Based on R.Brubaker’s sociological framework for “eventful” nationalisms,this paper presented the formation processes of the dominant “we” vision (so called “national identity”) of the post-war Okinawa in the early 1950s. It focused on the transaction between the vision formation and the institutions/policies of the two relating governments, the U.S. and Japan.
The term “Complex Nation” refers to the “we” vision represented by simultaneous employment of the two different categories of “nation”, in this case “Japanese” and “Okinawan”. This concept was introduced to avoid the dominant, but theoretically invalid presumption that see “national identities” are mutually exclusive.
In pre-WWII Okinawa, the modern “we” vision was formulated as a distinctive ethnic group that constitutes a segment of the Japanese nation. The term “Okinawan” was not expressively linked to the thought of Self-Determination.
This “we” vision, however, was destabilized when the Japanese rule was replaced by that of the American’s after the war. I argued that the reconfiguration processes of the “we” vision in the early post-war period may be revealed by paying attention to the formation and relating processes of the three Self-Determination derived ideals arose at that time. These are Jichi (self-governance), KeizaiJiritsu (economic self-support) of the Okinawan Nation and Fukki (reversion to the Japanese Nation).
After verifying the fact that Jichi and keizaiJiritsu became idiomatic phases by 1950,
I argued that the “national identity” formation processes of the two different vectors occurred simultaneously in 1951.
One was the process of the strengthening Jichi and keizaiJiritsu ideals, caused by the American institutions/policies conflictive to these ideals.
The frequent American interventions in the civil affairs that were supposed to be reserved for the self-governance of Okinawan left the Okinawa Gunto Government with little self-deciding power to practice.
The keizaiJiritsu ideal, put forward by the Okinawa Gunto Government in its economic plan, was also denied by the U.S., because the “native” industrial growth was considered as of secondly importance.
The resulted grievances strengthened the Okinawan’s normative attachment to Jichi and keizaiJiritsu ideals, and the vision of “we” as a self-determining subject.
The process of the other vector, the formation and mainstreaming of Fukki proceeded simultaneously.
The trade with Japan, reopened in 1950, constituted the structural factor. The Japanese government institutions/policies that established the tariff and non-tariff barriers against Okinawan commodities stimulated the Okinawan perception that the Okinawan export industries could only survive if it had a free access to the Japanese market, and placed under the Japanese Government protection.
The actual reversionist movement arose when the negotiation on the political status of Okinawa after the peace treaty started between Japan and the U.S. in the early 1951.
The “we” vision put forward by the reversionists, however, was qualitatively different from the “we” vision of the pre-war type since the category “Okinawan” now connoted “the self-determining subject”. What came into being was a frame of vision in which the two categories of self-determining subject are rhetorically connected to represent “we”.

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The purpose of this study is to explain the progress of the Keirin importation plan in the Ryukyu Islands of a period of U.S. occupation. The subjects of this study are three points of the following. (1) Progress from the Keirin importation plan in the Ryukyu Islands of a period of U.S. occupation a plan to the abolition is researched. (2) Research into the reason why the Keirin importation plan was promoted. (3) Research into the reason why the Keirin importation plan couldn't be enforced The following three matters could be pointed out as a result of the study. (1) Progress from the decision of Keirin importation plan to the abolition reflected the diplomatic relations of Japan and the United States and the international situation such as the beginning of the political change of the East Asian region and the cold war. (2) As for the Keirin importation plan, a Japanese side was cooperating in Naha City and Ryukyu side. The purpose of Naha City was to make up for shortage of finance. A purpose on the Japanese side was to exercise a political influence and an economical influence in the Ryukyu Islands. (3) The development of Keirin importation plan stimulated USCAR (United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands). One of the causes that USCAR dismissed the decision of Naha municipal assembly which ignored public opinion is an inhabitant's Keirin counter movement

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The purpose of this paper is to review the political power struggle for de-veloping a totalitarian single-party system, by analyzing how Fumimamo Konoe, his fellows, and the army coped with political parties' activities to re-organize the political world utilizing Konoe's new party campaign from the late 1930s to the early 1940s, in which the conflict among the national government, the army, and political parties became more fierce. The Shino-Japanese War, which broke out in the wake of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in July 1937, showed the sign of prolongation in 1938. Then, the first Konoe Cabinet resigned en bloc in January 1939. Later, the Hiranuma, Abe, and Yonai Cabinets were established as the national government, with the prime ministers being military personnel and bureaucrats. However, these three cabinets could not improve the situation, and Japan witnessed the deepening of political confrontation due to the prolongation of the Shino-Japanese War. On the other hand, the Japanese army aimed to back up Konoe with the purpose of unifying diplomatic measures in response to the peace overture toward China for terminating the war, and the central government aimed to reorganize the political world by organizing Konoe's New Party. Then, in July 1940, the Yonai Cabinet resigned en bloc, and the second Konoe Cabinet was established based on the supports from the army and political parties. This paper focuses on the domestic political visions and diplomatic policy visions of the army and political parties, elucidates the influences of the relation between the army and political parties on the politics before and after the inauguration of the second Konoe Cabinet, and then discusses the factors in the failure of "Konoe's New Systems" while considering the difference from the political plans of Konoe's fellows.

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