The aim of this article is to investigate the early 20^<th> century London Major Clearing Banks' international liquidity management; to estimate their profits; and to clarify the position of the rentier-state's overseas business in banking management at the height of the British Empire. C. Goodhart, the most influential scholar on this topic, 'emphasized the banks' overriding concern for liquidity, with their concentration of the short end of the London (international) money market'. Over the past few decades, a number of studies including "Rentner-staat' Imperialism', 'Condemnation of Banks' lending policy against British industry', and 'Gentlemanly Capitalism' have supported his position. The assumption was widely accepted that, though based in industrial districts, the British Major Banks preferred international managements in the London money market to domestic lending to industrial companies and the liquidity problems that resulted. However, few attempts have been made to research the actual scale and feasures of the Clearing Banks' operations or the ratio of their profits to aggregate profits in banking. These are, however, essential to judge the extent to which the London Major Banks depended on international managements in the London money market relative to domestic industrial finance. The following are the results of an analysis of the banking business based on the internal records of the top three pre-WWI banks in the U.K., Westminster Bank, Midland Bank, and Lloyds Bank, with an especial focus on Lloyds, the largest and the one with its origins in an industrial district. First, during the years of greatest overseas investment (1908-1913), the highest ratio of overseas investment to total bank assets was only 5-6%, and the figure decreased year by year. Second, the Banks did not make large-scale purchases or sales of overseas investments. Third, they underwrote only a tiny amount of overseas investment and earned little commission from it. Fourth, the real ratio of international managements in liquid assets to total Bank assets was only about 17 percent. Finally, the ratio of profits earned from international managements on liquid assets to total gross Bank profits was only about 20-30 percent. These facts suggest that, contrary to conventional views, major banks kept overseas investments and other international managements of liquid assets at a certain distance even in the golden age of overseas investment.

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It was in the early 1960s that South Korean economic development got fully underway. Since that time, the Korean economy has been developed under strict government control. Under a succession of export-driven economic development plans, the Korean government selected specific industries that seemed to have strong growth potential, and allocated scarce capital to those industries. As a result of this economic policy, many small-to-medium sized companies had serious difficulties raising necessary capital and they had no choice but to depend on the informal credit market to solve the problem of capital shortage. The Korean informal credit market enjoyed rapid growth due to the strong and steady demand. The role of suppliers of capital to this market was played by a few men of property, the so-called KUNSON, a Korean term of signifying rich people. The Korean informal credit market has continued to meet capital demand not only from small-to-medium sized enterprises but also from individuals, providing various financial services such as asset-backed loans and credit loans. In conclusion, the Korean informal credit market has adjusted itself to the fast changing Korean economic environment and has played several important roles such as supplying information and capital to small and medium-sized companies. The informal credit market thus functions as a complementary market to the established Korean financial institutions.

