Russia, perceiving the U.S. political actions in Eastern Europe as threats to its vital interests there, developed the concept of ‘Strategic Deterrence.’ According to Russia’s ‘Military Doctrine’ of 2014, this concept means countering non-military and military threats to Russia’s interests by non-military, conventional, and nuclear means. Nuclear weapons can serve three purposes within this concept: ultimate means, conflict localization means, and narrative offensive means. Russia officially shows its readiness to use strategic nuclear forces as ultimate means to counter conventional threats to the existence of the state, and to develop conventional forces for local conflicts. When Russian officials mention the use of nuclear weapons, it serves as a narrative offensive means, which they expect will incite fear among the adversaries’ populations and weaken their united will to confront Russia, and thus fulfill the role of a non-military means of the ‘Strategic Deterrence’ framework. Russian military might think of what I call ‘conflict localization means’ in this paper, popularly known as an ‘escalate to de-escalate’ doctrine, a posture of using nuclear weapons to persuade adversaries to cease further military actions in a local conflict. ‘Military Doctrine’ of 2014 and other factors show little evidence of the existence of such a posture, but do not necessarily exclude the possibility. Partly to enhance a nuclear ‘narrative offensive,’ the possibility of use of nuclear weapons as a conflict localization means is made deliberately ambiguous. The Russian military did officially seek to realize the conflict localization means in the 2003 reform document, and debates on this matter continue. The ‘Grom-2019’ military exercise in October 2019 showed a possibility of forming a unified command and control not only of strategic nuclear forces but also of local-level weapons such as Kalibr and Iskander cruise missile systems with nuclear warheads. The issues of the nuclear threshold and strategic stability will depend on further development of forces and doctrines of Russia and the United States.

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Nuclear deterrence, the foundation of peace since the end of the Second World War, has now entered into a period of transition. As US-Soviet strategic nuclear forces reached “essential equivalence, ” the strategy of Assured Destruction began to be questioned. Doubts about the efficacy of this strategy produced the concept of a limited nuclear war strategy, as can be seen in the search for flexible options and the advocacy of “discriminate deterrence, ” and of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which emphasizes strategic defense. The US and the Soviet Union both continue their arms race, both in terms of quantity and quality. Yet, in December 1988, the two superpowers signed the treaty to abolish Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF). Furthermore, the US and the Soviet Union continue to negotiate to reduce their strategic forces by half. Both countries have place a brake on increasing their nuclear forces, and it is possible that they will be able to go a step further and reduce these arsenals. Arms control policy has also entered a period of transition.
Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) was seen as a rational strategy in the 1960s. However, since the early 1970s, those responsible for US security policy began to entertain doubts regarding MAD. Moreover, the increase in Soviet military activism in the Third World only increased American suspicion. In 1974, the US Secretary for Defense, James Schlesinger, began to revise the MAD strategy, and since then, both the Carter and Reagan Administrations have subscribed to a “countervailing strategy, ” and have undertaken the modernization of American strategic nuclear forces.
The Soviet Union, even after it achieved parity with the US, continued to increase its nuclear forces. However, based on General-Secretary Gorbachev's “reasonable sufficiency” concept, the Soviet are moving away from an “offense-oriented” strategy and toward a “defense-oriented” strategy. It would appear also that the Soviets are moving away from their strategy of fighting and winning a nuclear war.
If the strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction can no longer be relied upon, what type of strategy will break the stalemate of nuclear deterrence? President Reagan has proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). However, many people have expressed their doubts about the technology, the cost, and the military strategy of SDI. Furthermore, confusion on Western strategy exists within the alliance. The Treaty to abolish INF has both surprised and confused the countries of NATO, which have relied on nuclear deterrence throughout the postwar period. Arguments exist in Europe for the modernization of nuclear forces as well as for the denuclearization of Europe, and the debate is very confused.
Arguments about the future of nuclear strategy can be divided into three views. First, there is the view that a strategy based on MAD will be unavoidable in this century, and therefore we should return to MAD. The second view argues that MAD, based upon the murder of masses of people, is immoral, and therefore we should pursue and promote the SDI. And, a third view sees deterrence based on nuclear weapons as dangerous, and advocates a departure from nuclear deterrence. It is unclear which direction the US and the Soviet Union will choose in addressing strategic issues.
What we need is deterrence against war. In the foreseeable future, it is unlikely that we will find an effective method of maintaining the peace other than nuclear deterrence. But, we need stable deterrence. The Western countries need to find a balance between an effective strategy and arms control. It is irresponsible to simply reduce nuclear forces without paying attention to strategic concerns. However, excessively increasing nuclear forces only provoke the other side, and it is destabilizing. What we need to do now is to construct a new conception of deterrence stability.

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The INF elimination Treaty signed by Reagan and Gorbachev on December 8, 1987 is a clear success in securing Soviet agreement to the NATO's arms control goals, such as the global zero of ‘deep cut’ and the intrusive verification measure of ‘on-site inspection, ’ which the SALT Treaties markedly failed to achieve in the 1970's. However, this Treaty has generated a good deal of confusion and unease in the West. The imbalance of conventional forces in Europe, which favors the Soviet Union, could become more dangerous if the West's nuclear deterrent is weakened. Radical nuclear arms reductions could be harmful to Western security.
This article aims to clarify the central thesis of whether arms control can be compatible with nuclear deterrence and Western security. It is a thesis that even the most thoughtful arms control theorists have so far failed to analyze in the postwar period.
First, any degree of denuclearization of Europe not tied to a redress of the Soviet conventional/chemical superiority will not make Europe safe for conventional/chemical warfare. At the same time, to implement the INF Treaty is to lose the only means of making a “Eurostrategic nuclear war (theater limited nuclear war in Europe), ” which could leave the USSR open to attack, but would give sanctuary to the USA, and which might dissuade most effectively the Soviet Union's decision of waging war upon NATO.
Second, the INF Treaty serves to decouple the U. S. strategic deterrent from Europe's defense, and creates phychologically an atmosphere among the American people to support the withdrawal of the American troops from Europe. Third, it would become the first step on the ‘slippery slope’ to the denuclearization of Europe, which will lead to neutralization of Europe. This is one of the ultimate goals pursued by the Soviets. Movement towards denuclearization also undermines the important principle of sharing the nuclear burden and risks within Alliance.
It is not unreasonable to conclude that the theoretical deficiency of arms control concepts, combined with related and false militico-strategic concepts, necessarily contradicts the end of national security and contributes to a worsening of the existing security situation. There are several reasons and causes.
The marked false strategic doctrine formulates a nuclear deterrence rationale to prevent an all-out or accidental nuclear war with the Soviet Union, divorcing from its original and right objectives to deter the Soviets from starting to invade with any type of weapons. Another deficiency is derived from the official U. S. persistence in believing in the erroneous theory of ‘nuclear equilibrium at a lower level, ’ which decreases proportionally the gross amount of destruction by the projected nuclear weapons and therefore the credibility of nuclear deterrence. The U. S. has not awakened to the danger caused by a radical cut of their own ‘nuclear deterrent’ in pursuit of a weakening of the Soviet ‘nuclear counter-deterrent’.
Especially, the U. S. does not recognize the geographical advantage of the central location in the Eurasian Continent which offers the Soviet state absolute safety and permits a multiplicity of applied pressures around the periphery. That is to say, the only retaliatory way to resist the unchangeable desire of the heartland power for the achievement of hegemony is to sustain a robust and superior nuclear capability, because only nuclear weapons can definitely give decisively destructive damages to the central or valuable part of the Soviet mainland.

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