On January 10, 1984, North Korea formally proposed a “tripartite conference” with the U. S. and South Korea. As typified by the “equal basis participation” of South Korea, the proposal is more flexible and realistic than ever. Implicitly, however, Pyongyang's proposal for “threeway talks” mainly aims at the attainment of talks with Washington. North Korea therefore might not have direct dialogues with the South without the attendance of the U. S.
South Korea, which harbors a strong suspicion about North Korea's intentions to solve the separation issue peacefully, soon rejected the proposal, whereas the U. S. did not oppose it straightforwardly. Considering this response by the U. S., together with the flexible posture towards North Korea in the past two years, we cannot deny the possibility that the Reagan Administration might eventually take up Pyongyang's proposal to bring some progress in the approach to detente on the Korean Peninsula.
North-South unification is of course the most significant Korean issue, but so far there is no probability that unification can be accelerated. For the time being, groping for some way to detente is the only thing that can be done. Fortunately, the “mechanism to deter increased tension” seems to have been rooted on the Korean Peninsula. Detente can hardly be attained soon, though, at least the risk of war on the Korean Peninsula has decreased considerably. This observation is proved firmly by the fact that the bombing incident in Rangoon in October, 1983, did not escalate into a big dispute. In addition, movement to “de facto cross-recognition” by big powers has become conspicuous recently.
As the situation changes like this, North Korea, which had been adopting a stubborn attitude, shows signs of flexibility. If North Korea continues to follow such policies, hope for detente on the Korean Peninsula may emerge in the late 1980s.

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“The end of the Cold War” could be paraphrased as “the revolution to U. S. -Soviet Joint Action” in regards to their policies towards the Korean Peninsula, recalling that the tragedy of the national division of Korea was brought about by the failure of “U. S. -Soviet Joint Action”. This meant the so-called “Cross Contact” in a situation where the enmity between North and South Korea transcended that between the U. S. and Soviet Union. The new international environment eventually resulted in the establishment of diplomatic ties between South Korea and Soviet Union. Accordingly, the comprehensive security framework in Asia and Pacific advocated by Gorbachev was largely localized, for Roh Tae-woo's initiatives for Nordpolitik were accompanied by proposals for an international conference regionally defined within Northeast Asia.
Roh Tae-woo's address before the U. N. General Assembly in 1988 signified an attempt to improve the inter-Korean relations. Roh, in his address, proposed to adopt a “nonaggression declaration” within “the framework of mutual trust and security”. For the declaration to have the effect of a formal nonaggression pact, the proposed framework would have to be defined in concrete measures.
In spite of Seoul's new initiative, however, there can be no real hope for advancing inter-Korean relations as long as North Korea sticks to the Tripartite Talks within which the North regards the talks between Pyongyang-Washington as the prerequisites for progress in unification issues. The policy speech made by Kim Il-sung in May 1990 was highly significant in that Pyongyang dropped its insistence on the Tripartite Talks.
Moreover, North Korea unveiled a disarmament proposal incorporating a number of measures for mutual confidence building. North Korea's plan was principally concerned with taking direct actions on the adoption of a nonaggression declaration and on phasing large-scale military cutback. But confidence-building measures, as South Korea is aware, are not intended to bring about automatic military cutbacks.
Although efforts to improve inter-Korean relations resulted in the commencement of High-level Talks, disparities remain unsolved even after the adoption of the comprehensive North-South accord. The actual accord, for example, endorsed Seoul's position emphasizing the implementation of confidence-building measures on the one hand, and endorses Pyongyangs' insistance on reducing armaments on the other.
The North-South accord provides a case where the European experience should be applied, localized though it may be, in that the accord has comprehensive contents as seen in the CSCE. North and South Korean are supposed to seek for a sort of bargaining with the main agenda moving within the framework.

