Corruption is a well-known, pervasive problem in Russia. When describing the state of resistance against corruption in the country, researchers tend to focus on its weaknesses. In this context, emphasis is placed on the leadership’s lack of political will and the limited role played by civil society actors and international NGOs. The leadership’s behavior could be owing to the weak incentives for promoting anti-corruption policies that might inconvenience the incumbent elites.
However, this does not mean that Russia has not promoted anti-corruption policies. Various anti-corruption measures are found in domestic legislation. Especially during Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency, beginning with the approval of the federal law “on countering corruption” in 2008, a series of anti-corruption measures were introduced. It is worth exploring the mechanism by which the government promotes such anti-corruption policies that do not necessarily benefit the incumbent elites.
In this paper, I take the example of the asset declaration system for public officials. This is one of the typical anti-corruption policies, which led to a strengthening of the control over the incumbent elites. In Russia, the asset declaration system was introduced in 2010, in connection with ratification of the United Nations Convention against Corruption. In 2012, the system was amended to oblige public officials to declare not only their assets and incomes, but also large-scale expenditures. By tracing the introduction and evolution of the asset declaration system, I try to demonstrate the factors that made the Russian government strengthen control over the incumbent elites.
A key fact in analyzing this question is that anti-corruption has become an international norm. Russia has become a member of major international treaties in this sphere. However, it has been pointed out that the ratification of international treaties, in itself, does not guarantee their realization in domestic legislations. Especially important in this context is the role played by domestic political actors, such as NGOs and opposition parties. In this study, I focus on occasions when the government’s noncompliance with international norms was politicized by such political actors.
The evolution of the asset declaration system in Russia demonstrates that the politicization of the noncompliance with international norm pressured the government to introduce stricter controls over the incumbent elites. Because the government has itself served as a major promoter of the need to accept international norms, it was difficult to counter criticism of their noncompliance. Under such circumstances, the government had no option but to strengthen control over the public officials.
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