2022 年度から実施される『高等学校学習指導要領』では、歴史系科目の構成と内容が大きく変更された。「問い」を設定し、資料から読み取ったことを活用して多面的・多角的な視点から「問い」の課題について探究していくような学習が想定されている。生徒が「主体的・対話的で深い学び」を実現できるように授業担当者が適切に生徒をファシリテートするためには、歴史学の新しい成果をつかんでおくことが従来よりも大切になってくる。 このような問題意識から、国際バカロレアにおける「歴史」の実践もふまえながら、論を取り上げ、歴史学における議論の整理を試みた。第二次世界大戦と併せて「20世紀の三十年戦争」として関連させて捉える場合、第一次世界大戦は現代史の起点となる。誰も意図していなかったにもかかわらず、様々な要因が関連し合って戦争が始まってしまったという見方や、それへの反論、ドイツやイギリスの責任論、等、様々な議論がなされている。特に開戦100 周年の 1914 年以降に出版された書籍に注目しながら原因論について考察を加え、その歴史的意義についてあらためて確認した。

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This paper will deal with some important problems facing the current study of conflict. There are, as generally known, controversial issues in theorizing conflict situation. One is over the social role of conflict. We can observe two different ideas in this issue as follows.
The first is the negative approach; where it is possible to consider conflict an abnormal behavior. This should be eliminated from international relations. The second is, to the contrary, the positive approach; where we regard conflict as a useful social means. In this case, conflicts tend to function to contain opposing interests within the intra-social system, thereby contributing to harmonize the conflict situation.
Another is over the nature of conflict. There are again twofold ideas. The first is a personal conflict whose root lies in human minds. The second is a structural one whose cause is correlated with social mechanism. Along with theoretical developments in models of “linkage” and “integration”, our study has also been sophisticated to clarify the meaning, the role, and the function of conflict. As a matter of fact, there is still no appropriate way of explaining how conflicts actually operate.
For this heuristic purpose, the “Barringer Model” was newly proposed to handle controversial issues mentioned above. We find many important implications in the “Barringer Model” of conflict. For example, it argues that there must be an empirical difference between the phases of ending and that of resolving conflicts. This is certainly an interesting proposition. Therefore, we shall introduce this innovative model into the analysis of conflicting environments in international relations.
In this paper, we will make efforts to examine respective ideas observed in Barringer's model. In so doing, a theoretical contribution may be possible for rebuilding the theory of conflict. However, an empirical test of this model remains to be seen. Thus, this preliminary attempt was made in this essay.

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The Austro-Hungarian Empire collapsed at the end of the First World War. It is said that the cause of collapse was the anti-Habsburg nationalities that inhabited in the Empire and wanted to be independent from the Empire made use of the right of the self-determination that the American president, Woodrow Wilson, declared in his “Fourteen Points” speech in January 8th 1918. But in the article of 10 of the Fourteen Points he insisted that “The peoples of Austria-Hungary should be accorded the freest opportunity to autonomous development”. There was not the word “self-determination”. What does the word “autonomous” mean for the policy-makers of the Empire and the nationalities? This article examines how the policy-makers of the Empire, specially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, understood and utilized Wilson’s principles after the speech of the Fourteen Points in order to rescue their Empire from the crisis of dissolution.

The Fourteen Points seemed to them a tool for the rescue the Empire. So the then Foreign Minister, Count Czernin, made a speech in support of the Fourteen Points at the end of January. In February the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a note in the name of the emperor Charles via Spain to Wilson that the emperor could agree the Wilson’s principles in order to bring a peace to Europe. There was a good situation that a negotiated peace would be carried. But in the spring 1918 the United States changed her course and determined to collapsed the Empire. And the German Empire started the military offensive in the Western Front in March. Moreover the meeting between the leaders of the German Empire and the Austria-Hungary in May seemed to the United States that the emperor of the Austria-Hungary became a vassal. When the German offensive failed in August, the Austria-Hungary planned an armistice and peace-talks with the United States on the basis of the Fourteen Points. The policy-makers of the Empire understood that it is important to solve the South-Slav Question to persuade Wilson.

But in September the United States have already recognized that 1) a state of belligerency exit between the Czecho-Slovaks and Austria-Hungary and 2) the Czecho-Slovaks National Council is a de facto belligerent government. When the Austria-Hungary formally proposed the armistice and peace at the beginning of October, the United States rejected it. The United States insisted that the Fourteen Points was no longer relevant to the future of the Empire. Nevertheless the Austria-Hungary tried to appeal. She declared that she would approve Wilson’s opinion about the Czecho-Slovaks and the Jugo-Slavs. At last she determined to abandon her Allied, German Empire, and to propose a separate peace to the United States. But in the around of Empire the nationalities had declared the independence from the Empire on the ground of the self-determination.

On 3^rd November 1918 the army of the Empire concluded the armistice with the Entente and the war ended. This was also the end of the Empire.

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Thucydides has been considered as the father of the realist theory of international politics. Most realists believe that the phrase in the Melian dialogue in his History of the Peloponnesian War—“The strong do what they can and the weak must suffer they must”—is the essence of realist theory and was Thucydides' own position.
This article tries to rectify such a view of Thucydides. I shall present a more nuanced view of his History based on the studies of the late Professor Michitaro Tanaka, the expert on Greek philosophy in Japan, and Professor Masaaki Kubo, who is one of the best Japanese translators of Thucydides, as well as on recent researches which have appeared mostly after the end of the Cold War, conducted by international relations specialists.
Special attention is paid to four incidents in History, namely, the Mytilenaean debate, the Pylos incident, the Melian dialogue, and the Sicilian expedition. Between the incidents at Pylos and Melos, I shall argue that Athens gradually lost prudence, and became “fundamentalist”, to use Michael W. Doyle's word. At Melos, Athens reached “the last level of intellectual sclerosis” (Kubo), and the result of sclerosis was the tragedy of the Sicilian expedition in which Athens lost more than 60, 000 soldiers, including Demosthenes and Nicias. Then, the question is why Athenians lost their realistic eyes in international affairs. I shall present two answers: from a short term perspective, the accidental success at Pylos led Athens to expect more success to follow, and from a long term perspective, the fear of the consequences of loss led Athens' leaders to take overly ambitions actions.
Considering the History in this regard, I believe that Thucydides was critical of Athens' behavior at Melos, contrary to the view conventionally held. In the end, I identify Thucydides with the line related to “defensive realism, ” i. e., the Thucydides-Rousseau-M. Wight/J. Herz-R. Jervis/R. N. Lebow line, not the Thucydides-Machiavelli-Hobbes-Morgenthau-K. Waltz line. I find that in the History his logic went well beyond realism. Though I still believe that realism is going to remain in the mainstream of international relations, the logic of realism in the 21st century should be reconstructed in line with the “Thucydidian realism” presented in this article.

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