冷戦期の防衛庁長官や内局の防衛政策に対するスタンスは,自衛隊をいかに抑制するかという消極的統制の要素が強かった。しかし,冷戦の終結に伴い,自衛隊の役割に対するニーズが高まることによって,の防衛政策への関与が増加し,自衛隊を海外派遣や有事対処に積極的に活用しようとする積極的統制が顕著になった。内局の官僚も生え抜き組が主流となることによって,制服組との組織的利害の一致が進むこととなった。こうした1990年代以降の安全保障環境の変化との関与,防衛庁内の内幕一体化がシビリアン・コントロールを変質させることとなったのである。

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  In 1989 a large political shift began. On January 7th the Showa Emperor passed away and Heisei was decided on as the name of the new era. Various important political incidents and scandals occurred and the Takeshita and Uno Cabinets resigned. Some people imagined that this political shift would be like that of the Taisho era, in which the Meiji Emperor's death also indicated the start of far-reaching changes. Nobody knows when “the Heisei Political Shift” will conclude, but its first climax might be seen as the resignation of the Miyazawa Cabinet and the end of the Liberal Democratic Party's monopoly of government in 1993. It is often said that the end of the Cold War brought about this political shift, but few have explained how. This article hypothesizes that the Plaza Accords were one of the main causes of “the Heisei Political Shift”. It focuses on the unique economic consultant Kenichi Ohmae who established the network of Heisei Ishin (Heisei Restoration).

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　本研究では，戦後日本の首相の国会演説（施政方針演説・所信表明演説）に対してテキスト分析を行い，その内容の通時的変化を明らかにした．1945 年の東久邇宮内閣から2019 年の第四次安倍内閣までの全179 本の演説を収集し，昭和前期，昭和後期，平成前期，平成後期の4 時代に区分した上で，頻出名詞に対してTF-IDF 値を算出した．そして，全演説に対してLDA によるトピックモデルを作成し，首相ごとのトピックの推定を実施した．

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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the methodologies of five key modern exponents of realism: E. H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, Raymond Aron, Kenneth Waltz and Stanley Hoffmann. I explore the significance of each author's version of realism, focusing on the problems of: (1) understanding of the intentions of the actors; (2) explanation of causal relations; and (3) ethical judgments of human action.
First, Morgenthau and Aron differ considerably on their definition of theory. While Morgenthau sees in the quest for power the essence of all politics, Aron starts with the specific features of international relations, the state of war. Moreover, while Morgenthau attempts to give meaning to the factual raw material of foreign policy by using rational elements, such as national interests, Aron seeks to show both the limits of our knowledge and the conditions of historical choice. Morgenthau states, “to search for the clue to foreign policy exclusively in the motives of statesman is both futile and deceptive.” However, Aron attaches greater importance to understanding meaning, or the gap between actors' intentions and consequences.
This difference in approach is made clearer by second-generation realists like Waltz and Hoffmann. While Morgenthau illuminates the moral problems in statecraft, Waltz pays no attention to the actor's dilemma. While Aron views international relations as the interactions of symbolic individuals, the diplomat and the soldier, Hoffmann attempts to study also nonstate actors which behave as if they had autonomy. Paying little attention to the gap between the superpowers' intentions and their consequences, Waltz insists on the durability of the bipolar system. On the other hand, emphasizing the diffusion of power in the international landscape, Hoffmann advocates the “world order” as a public philosophy. His theory is also an encouraging message to citizens.
Second, on the relations between international systems and actors, Aron-Hoffmann and Waltz differ remarkably. Aron characterizes international systems by the configuration of the relations of forces and the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the states. Waltz, however, criticizes him for mingling elements at the unit level with elements at the system level. For Waltz, the states are fungible entities, comparable to Durkheim's individuals. International systems are forces whose origin is not the individual states but its collectivity, forces which are the real, and the determining causes of stability and war. Following Durkheim's rule of sociological method, Waltz believes that a single cause brings the same consequence. On the other hand, Aron's causal thinking is expressed in terms of probability or chance. In other words, what remains undetermined is what interests him most. Aron and Hoffmann believe that in human affairs necessity itself is of man's own making, although hisory may well be governed by forces beyond man's control.
Third, accepting the Weber's ethic of responsibility, each realist has different criteria for judging human action. As Michael Smith points out, the ethic of responsibility says nothing about how the leader weighs consequences, speaking only to his ability and willingness to face them. Carr and Morgenthau's concept of morality was proved inappropriate by reality. Carr's intuitionism, which was buttressed by his deterministic view of history, was to support the appeasement policy toward Hitler. Morgenthau's national interest was misunderstood by decision makers in Washington as a criteria which supported the resistance against the expansion of communism in all its forms.
It was Aron who correctly modified their criteria. He points out that realists fail to recognize the action of ideologies. According to Aron,

