signed in 1951, the government of Japan entered into negotiations with the Korean Government on various problems which would arise when the treaty became effective.
    The talks, however, brought about no result, and without any agreements between the two governments, the Peace Treaty went into effect. Since then, six sessions of intermittent talks were held between the two governments during the past eleven years. There are many reasons for the prolongation of the talks. These include, emotionalism among the peoples of Japan and Korea, as well as the extreme anti-Japanese sentiment which prevailed in Korea during the Rhee administration. Concrete causes for the failure, however, have been, among others, the questions of property settlement and fishery in which the fundamental differences of opinion of both parties have been evident.
    The ROK government regarded the question of property as vital, and maintained the attitude that without the settlement of this issue other problems existing between Japan and Korea would remain unsolved. In the face of such a stiff argument of the ROK government, the Japanese Government made significant concessions on two occasions. The first was the withdrawal of the six-year old Japanese demand, in late 1957, for compensation for the property previously owned by the Japanese nationals in Korea. The second concession involved Japan's modification regarding her demand for property compensation based on legal principle. The new Foreign Minister Ohira hoped to settle this issue on the basis of political expediency rather than on legal basis. These concessions brought about a basic agreement regarding the property question which had been one of the greatest obstacles in the talks. This being accomplished, hopes for the conclusion of talks brightened.
    Be that as it may, the future of the talks seems to depend on the degree of the concessions by the ROK government on the question of fishery (the removal of the Rhee Line) which the Japanese Government consider important.
  • ロシア・東欧学会年報
    2000年 2000 巻 29 号 145-165
    発行日: 2000年
    公開日: 2010/05/31
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 坂元 茂樹
    九州法学会会報
    1989年 1988 巻
    発行日: 1989/09/30
    公開日: 2017/08/17
    会議録・要旨集 フリー
  • 神藤 浩明
    社会科学研究
    2016年 67 巻 1 号 5-23
    発行日: 2016/02/25
    公開日: 2021/02/09
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス
  • 井出 翕
    ドクメンテーション研究
    1971年 21 巻 6 号 201-202
    発行日: 1971/06/01
    公開日: 2017/10/26
    解説誌・一般情報誌 フリー
  • 日本占領の多角的研究
    宮里 政玄
    国際政治
    1987年 1987 巻 85 号 133-150,L14
    発行日: 1987/05/23
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    While the Japanese Peace Treaty of 1951 has been analyzed extensively, the Administrative Agreement of 1952 governing the status of U. S. forces stationed in Japan following the Peace Treaty has not been so adequately analyzed, perhaps due to the relative lack of primary sources. In recent years, however, U. S. documents, in which some important Japanese documents are included, have been released. The purpose of this article is to analyze the making of the Agreement by using these U. S. documents, thus filling the missing chapter in Japan-U. S. relations. The article focuses on interactions among U.S. officials rather than on bilateral interactions, though it does briefly analyze them whenever sufficient materials are available.
    Part 1 traces the process of drafting the first U. S. draft by analyzing NSC 60/1 (September 8, 1950), impact of the Korean War, and the Dulles Mission's visit to Tokyo in early 1951. Part 2 deals with interactions among U. S. officials, particularly among the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the State Department, which led to the final draft presented to Japan in early 1952 as the basis of negotiation. The issues analyzed rather extensively are articles on criminal jurisdiction, areas and facilities, and the joint U. S. -Japan command. Part 3 analyzes the bilateral negotiations in Tokyo in early 1952, but it limits its analyses to the joint command issue, not only because it was the only article that was revised due to persistent Japanese requests, but also because the two other important articles (criminal jurisdiction, and areas and facilities) have been adequately analyzed by Kumao Nishimura who, as a member of the Japanese negotiating team, participated in the negotiation.
    Major findings are: 1) an often disputed proposition in the bureaucratic politics model that “stands depend on positions” seems largely relevant in this case, of particular interest in this respect being the stands taken by CINCFE in Tokyo, who was responsible for defending Japan from external attack, thus demanding the maintaining of the status quo, but was also compelled to honor Japan's integrity as a sovereign nation; and 2) the major articles mentioned above were outcomes of much bargaining among U. S. officials, which resulted in compromises in which none was fully satisfied; and 3) the fact that the article on the joint command was revised in the Tokyo negotiations was due largely to Dean Rusk's strenuous and skillful coalition-building both in Tokyo and Washington as well as skillful negotiation on the part of the Japanese.
  • 溝口 修平
    国際政治
    2014年 2014 巻 176 号 176_111-176_125
    発行日: 2014/03/31
    公開日: 2015/10/20
    ジャーナル フリー
    After Ichiro Hatoyama became Japan’s Prime Minister in December 1954, Japan and the Soviet Union began a series of negotiations to reach a peace treaty. The most difficult issue to be resolved was the territorial problem. As the two countries could not reach a final agreement on this issue, they left it unresolved and instead of signing a peace treaty, signed a Joint Declaration in October 1956.
