This paper examines how electronic warfare, a way of fighting in the electromagnetic domain, is defined in Russian security strategy. The author would like to focus on the strategic papers and look at how organized the "electronic warfare forces" in the Russian military. Then, the author would like to consider the "electronic warfare equipment" possessed by those "electronic warfare forces". In addition, the author will take up as a case study how Russia's electronic warfare is carried out in the current Russo-Ukrainian War. Finally, in modern warfare, "X-rays" and "γ-rays" are considered to categorized within the electromagnetic domain, so the author also would like to estimate the possibility that Russia will implement electromagnetic pulse(EMP) attack.

More than 23 years have elapsed since the 1996 agreement of returning the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma by the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO). This article examines structural factors that prevented the return. It argues that the dual hierarchical relations between the U.S. and Japan, and between Japan and Okinawa, caused a delay in returning MCAS Futenma until today. By reviewing changing geo-strategic surroundings, especially the rise of China, and discussing how the U.S. has responded to such changes, this article seeks to demonstrate that the U.S. military strategy and priorities have shifted over the years. It maintains that the increasing military capacity of China, most notably its anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capability, forced the U.S. to reconsider the roles of its own forces in Okinawa and, as a result, prompted the fortification of Guam. The rise of China has also affected the military strategy of Japan, particularly of its so-called “gray-zone” defense of remote island territories. Under these emerging situations, the U. S. Marine Corps reevaluated its position in Okinawa, especially its Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), as deterrence and the only combat-credible U. S. asset pre-deployed in Japan. As MCAS Futenma hosts 24 MV-22, also known as Osprey, which are essential for the MAGTF to accomplish its mission, its return has been postponed until its core functions are relocated to alternative sites. Existing literature views that Japanese domestic politics are directly responsible for the delay. On one level, this article complements such a view by identifying the structural factors that indirectly affected the relevant decisions of the U. S. and Japanese governments in withholding the return of MCAS Futenma. However, the article concludes that the “failure” must be seen as a result of complex interplays among myriad levels of factors including the U.S.–Japan, Japan–Okinawa, and intra-Okinawa relations and politics.

AIや自律ロボットをはじめとする新興技術（エマージングテクノロジー）の急速な発展と産業における利用が議論される一方で，自律型致死兵器システム（LAWS）の研究開発も進展している．国際的な議論としては，特定通常兵器使用禁止制限条約（CCW）の枠組みにおける規制について検討がなされ，今後のガイドとなるべき原則指針が提案されている．本稿では，自律型致死兵器システムについて，LAWSに適用される国際人道法，国連軍縮研究所（UNIDIR）の報告書，CCWのLAWS非公式専門家会議から政府専門家会合（GGE）における議論の状況，提案された原則指針の内容，法的・倫理的側面をめぐる検討状況を確認する．