本論文は，既にEU研究に適用されながらもその問題点が指摘されてきた

をEU（European Union）研究に活用することができるようにするために，アプローチの操作，修正を試みるものである．

　それまで停滞していたEU統合が1980年代半ばの域内市場統合計画によって息を吹き返すと，EUに対する理論的アプローチが発展した．

はそのうちのひとつであり，EU諸機関が時間の経過とともに加盟国政府に影響を与えて，加盟国政府にさらなる制度化を選択させると主張してきた．しかしながらは，政府の国益や選好に関わる前提を競合理論であるリベラル政府間主義と共有したため，議論の上で大きな制約を抱えることになった．本論文はその制約を明らかにしたうえで，EU研究に適合するようにを操作，修正する．

　新たに操作を加えた

は，加盟国による制度的選択が自国では解決することができない課題の「欧州的（集合的）解決」であること，それゆえに当該制度選択がゆくゆくは加盟国を拘束することを明らかにする．このような理解は，EU研究におけるに向けられてきた学術的批判にこたえてその問題点を克服するとともに，たとえばユーロ危機の顛末のように一度統合が停滞した後に再統合が進む理由やメカニズムを明らかにする可能性がある．

抄録全体を表示

　The Economic and Monetary Union （EMU） has experienced both stagnation and progress, in other words, stop and go, since the original plan was launched in the 1960s. After the financial and fiscal crisis, the EU has declared to move towards a genuine economic and monetary union and has launched a plan for completing EMU. This paper attempts to explain why and how the EMU has been gradually developed.

　While the EU and its member states tackled the financial, fiscal and economic crisis, the EU began to address the shortcomings of the EMU and launched a plan to complete a genuine EMU. Scholars attempt to analyze such institutional development/improvement through various theoretical approaches, such as liberal intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism, supranationalism, historical institutionalism and “Failing Forward” approach. This paper overviews understandings and analysis that are developed by such theoretical arguments, and argues that such theoretical approaches fail to grasp a dynamism towards further economic and monetary union because they ignore an international factor that pushes/drives member states and the EU towards integration. Followed by the argument, this paper also exhibits how we understand and analyze the relaunch of the plan for completing EMU by considering an international factor.

　Taking account of international factor helps us understand why the EU had experienced several crisis since its launch of the original plan for the economic and monetary union in the 1960s, and understand why the member states accept the gradual monetary cooperation through the 1980s, the start of the euro, and the relaunch of the plan for completing EMU after the crisis: The EU and its member states usually suggest integration projects in order to mediate exogenous financial and economic shocks; but, they cannot achieve complete agreements for integration due to diverged national interests and preferences; such “incompleteness” of the integration triggers financial speculation and crisis; and member states come to accept the initial plan for integration and a new plan for further integration is launched and implemented. European integration alternates between crisis/stagnation and progress, but gradually moves toward a further and more complete integration.

抄録全体を表示

Regional security institutions are founded on security systems, such as cooperative security, collective self-defense, and collective security, which play an important role in ensuring member states’ survival in an anarchic international environment. However, such a materialist perspective tells only a partial story about the roles of regional security institutions; these entities also help to define member states’ cognitive template of regional security. Given the concepts of “region” and “security” are both socially constructed, “regional security” is the concept that is ultimately defined and redefined by the group of states, and thus inter-state regional security institutions play an imperative role in that process.

How do regional security institutions shape the concept of regional security? The most relevant theoretical framework to answer this question is the Copenhagen School’s “securitization” theory. It offers analytical insights in understanding the social construction process of regional security by emphasizing important factors such as speech acts, audience acceptance, and extraordinary measures. Nevertheless, its recent research focus has deviated from inter-state relations and regional security institutions, and the question has been left unanswered.

In this context, this article, employing a synthesized analytical framework of securitization theory and an agent-centered historical institutionalism, argues that regional security institutions become a “securitization” tool for member states by providing them a staged process to collectively define their own regional security. Specifically, this article proposes a two-stage hypothesis. First, the member states’ perception of a change in the regional distribution of power triggers the securitization process. Second, the securitization process will be completed if member states accept a new threat perception by a securitizing actor and conduct extraordinary measures to deal with the threat. These measures can be conducted only when the existing institutional function cannot manage the new threats. After this cognitive template of regional security is consolidated within the institution, it begins to constrain member states’ strategic thinking and choices.

To test the hypotheses, this article conducts a comparative case study with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—in the process of establishing the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1994—and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)—in the process of establishing the protocol relating to the mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peace-keeping and security.