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Junichiro Koizumi, Prime Minister of Japan, initiated the creation of a community ‘that acts together and advances together’ in East Asia in January 2002. The plan has been receivedwarmly by Japan’s East Asian neighbors, including the ten ASEAN countries, China, and Korea.Earlier plans for East Asian cooperation such as the Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere(GEACS), proposed in 1940 by Yosuke Matsuoka, the then foreign minister of Japan, and the East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC), proposed in 1990 by Mahathir Mohamad, the then prime minister of Malaysia, failed. This was because the Japanese military rule of GEACS was destroyed by the allied forces in 1945, and the anti-US stance of EAEC was not acceptable to East Asian countries in the 1990s. Why, then, has Prime Minister Koizumi’s idea been accepted by other East Asian countries?
Many academic papers and Japanese government reports have put particular emphasis on the following points promoting East Asian cooperation: (1) the closer intra-regional exchanges between Japan and East Asian countries have accelerated the economic development of East Asia;(2) the financial crisis in 1997 has caused other East Asian countries to realize their acute need for Japanese financial assistance; (3) non-traditional security issues such as terrorist attacks and sea piracy have required a regional approach between Japan and other East Asian countries; and(4) Japan and other East Asian countries attach importance to ASEAN’s functional cooperation, which has also been favorably received by ASEAN members.
What are the prospects for an East Asian Community?And what role should Japan play in the process of community building? ASEAN countries had shown some concern over China’sgrowing influence in the economic field, and China suggested the establishment of an ASEANChina Free Trade Area (ACFTA) in 2001. This was intended to alleviate the‘ China threat’perceived by ASEAN countries and to enhance ASEAN–China ties. Japan reactively enhanced the Japan–ASEAN Partnership in the Tokyo Declaration in 2003, and Japan–China relations have reached an impasse because of historical issues. The US government has also shown some concern over the possibility of an East Asian Community because it has been concerned about Chinese ambitions to turn East Asia into its domain.
If the realization of an East Asian Community is Japan’s objective, the Japanese government should take the following measures: (1) maintain communication channels with the Chinesegovernment for the promotion of East Asian cooperation; (2) relieve the strained relations between the USA and East Asian countries, especially China; (3) revise the regional free trade agreements between Japan, China, and ASEAN countries, and make these agreements into more effective and facilitated ones; (4) consider a truly open and flexible membership for the current East Asian Summit.

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President Kim Dae Jung’ diplomacy is characteristic in the sense that it attempted to go beyond the traditional ‘four power” diplomacy, and to take initiatives for East Asian regionalism. He led the discussions on the East Asian Community by proposing to establish a series of preparatory meetings such as East Asia Vision Group in 1998, and East Asia Study Group in 2000. The final report of EAVG, “Towards an East Asian Community” is still considered an important milestone in the process of East Asian regional cooperation.

The motives behind his call for East Asian regional unity were not restricted to economic ones, although the financial crisis was the immediate and foremost challenge. By advancing regional and sub-regional cooperation in the form of ASEAN plus Three and Korea–Japan–China Trilateral Summits, President Kim tried to mobilize international support for inter-Korean rapprochement, and to alleviate emerging rivalry between regional powers such as Japan and China. This article aims to analyze the views and strategies of Kim Dae Jung administration toward East Asian regionalism in general, and the trilateral cooperation among Japan, China, and South Korea.

