The purpose of this paper is to consider what it is like to understand
the “other” politically and to make a political judgment. The “other” is
one of the central issues in contemporary philosophy, and there are quite
a few studies on it in educational research. Most of these studies focus
on a one-on-one relationship between the “other” and “I,” and argue that
such a relationship is an exemplary and fundamental one. Given that,
however, we confront others not only in a one-on-one situation but also
in a “web of relationships,” it is necessary to consider the issue of the
“other” as a political matter, that is, a matter of how such a “web” should
be and not what “I” am responsible to the “other” for.
This paper focuses on Hannah Arendt’s theory of judgment. That
is because her concept of “plurality” suggests a possibility of political
understanding of the “other.” According to Arendt, judgments become
political when we take into account opinions of “other people.” In
political judgment we represent their perspectives. Arendt names this
way of thinking “representative thinking.” In political judgment the
“other people” are those who are absent. Arendt’s theory of judgment
is based on her reading of Kant’s Kritik der Urteilskraft (Critique of
Judgment).
This paper addresses the following two questions: (1) How does
Arendt interpret Kant’s Critique of Judgment? (2) Who is the “other”
and who are the “absent people” in political judgment? In answering
the first question, this paper argues that there exists a tension in
Arendt’s theory of judgment between universalism and particularism. In
exploring the implications of that tension, this paper provides an answer
to the second question. It is the “external” who is the “other” in political
judgment. Having addressed these two questions, this paper reconsiders
the implications of the concept of “plurality” in Arendt’s thought.
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