The basic findings are three-fold. First, member states’ perception of a change in the regional distribution of power mattered in setting off the securitization process. Second, member states’ agreement with new security threats and extraordinary measures are imperative to complete the securitization process, but a securitization actor can be varied in at each step of the process. Third, historically embedded norms of the regional security institutions should be taken seriously as it narrows the range of strategic choices on extraordinary measures. Despite a lack of sufficient number of case studies, the ASEAN and ECOWAS cases revealed that the complex securitization processes through regional security institutions created and recreated a cognitive template of regional security, which framed their security perspectives.

抄録全体を表示

The European Union has regarded the concept of “democratic principles” as important, which includes human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The purpose of this article is to examine the implication of these principles from the point of view of political conditionality.
The typical form of the EU conditionality was the inclusion of “essential element clause” and so-called “non-compliance clause” in some agreements between the European Community and the third countries. The formulation of conditionality in this line has developed after the mid-1990's. First, these two clauses were more universally included. Second, the concept of “good governance” has been linked with the non- compliance clause in the new agreement with the African, Caribbean and Pacific states (ACPs). Third, various external assistant programmes under the Community have become conditional.
In parallel with these trends, the EU has become a global actor in the field of democratic principles. Acceptance of qualified majority voting in the internal procedure of the Community made the non-compliance clause more applicable. This led unific sanctions at EU level in the case of some ACP countries. On the relation to neighboring countries, the strict political conditions have been established, especially in the context of enlargement policy toward Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs). In addition, the sharing of image of the democratic principles among the Member States through some effort to define them shall increase the actorness of the EU.
While the conditionality toward the third countries has been strengthened, there is any possibility of “internal” conditionality for the Member States. It seems unclear whether suspension clause of Article 7 TEU introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty is applicable, although new Article 7 (1) TEU by the Nice Treaty will provide some opportunity that EU concludes a risk of breach by a Member State of democratic principles.
The powers which relate to the conditionality have been transfered from the Member States to the EC/EU level not only in the foreign policy but also in the internal one.

抄録全体を表示

The last quarter century has witnessed a rising scholarly interest in international institutions. Various reviews of the study have identified several schools of thought. Popular among them is a variable-focused typology: power, interests, and ideas, which in turn produces a neorealism-neoliberalism-constructivism trilogy. Also widely accepted is a distinction based on ontology, epistemology, and methodology, the schism of which is between rationalism and constructivism.
While building on these works, I pose different questions: How can we conceive of actions and institutions, and how are we to characterize and explore the relationship between them? I would argue that we can answer them in three ways, namely, instrumental, deliberative, and cognitive approaches to international institutions. Appropriating insights of “new institutionalisms” in social sciences, I develop these approaches by explicating three faces of concepts such as rationality, interaction, communication, decision-making procedures, compliance, interests, and ideas.
Relying upon the logic of consequentiality, instrumentalists focus on actors' calculation and ask how institutions intervene in the process. Actors live under uncertainty so that exchange of private information becomes an important aspect of strategic interaction. They regard institutions as various types of information and as procedures for aggregating various interests. Institutions are only one among many instruments, and actors utilize them as long as they serve their own interests.
The deliberative approach adopts the logic of appropriateness and argues that actors match their choices not with expected consequences but with situations they find themselves in. Actors live in a world of multiple and potentially conflicting roles and rules. Appropriateness of actions, therefore, can be contested so that common standards need to be established in the process of deliberation. Consensus constitutes the basis of communicative action. Actors can change their conception of appropriateness—norms and rules—while transforming their own conception of interests and identities through socialization. Institutions construct the practice of deliberation, serve as reasons for action, and situate deliberation within the overall decision-making process.
Cognitivists, with the logic of orthodoxy, explore how actors perceive the world as they know it, and argue that institutions make social cognition possible. Actors live under an ambiguous world. As templates for cognition, schema, scripts, frames, and symbols enable actors to divide the world into many components, to categorize and classify themselves to formulate their identities, and to make the world meaningful. Actors can strategically appropriate these templates from the “cultural toolkit” and construct historical narratives, through which they transform the tools themselves.
I conclude with considering some implications of this typology for the furure of theories of international institutions. I propose that we should view rationality as “embedded, ” and inquire conditions under which a particular mode of rationality is dominant. Also, I suggest a need for elaborating and expanding the “theoretical toolkit” presented herein.

抄録全体を表示