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  • 地学雑誌
    1912年 24 巻 11 号 801
    発行日: 1912/11/15
    公開日: 2010/12/22
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 外交史料館報
    2021年 34 巻 41-49
    発行日: 2021年
    公開日: 2021/10/15
    研究報告書・技術報告書 フリー
  • 波多野 澄雄, 井上 正也, 冨塚 一彦
    外交史料館報
    2021年 34 巻 25-40
    発行日: 2021年
    公開日: 2021/10/15
    研究報告書・技術報告書 フリー
  • 外交史料館報
    2012年 26 巻 137-153
    発行日: 2012年
    公開日: 2022/03/16
    研究報告書・技術報告書 フリー
  • 河野 康子
    外交史料館報
    2016年 29 巻 41-60
    発行日: 2016年
    公開日: 2021/11/17
    研究報告書・技術報告書 フリー
  • 平川 幸子
    アジア研究
    2008年 54 巻 1 号 95-99
    発行日: 2008/01/31
    公開日: 2014/09/15
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 編纂室
    外交史料館報
    2023年 36 巻 47-53
    発行日: 2023年
    公開日: 2023/07/20
    研究報告書・技術報告書 フリー
  • 佐藤 宏, Norimichi Narita, Chikayoshi Nomura, Yu Sasaki, Kyoko Matsukawa, Kazuyo Sakaki, Nabin Aryal, Kazuyo Minamide
    南アジア研究
    2005年 2005 巻 17 号 250-257
    発行日: 2005/12/26
    公開日: 2011/03/16
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 現物賠償、戦争賠償、ナチスの不法に対する補償
    編纂室
    外交史料館報
    2017年 30 巻 103-130
    発行日: 2017年
    公開日: 2021/11/01
    研究報告書・技術報告書 フリー
  • 特集 『日本外交文書』八〇年
    外交史料館報
    2017年 30 巻 19-24
    発行日: 2017年
    公開日: 2021/11/01
    研究報告書・技術報告書 フリー
  • ATOMEXPO-2019参加および発電所視察
    廣川 直機
    日本原子力学会誌ATOMOΣ
    2019年 61 巻 10 号 744-745
    発行日: 2019年
    公開日: 2020/04/02
    解説誌・一般情報誌 フリー

     2019年6月に大阪で開催されたG20の中で日露首脳会談が開かれ,

    平和条約
    締結へ向け長年の懸念材料である北方領土問題等の交渉加速を継続することで一致した。原子力分野では,チェルノブイリ原子力発電所の事故のイメージが強い一方で,輸出も含む建設ラッシュ/洋上原子力発電施設/原子力砕氷船の開発といった情報が聞こえてくる。知っているようで知らない隣国「ロシア」,その一端を紹介する。

  • ロシア・東欧学会年報
    2000年 2000 巻 29 号 145-165
    発行日: 2000年
    公開日: 2010/05/31
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 外交史料館報
    2020年 33 巻 151-179
    発行日: 2020年
    公開日: 2021/10/25
    研究報告書・技術報告書 フリー
  • 外交史料館報
    2022年 35 巻 168-179
    発行日: 2022年
    公開日: 2022/06/17
    研究報告書・技術報告書 フリー
  • ―日ソ間昆布採取協定と高碕達之助―
    村上 友章
    国際政治
    2012年 2012 巻 170 号 170_93-170_108
    発行日: 2012/10/25
    公開日: 2014/10/26
    ジャーナル フリー
    The Soviet Union invaded the Kuril Islands after the end of the Pacific War and Russian border guards had often apprehended Japanese fishing boats on the sea around these islands for the invasion of “Soviet territorial waters”. These numerous incidents by Russian authorities in capturing Japanese fishing boats and their crews seriously damaged the livelihood of the Japanese fishermen involved. They continued to demand the Japanese government to secure the safety of fishing on the sea especially around the Habomai and the Shikotan islands. In June 1963, a part of their earnest wish was realized. The Japan Fisheries Association concluded a private agreement with the Soviet government. This agreement allows seaweed harvesting by the Japanese fishermen in a small area within “Soviet territorial waters”. This article will examine the negotiation process of this agreement.
    It took a long time since the restoration of diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union in 1956 to reach the agreement because it involved an intractable territorial dispute over a Russian-held chain of islands. The Soviet Union proposed to Japan to conclude a Peace Treaty in which Japan world accept to have only two of the islands (Habomai and Shikotan) returned as part of the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration. However, the government of Japan could not accept this condition and asked the Soviet Union to return not just the two islands but also Kunashiri and Etorofu. Therefore, in order to secure the safety of the Japanese fishermen on the sea, either the Soviets would drop the condition, or Japan would accept the proposal and conclude a Peace Treaty with such provisions. However, both countries exhibited an uncompromising attitude to each other. In addition, many Japanese were indifferent to this local problem.
    The individual who resolved this difficult problem was the Chairman of Japan Fisheries Association Takasaki Tatsunosuke. He was a famous conservative political leader known for his contribution in signing a private trade agreement with the People’s Republic of China in 1962. When he participated in the Japan-Soviet Negotiations on Fishery, he personally tried to lead both countries to conclude a Japan-Soviet Peace Treaty by making Russia recognize “residual sovereignty” of Kunashiri and Etorofu and return Habomai and Shikotan. However, the Soviets took a stern approach toward the government of Japan because of the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The government of Japan was not sympathetic to his initiative either. Hence, Takasaki decided to adopt a stopgap measure and sought to conclude a private agreement with the Soviet government in order to avoid the territorial issues. His proposal succeeded in gaining concessions from both countries and in securing the safety of the Japanese fishermen in the given small area. But as a result, ironically, the stability of the Japan-Soviet relations reduced the need for a Peace Treaty and Takasaki’s “residual sovereignty” plan.
  • 西沢 保
    社会政策
    2020年 12 巻 2 号 19-31
    発行日: 2020/11/30
    公開日: 2022/11/30
    ジャーナル フリー

