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  • 富永 枝里香
    アメリカ研究
    2012年 46 巻 89-108
    発行日: 2012/03/25
    公開日: 2021/11/06
    ジャーナル フリー

    This thesis aims to show how America’s Middle East policy began to tilt towards a pro-Israeli stance in the aftermath of the Six Day War by analyzing the Lyndon B. Johnson administration’s reaction to the USS Liberty incident.

    On June 8th, 1967, the USS Liberty, a U.S. intelligence ship, was assaulted by the Israel Defense Forces while sailing off the coast of Gaza, leaving 34 Americans killed and 171 injured. Officials for the Johnson administration initially argued as to whether the attack was intentional or mistake, but eventually accepted Israel’s claim that the attack was an “innocent mistake.” This, despite the fact that the officials had yet to receive results from American investigation teams.

    While previous studies of the USS Liberty incident principally focused on Israel’s motives for the attack, this study will argue why the Johnson administration swiftly decided to downplay the attack before the conclusion of American investigations. Previous studies of America’s policy toward the Six Day War demonstrated a lack of interest in the USS Liberty incident, perhaps due to its relatively nominal impact on the overall peace process. This author, however, explores the possibility that America’s reaction to the USS Liberty incident was driven by officials’ desire to strengthen relations between the United States and Israel in the wake of the Six Day War.

    Consequently, this study will evaluate the USS Liberty incident in terms of considering the process from how the United States began tilting toward a pro-Israeli stance. In relevant literatures it has been clarified that the United States actively displayed a pro-Israeli stance during the period between the Six Day War and the Yorn Kippur War. However, it is not necessarily said when and how the United States expressed its pro-Israeli stance. This study will clarify that the Johnson administration created the watershed to formulate America’s pro-Israeli policy in the aftermath of the Six Day War, by analyzing America’s reaction to the USS Liberty incident.

    Furthermore, this author will point out that the Johnson administration did not actively display a pro-Israeli stance, but indirectly dictated policy under pressure which led to the drastic transformation of the Middle East. The administration decided to downplay the attack before Americans gathered all available information. This was because the Johnson administration managed to control the Israelis who were taking an aggressive stance against the Arabs in the peace negotiations. The motive here was to avert the Soviets’ further involvement in the Arab world and to alleviate tensions between Arabs and Israelis. However, in terms of the context of history, the Johnson administration’s policy over the USS Liberty incident deepened the U.S.-Israeli relationship, resulting in the United States’ formulating a pro-Israeli policy in subsequent decades. Although the Johnson administration’s aim was to create peace in the region, the decision of deepening relations with Israel eventuated that the Arabs would resort to seeking assistance from the Soviets, consequently furthering America’s involvement in Arab-Israeli conflicts.