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From the mid-1880s into the 1890s the machine reeling industry in Suwa (Nagano Prefecture) overwhelmed the hand reeling method used in Kozuke (Gumma Prefecture) and began the formation of silk thread mass production there. This period may therefore be called the era of silk industrial capital formation. It goes without saying that finance played an important part in this achievement, but we have yet to see any analysis of the dynamic relationship between the rise of silk capital and how it was financed. In the present paper the author attempts to rescue the research from the realm of static analysis carried out around the concept of "policy-generated finance" and study the dynamics of silk financing during this period centering around the economic depression of 1890, outline how it evolved from there, and view the interrelationship between finance and capital accumulation in Japan's silk industry. Silk finance, which was rapidly accelerating the industry's growth and capital accumulation despite overall low capital accumulation, required comprehensive integration of the production and distribution systems, from "original principal" (money for cocoon purchase) funding to advances on bills of exchange from silk reelers. However, the granting of credit which formed the basis for the provision of "original principal" based on accommodation bill discounting could not at the onset be handled by the existing silk financial institutions alone, and was thus carried out through tie-ups with Yokohama Specie Bank, urban and rural banks and outlet whole-salers, all centered around the Bank of Japan re-discounting. Under expanded credit from the Bank of Japan a system for linking together silk financial institutions was formed. However, given that credit expanded through policy decisions is directly determined by the business cycle, economically depressed conditions give rise to recurring, potentially destructive credit contraction. Therefore, silk finance had to display a business cycle inclusive capacity to adjust, given credit control via the Bank of Japan re-discounting practices ; and to display such a capacity, it was necessary for the system integrating silk financial institutions under Bank of Japan credit to function properly. A production/distribution integrating, business cycle-inclusive, comprehensive system for silk finance developed in three stages. The first stage, occurring between 1887 and 1893 (and including the panic of 1890) was marked by the formation of the system around the Bank of Japan and Yokohama Specie Bank, as well as structural changes in Yokohama financial markets. The second stage, occurring between 1894 and 1900, was marked by an expansion of the system under the leadership of the Bank of Japan and Yokohama Specie Bank, with large amounts of "original principal" provided by the Bank of Japan. The third and final stage, occurring after the panic of 1900, was marked by a move away from the Bank of Japan "original principal" funding and growing independence of the system, despite the need for "relief" loans under the Bank of Japan re-discounting during the panic. In other words, the system increased its independence from 1901 on the basis of the Bank of Japan credit. In this way silk industry finance continued to expand emphasizing "original principal" while the credit created by growing silk financial institutions was employed in greater and greater amounts for capital accumulation in the silk industry. At the same time, credit expansion and contraction effects increased under the Bank of Japan credit. As far as silk industry capital as a whole is concerned, the gradual establishment and development of a production/distribution integrating, business cycle inclusive, comprehensive silk finance system brought about the gradual realization of an environment that accelerated capital accumulation in the industry.

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In the 1890s, the Bank of Japan played an important role in providing funds to the silk industry, the cotton mill industry, the foreign trade sector, etc., and accelerated the growth of these important industries. With the establishment of the gold standard, however, such a positive lending policy became difficult. The purpose of this paper is to elucidate how the lending policy changed in 1900-1901 under the Japanese gold standard. Particularly, it focuses on the policy directed by Korekiyo Takahashi, who was the Vice-Governor of the Bank at that time, and clarifies the difference between his policy and monetary policy carried out under the classical gold standard by Governor Tatsuo Yamamoto. The main points of Takahashi's were as follows: (1) He tried to balance trade deficit not by an increase in the official discount rate, but by an export promotion. Therefore, he tried to strengthen the export industries through aiding customers of the Bank to provide them with funds. (2) In order to do this, he adopted a managerial technique of deposit bank, and attempted to change long-term and rigid loans of the Bank into short-term and liquid ones. He succeeded in it to a considerable extent, so that he made the turnover of funds of the Bank quicker. (3) Moreover, not only did he systematize that policy in the Bank, but he demanded that customers of the Bank, that is, major commercial banks, should follow it. Thus, the change in lending policy had an important influence on managerial technique of her customers, and promoted the reorganization of financial institutions.

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The Bank of Japan (BOJ) established 26 branches from its foundation in 1882 to 1945. The purpose of this paper is to consider how the BOJ located these branches, and how these branches affected the local monetary economy in their districts. In this paper, I examine these problems through a case study of the Matsuyama branch office, established in Matsuyama, Ehime Prefecture in 1932. According to one popular theory, it is said that the BOJ played the role of industrial financier for strategic sectors in the era of the industrial revolution, and that in the inter-war period the BOJ faced financial instability and played the role of "Lender of Last Resort" (LLR) for the maintenance of orderly credit conditions. These functions of the BOJ were carried out by the local branches. These branches were, so to speak, the "channel of BOJ credit" in the local monetary economy. This paper carries out its analysis from two points of view, that of the local economy and that of the BOJ. They are both stakeholders in branch establishment. In Matsuyama in 1919 business leaders (bankers and industrialists) began to make representations to the BOJ and the Ministry of Finance against the background of credit requirements in the "WWI Boom". However, after WWI, a crisis occurred in 1920. With this as a turning point, and against the background of the financial instability of the 1920's, their requirements changed from industrial finance to need for an LLR. Further, the BOJ began to realize the necessity of having branches in certain areas. In 1927, the Imabari Shougyou Bank and other banks in Ehime were attacked in a bank run and were closed. The Gojyuni Bank, the top bank of Ehime Prefecture, helped these banks, but could not help the Imabari Shougyou Bank. The BOJ acted as LLR for this bank and the bank run settled down. The BOJ realized the urgent need for a Matsuyama branch, and it was established in 1932 as the first new branch after the 1927 financial crisis. Though the Matsuyama branch was established and began business with local banks, money markets in the early 1930's were loose and local banks had little need of the BOJ as LLR. A few years later the Matsuyama branch played the role of negotiator of bank consolidation in war time.

