The ratification of the December 1965 Japan-South Korea Treaty established formal diplomatic relations between Tokyo and Seoul. In terms of diplomatic negotiation process, on the one hand, it did nothing more than confirm the relationship between Japan and the Korean Peninsula which was already in existence following the Korean War; on the orther hand, it also announced the birth of a new international system among three countries, Japan-US-South Korea. The conclusion of the Japan-South Korea treaty itself, was Japan's first diplomatic initiative since the end of war and the first act of Japan-US burden-sharing. However, it didn't deny the existence of another government in the Korean Peninsula i. e. North Korea nor did it put constraints on future relations with it. The Japanese leaders clearly limited the treaty's scope of application to the southern half of the Peninsula; subsequent relations with North Korea would be entrusted to the international situation in the future.
From that point of view, the 1972 U. S. detente with the Soviet Union and China, and the opening of the North-South Dialogue, brought a new perspective to Japan's relations with the Korean Peninsula. In fact, after Kissinger's July, 1971 China visit, in response to North Korea's invitation, Japanese-North Korean exchanges in the fields of sports, culture, and economy, rapidly developed. Furthermore, not only journalists, but also ruling and opposition Diet members began to visit to Pyongyang and hold discussions with Kim Il Sung. The Japanese government also clarified its policy on enlarging exchanges in nonpolitical fields. However, the North Korean side demanded establishing official diplomatic relations with Japan, which in essence, signified breaking relations with South Korea. In other words, North Korea would accept “coexistence with Japan” but would not permit “coexistence with South Korea.” With North Korea's announcement of suspending the North-South Dialogue, Japanese-North Korean relations took a turn to the worst.
However, with the start of the Roh Tae Woo administration, when South Korea announced abandoning its policy of isolation with North Korea, in July of 1988, an atmosphere of improved relations prevailed once again. Interestingly enough, this time, it was the Japanese side that demanded contact between the two governments. Also, both countries did not, nor do they, seek the establishment of diplomatic relations in the near future. The North Korea side fears setting the spark to the issue of cross-recongnition if it were to establish diplomatic relations with Japan. Nor does the Japanese side believe cross-recongnition is possible. In other words, Tokyo-Pyongyang relations cannot go beyond the level of Moscow-Seoul relations. It is possible however, that after “squaring up” issues from the “unfortunate past, ” “limited coexistence” short of diplomatic recongnition, would comprise no more than cooperative economic relations. The resilience of this relationship i. e. Japan and North Korea, will be tested by whether or not it will be able to withstand the Tokyo-Seoul-Pyongyang “game of diplomacy” with all its complexity.

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