This article seeks to outline the entirety of Wilson’s intervention in North Russia and Siberia. It should be presented based on the U.S.’s various motives toward Russia and differences in the characteristics of the interventions in North Russia and Siberia that have been provided by an earlier scholarship. Additionally, both interventions should be considered as not completely separate but intertwined with one other as an integral part of Wilson Administration’s policy toward Russia.

The U.S. was more receptive to intervention in North Russia than in Siberia. President Wilson regarded the intervention in North Russia as part of his war strategy against the Central Powers, classifying it as an essential aspect of the cooperative coalition with the Allies. In Siberia, Wilson approved U.S. expedition to secure safe transportation of Trans-Siberian and Chinese-Eastern Railways, which would contribute to social and economic stability in Russia. Inevitably, he supposed, this condition would enable the Czechs’ eastward passage via Vladivostok while mitigating Japanese territorial expansion in the Russian Far East.

Note that the developments of the Czechs played a key role in the Allied intervention in Russia. In North Russia, the Czech Legion was regarded as an influential figure to restore resistance to the Germans in the East. While in Siberia, the Czechs had to be transferred to the Western Front through repatriation to support the Allies, and their existence was vital to guard the Trans-Siberian and Chinese-Eastern Railways for the stabilization of Russia. As seen in his Aid-Memoir of June 17, 1918, Wilson placed the U.S. expedition in North Russia and Siberia within the whole picture of its intervention in Russia. The nucleus of U.S. intervention in Russia was the existence of the Czech Legion. In that sense, it was tragic that the U.S. and the Allies severely underestimated the divisions among the various anti-Bolshevik groups.

Wilson hoped for the emergence of a liberal Russia based on the free election and self-government. The “unintended consequence (the effect of the armed intervention),” however, baffled his promise for the future of Russia. Confronting confused local information and the untrustworthy Bolshevik government, America’s major concern and priority was to defeat Germany in World War I. Therefore, Wilson had no choice but to consider coalition diplomacy based on strategic coordination with Britain and France. Yet, this blinded the administration to the negative effect of America’s military intervention in Russia. By the very decision of armed intervention in Russia, however, Wilson’s policy toward Russia brought inconsistency in the principle of Point Six of his Fourteen Points Address and resulted in paying a price that he did not expect.