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Der Verfasser hat sich bemuht, die Geschichte der Preuβischen Bankpolitik auf Grund der Materialien vom Staatsarchiv Koblenz und Dusseldorf im Zusammenhang mit der politischen und wirtschaftlichen Geschichte in Preuβens darzustellen. Als Voraussetzung hierzu hat er zunachst versucht, den Carakter des preuβischen staates zu zeigen. Er erblickt, daβ preuβischer Geldumlauf durch den Preuβischen Bank kraftig gefordert wurde, indem der Carakter als Vormund des preuβischen Staates die Errichtung der Privatbanken hemmte. Daher die Preuβischen Bank wurde ihrer Aufgabe voll und ganz gerecht, den Geldumlauf des Landes zu fordern sowie Handel und Gewerbe zu unterstutzen. Die Preuβische Bank sah sich als einziges Kapitalkraftiges Institut in der Lage, sowohl durch bedeutende Ausdehnung ihres Filialnetzes als infolgedessem durch Ansichziehen eines groβen Teiles der umlaufen Wechsel diese ihr zugewiesene Stellung zu befestigen. Preuβische Bank konnte also ihren Notenumlauf entsprechend der Zunahme ihrer Wechsel-und Lombardanlage vergroβern. Auf diese Weise unterstutzte Preuβische Bank Handel und Gewerbe. Das Ergebnis laβt darauf schlieβen, daβ in dem groβen historischen Prozess der Geschichte Deutschlands der preuβischer Staat als Vormund eine wichtige Rolle spielte.

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最近の木材需要の増大と共に,需給の不均衡,価格の上昇等による林業経済上の検討が種々なされているが,木材の動きと表裏関係にあり,且つ時には逆に価格,需給関係に影響を与える金融面についての資料は非常に少く,不明な点が多いと考えられる。従つて,これらの事情を把握することによつて,林業経済上の問題提起と解決策を見出されるものとの意図によつて取りまとめ中の概要について発表する。

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The purpose of this article is to examine why financial institutions for small businesses developed in the city of Osaka in the interwar period. In the period from the Showa financial crisis of 1927 to the great depression of 1929〜31, deposits and loans by ordinary banks decreased, but deposits and loans by savings banks, mujin [mutual financing] companies, and credit associations used by small businesses rapidly increased. The growth of these financial institutions was mainly supported by their characteristic ways of financing. Branches of Fudo Chokin Ginko [Fudo Savings Bank] and mujin companies made long-term and unsecured loans, although at rates of interest higher than those charged by ordinary banks. Credit associations made short-term loans without collateral, and discounted bills. Moreover, they provided funds for the wholesalers that played a principal role in the finances of small businesses. The diversity of users was also an important factor in the development of financial institutions specializing in small businesses. Even in the great depression, they were utilized not only by firms that needed funds to continue to trade, but also by businessmen who intended to expand, those who wanted to maintain accounts with ordinary banks, and those who sought more profitable ways of saving.

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The purpose of this article is to analyze the activities of the Bank of Japan as lender of last resort (LLR) in the 1920s. During the crisis of 1920 and the banking upheaval of 1922, the Bank of Japan faced an outflow of specie as a result of the rapidly worsening balance of trade, and therefore limited its relief financing. However, after the great Kanto earthquake of 1923 it embarked on large-scale relief financing, with government backing, in order to prevent a financial disaster. As a result, the market stagnated from an excess of currency. Since there was the additional issue of a possible return to the gold standard, when the 1927 crash occurred the Bank of Japan made retrenchment its priority and carried out more relief financing, particularly for the larger banks. In short, the Bank of Japan's activities as LLR in this period were regulated by the logic of the return to the gold standard.

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