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1990 will be the 45th anniversary of the North-South division of the Korean Peninsula. Since that division, the international environment surrounding this Peninsula and the relations between the United States and the two Koreas underwent a number of big changes. However, Americans always put the greatest emphasis on the “maintenance of security and stability in the Peninsula” in its policies towards the Peninsula. Washington devoted tremendous effort to preventing not only the recurrence of a war but also any North-South conflicts that might escalate into a war. On this premise, the United States constantly showed much interest in the political growth and economic development of the Republic of Korea (ROK). Although an attitude that can be regarded as “domestic interference” sometimes became conspicuous, Washington tried to get the chances to promote the “democratization” of ROK. The United States also contributed to the economic growth of ROK, as the largest donor of economic aid initially and as the greatest trading partner in recent years. It indirectly encouraged relational improvement between the North and South to pave the way for détente on the Korean Peninsula and, mainly from this point of view, paid a certain degree of attention to the improvement of its own relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).
The new Bush Administration started in the United States in 1989, but it should be taken for granted that no major changes will occur in the above basic policies towards Korea.
American concern about the internal politics of ROK is of course likely to continue, however, they will see more difficulties to exert strong influence on the South Korean government. The extent to which Washington's pressures will have an effect on ROK will be sharply declining in the years to come. The role that the United States played in the ROK's political change in June, 1987 was not so slight as one can neglect, yet its practical effect was still limited considerably. The “political maturity” of South Korea backed by economic growth has changed the “weak constitution” that was very sensitive to the influence of the United States. Washington appears to be welcoming this political development brought about by the remarkable economic growth of South Korea, however, it will continue to express its serious concerns about the democratization and human rights protection in ROK.
Since an atmosphere in which ROK is regarded as a “second Japan” is increasing in the economic sphere, Americans are expected to give hard pressures to South Korea continuously in asking for the opening of local markets or the correction of disequilibrium. It is almost certain that the United States will also urge South Korea to share more security burdens, based on an “appropriate evaluation” of the South's national power. At the entry of the 1990s, Washington will probably set forth an idea that only the ROK forces are sufficient for deterrence against North Korea and accordingly the withdrawal of US ground forces in South Korea would come to the fore again as a concrete political theme. At the same time an argument that ROK should play a more positive role in the security of Northeast Asia as “a member of the West” would strengthen on the part of the United States.
These economic and security demands on South Korea not only premise the stability and economic growth of the South but also necessitate the presevation of security and stability of the Korean Peninsula. From this viewpoint, too, the United States finds a significant interest in that the détente on the Korean Peninsula can be promoted by a progress of North-South relations. Therefore, Washington wishes more strongly than ever that ROK is going to take a “generous attitude” towards DPRK. On the other hand, it is unavoidable that Washington will basically

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戦後の公立学校では, 法的に「外国人」とされた在日朝鮮人の二世・三世に対し, どのような「問題」が見出されてきたのだろうか. 在日朝鮮人教育の運動・言説は, 1970年代以降全国的な発展を見せるが, そこでは「民族」としての人間形成を剝奪されているとされた児童生徒の意識やありようの「問題」 (教師が想定するところの民族性や民族的自覚の欠如) に専ら関心が注がれてきた. こうした教育言説をその起源へ遡ると, 1960年代までの日教組全国教研集会 (教研) での議論がその原型となっている.

1950年代後半から60年代の教研では, 在日朝鮮人教育への視角に大きな変容が生じた. その背景には帰国運動など一連の日朝友好運動と日本民族・国民教育運動の政治が存在していた. この時期の教育論には, 親や子どもの声に耳を傾け, 学校・地域での疎外, 進路差別, 貧困などの逆境に配慮し, その社会環境を問題化する教育保障の立場と, 学校外の政治運動が要請する課題と連動した, 民族・国民としての主体形成の欠落を問題化する立場が存在していた. 当初両者は並存関係にあったが, 上記の政治の影響下で60年代初頭には後者が圧倒的に優勢となった. その結果, 「日本人教師」が最も重視すべきは「同化」の問題とされ, 「日本人」とは本質的に異質な民族・国民としての意識・内実の “回復” を中核的な課題とする在日朝鮮人教育言説が成立した.

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