     100年前のパリの

    平和条約
    とILOの創設,恒久平和と社会的正義,国際労働保護法制への「後発国」日本の対応を検討する。
    平和条約
    の「第13編 労働」は,労働者の「wellbeingが至上の国際的重要性をもつ」という総力戦を踏まえた要請に沿う画期的なものであった。「労働者のマグナカルタ」といわれた労働9原則・労働保護法制を福田徳三はいち早く日本に紹介した。

     この労働憲章を決めたパリの国際労働法制委員会と日本の代表(岡実ら),後進国日本へのインパクト,国際労働会議への日本の労働代表選出問題,そして治安警察法第17条と労働組合法案,労働問題・労働行政の農商務省から内務省社会局への移管,河合栄治郎の「官を辞するに際して」「社会政策の分岐点」等を検討し,あわせて福田徳三の国際労働問題への関わりも含め,これらの営為の後世への遺産を考察したい。

  • 大八木 豪
    アメリカ研究
    2016年 50 巻 107-127
    発行日: 2016/03/25
    公開日: 2021/10/26
    ジャーナル フリー

    This article investigates how Asian Americans in the San Francisco Bay Area began forming a movement in the 1990s and early 2000s that demanded the Japanese government to issue an apology and reparations to the victims of the war crimes committed by the Japanese military in the 1930s and 1940s.

    In the early 1990s, protesting the Japanese government’s revision of history textbooks and some Japanese leader’s denial of the Nanjing Massacre, Chinese Americans in the San Francisco Bay Area began commemorative events for victims of Japan’s invasion of China in the 1930s and 1940s. These activities of collective remembrance led to the formation of an organrzation called the Alliance for Preserving the Truth of the Sino-Japanese War. As its name straightforwardly indicates, the organrzation aimed to excavate, maintain, and educate “the truth” of the Japanese invasion in China, while another goal was to demand that the Japanese government issue an apology and reparations to the victims. The members who had experienced or whose parents experienced the atrocities committed by the Japanese military during the war actively engaged in public education and support of academic research, and created a global network among organizations with the same goals by forming the Global Alliance for Preserving the History of World War II in Asia in 1994.

    The organization’s endeavors for public education bore fruit in the political arena when a conference by the Global Alliance for Preserving the History of World War II in Asia inspired California State Assembly member Mike Honda to introduce Assembly Joint Resolution (AJR 27), which urged the Japanese government to formally issue an apology and reparations to the victims of the war crimes. Honda, a Sensei who experienced the Japanese American internment during World War II, explained that based on the success of the Japanese American redress movement he had learned that an apology and reparations would heal victims’ wounds. He also emphasized the significance of this process of healing to the Asian American community in his district, which was divided by divergent memories of the war. Similarly locating AJR 27 within the history of Asian American activism, such as the Asian American movement and the Japanese American redress movement, other members of the community, including those who formed the “Rape of Nanking” Redress Committee (RNRC), supported Honda and his resolution. AJR 27 was passed in both California State Assembly and Senate in 1999.

    Formed by Japanese Americans and Chinese Americans and emphasizing its Asian American panethnicity, the RNRC not only demanded the Japanese government to issue an apology and reparations to the victims of the war crimes, but also criticized U.S. foreign policy for blocking the demand toward the Japanese government based on the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Its criticism was clearly articulated when it organrzed with the Asian American studies program at the University of California, Berkeley a counter-conference against the commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the treaty supported by both the Japanese and U.S. governments in 2001. Whereas Foreign Minister Makiko Tanaka and Secretary of State Collin Powell celebrated the treaty for providing peace and prosperity in Japan and the Pacific alike, the participants at the conference posed an opposite view that the treaty had harmed international relations in the region. In addition, they demanded that the Japanese government issue an apology and reparations to the victims and the U.S. government to stop supporting the peace treaty.