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‘Cold politics’ in current Japan–China relations is accelerating the termination of Japan’s yen loans to China. This situation is in turn generating official development assistance (ODA) ‘friction’, which aggravates the‘ cold politics’. Why has post-war reconciliation betweenJapan and China become deadlocked? Didn’t Japan’s economic cooperation with China, including ODA, contribute to post-war reconciliation?
The government of Japan has made post-war reparation part of its post-war settlements.However, the diverse forms of the post-war settlements, the controversial concept of post-war reparation, and the divergence between the domestic and international law concepts of reparations have made it more difficult for Japan to link post-war settlements with post-war reconciliation.
Approaches to post-war settlements with Asian countries have centered on reparation and cooperation in order to achieve reconstruction. However, the governments of the PRC and Taiwan both renounced reparation claims against Japan because of the Cold War and the “two Chinas” issue. This is why China accepted ODA without receiving reparation beforehand.
From the perspective of the post-war reconciliation process, China’s renunciation of its reparation claims in the Japan–China Joint Statement of 1972 can be seen as its willingness for reconciliation with Japan in return for Japan’s expression of remorse. However, Japan did not make clear within what framework it accepted China’s renunciation of its reparation claims. In1979, Prime Minister Masahiro Ohira, who had been Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1972, launched ODA to China. While Japan has not referred to a link between the renunciation of reparation claims and the launch of ODA, China has often touched upon such a link.
The basic structure of the Japan–China relationship that Ohira attempted to create (the ‘1979regime’) rests on the following three pillars: (i) the ‘1972 regime’ (based upon an understanding of the Taiwan issue, the history issue, etc.); (ii) an understanding of Japan’s active support for China’s economic reconstruction, and its reform and open-door policy; and(iii) establishing long-term friendly relations with China.
The ‘1979 regime’ is also a political structure that has been shaped by multiple factors such as international and domestic political crises in both Japan and China, in addition to elements associated with the post-war settlement. Therefore the‘ 1979 regime’ was formed in the contexts of both crisis and reconciliation, and economic cooperation based on the reconciliation context has helped to promote the process of reconciliation.
However, the reconciliation process is now drifting; completion of this process will require joint efforts by Japan and China to formulate new international policies, or in other words, peacebuilding policies.

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Since 1988, Myanmar been subject to conflicting movements aimed at democratization and the suppression thereof, exemplified most recently by the military coup d’état of 2021. This paper considers this topic in relation to the broader international structure, in which countries such as the United States, China, and the ASEAN nations have engaged in various forms of democratization and the suppression of the same in Myanmar, giving rise to complex regional and inter­national politics.

Theoretical research on international relations has provided an excellent analysis of this international structure. In addition, area studies have produced a wealth of findings on the domestic politics and external actions of various countries; however, it can be challenging to conduct an analysis that combines theoretical research and area studies, as the two disciplines diverge considerably. This study integrates and considers findings from both disciplines as described below.

Based on theoretical research, this study identifies the characteristics of the international structure described above after the Cold War and since the latter half of the 2010s. It then confirms how that international structure has been correlated with movements to democratize Myanmar and the involvement of various countries therein. Furthermore, this study examines whether area studies may provide alternative arguments or supplement and revise the findings of theoretical research. Through this process, it may be possible to explain Myanmar’s political disturbances and the involvement of various countries as a fitting combination of international structures and domestic circumstances.

The results of this analysis will illustrate, for example, that while Myanmar pursued democratization with support from the United States and the EU in the context of international structures following the Cold War, the military of Myanmar retained its authoritarian grip and built its own hybrid regime. In addition, given the international antagonism between the United States and China, and the distance maintained by ASEAN nations from both countries, it will be explained how these countries are reducing their involvement in Myanmar as political chaos continues following the coup. This study also clarifies how ASEAN functions as a buffer between the inter­national structure and Asian countries.

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