    This article reevaluates the shift of the United States policy toward these negotiations. Previous studies have made it clear that the role of the United States was significant in the negotiations and that although it had kept to a “non-involvement” policy at first, eventually it intervened in Japan’s decision-making process in the final stage. With regard to the interpretation of this policy shift, however, there is a divergence of views: some argue that the United States came to give full support to Japan, but others conclude that while it did give strong support to Japan, it avoided adopting any clear stance on Japan’s claim that “the Kurile Islands,” which Japan renounced in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, does not include the two disputed islands, Etorofu and Kunashiri. How can we construe the essence of the United States policy shift?
    Based on the research at the National Archives at College Park, this article concludes the following three things. First, it is appropriate to interpret the policy shift as the latter. In September 1956, the United States government presented the Japanese counterpart with an aide-memoire, in which the United States stated clearly that the four disputed islands “should in justice be acknowledged as under Japanese sovereignty.” This was a strong political support to Japan, but the United States did not say anything about the definition of the Kurile Islands. The second argument here is that this US position was consistent throughout the Japan-Soviet negotiations. Though preceding studies tend to stress the aspect of the policy change, there was also continuity in the US policy to the effect that the United States government supported Japan in a political sense, but avoided any statement on the legal problems. Finally, this continuity resulted from the dilemma of the interest structure which the United States had in the Cold War era. In this period, there were two essential national interests of the United States in Asia, that is, the preservation of the San Francisco Peace Treaty regime and the maintenance of Japan-US alliance. But these interests were difficult to keep at the same time, and would be damaged by any change of the status quo in East Asia through the Japan-Soviet negotiations. Thus, the United States had to keep its policy, just because it had almost no other choices.
  • 国際政治のなかの沖縄
    新崎 盛暉
    国際政治
    1999年 1999 巻 120 号 109-119,L12
    発行日: 1999/02/25
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Japan's postwar security policy has developed as a derivative of US global strategy, and has served to complement that strategy. Okinawa has served as the military foundation of that policy. The San Francisco Preace Treaty was influenced by events on the Korean peninsula. Moreover, in April 1952, the US-Japan alliance was concluded, and the US military viewed Okinawa as the “cornerstone” of its Pacific strategy. Not only did Okinawa occupy a geographical vantage point for the US to oversee East Asia, but it also provided the means for linking the US with its military allies in the region.
    The anti-base movement in Okinawa began to advocate a “return to Japan and its peace constitution” before the San Fracisco Peace Treaty was concluded. After the Treaty was ratified in April 1952, US military authorities in Okinawa clearly viewed the anti-base movement as a tool of international communism, and sought to repress it. But the “shimagurumi toso” (the island-wide protest) against US policy towards expropriated land in Okinawa in the 1950s reinvigorated the anti-base movement, and led to the formation in 1960 of the Council on the Reversion of Okinawa Prefecture to Japan. The anti-base movement in Okinawa intensified with US militaly intervention in Vietnam in 1965, and Okinawan activists joined others around the globe in protest of US strategy. Faced not only with domestic protest but also with a global anti-Vietnam war movement, the US found it increasingly difficult to execise powar over Okinawa.
    The reversion of Okinawa negotiated by the US and Japanese governments, however, was seen as a means of reorganizing and strengthening the US-Japan military alliance. The Japanese government used the 1972 reversion of Okinawa to consolidate US military bases. During the 1970s' US military bases on the main Japanese islands were reduced by one-third, but the US bases on Okinawa went virtually untouched. Today, the concentration of 75% of US military forces stationed in Japan on Okinawa, which has only 0.06% of Japan's total land area, is the result of an international policy of transferring the burden of these bases to Okinawa.
    Again, in the 1990s' the anti-base movement in Okinawa that emerged after the rape issue in the fall of 1995, was a direct challenge to US and Japanese government efforts to redefine the US-Japan alliance. By redefining the alliance, the US aimed to ensure Japan's support, as a subordinate military partner, in a strategy of joint global hegemony. Japan's military cooperation and rear-area support for US military actions in the vicinity of Japan, and the strengthening and consolidation of US bases on Okinawa, was required.
    The 1990s anti-base movement in Okinawa has provided the opportunity for greater cooperation between the Okinawa and Korean anti-base movements. New avenues of cooperation are possible. The peaceful unification of North and South Korea would be extremely advantageous for the reduction and withdrawal of US military bases in Okinawa and Korea. But, the call for the reduction and withdrawal of US military bases has yet to resound broadly among the public, and any real path towards peaceful coexistence on the Korean peninsula, and peace among the countries of Asia, will depend upon broad popular support.
  • 地理学評論
    1926年 2 巻 5 号 464-465
    発行日: 1926/05/01
    公開日: 2008/12/24
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 杉山 茂雄
    ロシア・東欧学会年報
    1998年 1998 巻 27 号 68-73
    発行日: 1998年
    公開日: 2010/05/31
    ジャーナル フリー
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