    Thus, Asian American in the San Francisco Bay Area advanced a movement to demand the Japanese government to issue an apology and reparations for war crime victims by placing their endeavors in the tradition of Asian American activism and developing a panethnic Asian American identity.

  • 日本外交の非正式チャンネル
    植木 安弘
    国際政治
    1983年 1983 巻 75 号 81-97,L10
    発行日: 1983/10/20
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Postwar Japanese diplomatic negotiations with the Soviet Union have involved informal contact-makers in certain significant ways. Their roles and functions, however, have changed over time. Two major diplomatic negotiations involving the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries in the mid-1950s and the continuing territorial dispute in the 1960s and the early 1970s are examined to illustrate the case in point.
    The initial contacts to start negotiations on normalizing bilateral relations were made through informal channels. Fujita Kazuo, a journalist, and Majima Kan, the chief administrator of the National Conference to Restore Diplomatic Relations with China and the Soviet Union, became instrumental in the successful Soviet bid to open a direct communication link with Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichiro (1954-1956) at quite the displeasure of the Japanese Foreign Ministry. Once the formal negotiations set off, informal channels were, nonetheless, still utilized, but this time at the highest negotiating levels and mostly by Japan.
    Hatoyama's visit to Moscow in October 1956 culminated in the Joint Declaration to establish diplomatic relations but the territorial issue was left unresolved. Subsequently. Japan made repeated efforts in vain to break through the deadlock, including the informal diplomatic maneuvers in the 1960s and Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei's tête-à-tête negotiations with the Soviet leadership in Moscow in 1973. The Soviet Union used non-diplomatic channels to probe Japanese thinking and in turn to convey to Japan some of its own thinking on outstanding issues. The maneuverability of informal contact-makers, however, narrowed in the 1970s as both the Japanese and the Soviet negotiating positions on the territorial dispute hardened.
    Several other factors restricted the use of informal contact-makers as back channels of negotiations in the 1970s. The Foreign Ministry took the view that the ultimate resolution of the territorial issue squarely rested with the political judgment of the highest Soviet leadership. The hierarchical and closed structure of Soviet foreign policy-making also limited the maneuverability of Japanese informal contact-makers. The Foreign Ministry did not favor using politicians and other prominent individuals with political clout as emissaries, nor did it favor seeing individuals without official credentials approaching Moscow. This stemmed in part from the Ministry's belief in conducting a unified foreign policy, and in part from the Ministry's elitism in handling foreign relations. It was distrustful of Japanese who with unofficial capacity would volunteer to seek contacts with the Communist power.
  • 有木 宗一郎
    ソ連・東欧学会年報
    1982年 1982 巻 11 号 72-79
    発行日: 1982年
    公開日: 2010/03/16
    ジャーナル フリー
  • ――ソ連による日米安保の「受容」――
    岡田 美保
    国際政治
    2020年 2020 巻 200 号 200_84-200_100
    発行日: 2020/03/31
    公開日: 2020/04/16
    ジャーナル フリー

    In the pre-negotiation stage, the most difficult obstacle to start the Japan-Soviet normalization negotiation turned out to be the issue of the Japan-US Security Treaty. While Japan regarded it as the most fundamental framework to realize its security, the Soviet Union did not change its position that the Treaty was an obstacle to start Japan-Soviet negotiations. This article investigates what kinds of discussions were held within the political leadership of the Soviet Union on the positioning of the Japan-US Security Treaty in the process of normalization with Japan. An analysis of declassified Soviet archival documents reveals the following five points. First, the Korean War changed the Soviet Union’s perception of the threat posed by the US forces stationed in Japan, and the role of the Kuril Islands in their defense policy changed accordingly. Second, as for the issue of peace with Japan, the division in the Soviet Union’s political leadership after Stalin’s death was most evident in the question of whether or not to accept the Japan-US Security Treaty. Third, the Soviet Union entered into negotiations with differences in opinion on this point. Fourth, after the start of negotiations, the political leadership of the Soviet Union, headed by Khrushchev, overturned Foreign Minister Molotov’s negotiating stance of not accepting the Japan-US Security Treaty, and made a decision to “accept” it under certain conditions. Fifth, the Soviets’ proposal on transferring Habomais and Shikotan islands to Japan was closely related with their decision to “accept” the Japan-US Security Treaty.

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