  • 村上 雅博
    水文・水資源学会誌
    1994年 7 巻 4 号 305-314
    発行日: 1994/07/05
    公開日: 2010/02/10
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 飯塚 正人, 澤江 史子
    イスラム世界
    2008年 70 巻 90-94
    発行日: 2008年
    公開日: 2023/10/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • ―展開と解体―
    木村 正俊
    年報政治学
    2009年 60 巻 2 号 2_50-2_69
    発行日: 2009年
    公開日: 2013/02/07
    ジャーナル フリー
      Between the 1950s and 1970s the world politics was dominated by revolutionary movements in the Third World and the hero of the age was Che Guevara. The Palestinian liberation movement emerged in that era. This article analyzes the evolution and devolution of the Palestinian liberation movement by regarding it as one of the revolutionary movements in the Third World.
      After discussing general arguments over revolutions in the World Politics, this article treats the development of the Palestinian liberation movement and the change in its attitude toward armed struggle. Armed struggle by the Palestinian national movement and regional politics in the Middle East influenced each other. Armed struggle by Palestinian guerrilla groups stimulated the 1967 War, which resulted in changes in their attitude toward armed struggle and the shift in the agent of liberation.
      The Palestinian Revolution encouraged the Lebanese Civil War. The coalition group between the Palestinian liberation movement and Lebanese progressive groups was opposed to the Lebanese conservative groups. The 1982 War had a crucial effect on the fate of the Palestinian Revolution.
  • 国際政治のなかの中東
    高安 健将
    国際政治
    2005年 2005 巻 141 号 86-100,L12
    発行日: 2005/05/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This article examines the responses of the British government to the fourth Middle East conflict and the first oil crisis, both of which occurred coincidentally in October 1973. The British government led by Edward Heath recognised that Britain had ceased to be a Super Power and that it was experiencing a domestic crisis. It was therefore fully aware that it could not achieve settlements for the Middle East conflict and the oil crisis on its own. However, the differing interests and perceptions towards the crises made it extremely difficult for the British government to cooperate with the United States in particular and to a lesser extent with the European Community.
    The disagreements between Britain and the United States reflected their respective grasps of the Middle East conflict and their interests in securing oil supply from the Arab oil-producers. The Heath government was more sympathetic to the Arabs, who in fact launched the offensive against the Israelis in 1973. Its consistent understanding was that the Israelis had occupied Arab territories in 1967 and that the acquisition of territory by war was inadmissible. For the Heath government, the Arabs had not crossed an international border to commit aggression, but rather that the fighting was going on in territories that legally, and in the view of the United Nations, belonged to the Arabs. In contrast, the US government initially regarded as the baseline of a ceasefire the dividing line between the Arabs and the Israelis that had been created after the Israeli occupation in 1967. Domestically, the Heath government was facing a huge energy crisis, which was triggered by a ban by coal-miners on overtime work. It was vital for the British government to secure oil imports from the Arab oil-producers, a need not faced by the United States.
    The Heath government and the Nixon administration disagreed not only over the causes of the conflict, and over how to achieve first a ceasefire and then long-term settlement between the Arabs and the Israelis, but also over the perceptions of the actors involved-including Egypt and the Soviet Union -and particularly with regards oil security. While Heath in fact distrusted the intentions of the Nixon administration, which was confronting the Watergate affair, the US government suspected that the British government, by siding with the Arabs, was deliberately undermining its Middle East policy.
    This article argues that the British government sided with the Arabs in 1973 in order to secure oil supplies, despite generating acute tension with the United States and the European Community. Such discord, this paper argues, eventually deprived the British government of any significant role in settling the Middle East conflict and the oil crisis.
  • 鹿島 正裕
    国際政治
    1996年 1996 巻 113 号 135-151,L15
    発行日: 1996/12/30
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The third Arab-Israeli war of 1967 quickly ended in an overwhelming victory for Israel, in what is called the “Six-day war” by her. At that time, the Arab countries claimed that the United States had participated in the war on the Israeli side, and severed diplomatic relationship with her. Because the U. S. -Egyptian relationship had already been bad before the war, and the Israeli aerial attack was far more efficient than Egyptians had expected, they suspected U. S. -Israeli complicity. In fact, the Johnson administration had repeatedly warned Israel not to initiate hostility, while trying to organize an international fleet to deter Egypt from the use of force. The Arab side, however, continued to maintain that the United States had encouraged Israel to attack Egypt in order to weaken the revolutionary Nasser regime. The then unofficial spokesman of Nasser, Mohamed Heikal, still does so in his recent thick book “1967 al-Infijal (outbreak)” (Cairo, 1990), which is based on declassified documents of the United States and Egypt.
    According to him, when Egypt demanded the United Nations Emergency Force (which had been stationed in Sinai Peninsular since the 1956 Suez War) to leave from the Israeli border area, United Nations Under-Secretary Ralph Bunche, an American, advised Secretary-General U Thant not to accept partial withdrawal, thus provoking Egypt to demand total withdrawal and to occupy Sharm el-Sheikh and then close the Strait of Tiran for Israel. It was an American plot to give Israel a casus belli. After that the United States warned Egypt, in cooperation with the Soviet Union, not to initiate hostility while hinting to Israel that she would not, unlike on the occasion of the Suez War, support any United Nations move to sanction Israel if she attacked Egypt.
    On the American side, serious studies based on declassified documents as well as interviews with then policy-makers have been accumulated, some of which expressly try to refute the Egyptian accusations. I have studied and compared these books and articles, checked many of the documents and interviewed some people myself, and concluded that it is not that the United States “unleashed” Israel to attack Egypt, but that the Nasser regime itself let, through a series of miscalculations, the Egyptian military provoke Israel into war. However, Israeli decision-makers were wise enough not to attack Arab forces prematurely—they gave time to the U. S. and Britain to try to organize the international fleet. When the Johnson administration found the efforts rather fruitless, it was in fact inclined to let Israel help herself. In this sense the United States was involved in the political process leading to the outbreak of the war.
  • 現代の安全保障
    木村 修三
    国際政治
    1979年 1979 巻 63 号 55-68,L3
    発行日: 1979/10/15
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    (1) Israel is not a militaristic state although she is a model of ‘nation-in- arms’ in the sense that military defense occupies the center of her people's life.
    (2) The reason why Israel is ‘nation-in-arms’ is due to the fact that she was surrounded by hostile countries which do not recognize her legitimacy as a state, and that she has actually fought four times with them in the past. In addition to this, holocaust analogy and ‘Masada complex’ which are latent in the psychology of Israelis, highten terror in their heart.
    (3) But, up to now, Israel has never faced the critical situation in which she could be actually annihilated. Rather, she has always won overwhelming victory in the past wars, with the only exception of the Yom Kippur War. At the same time, it is an undeniable fact that the terror of annihilation has been utilized for the justification of her intransigent policy.
    (4) Israel has tried to persuade the Arab states for their recognition of Israeli's legitimacy as a state, while totally rejecting the wish of Palestinians for the establishment of their independent state. After the end of Six-Day-War, Israel has made every efforts to secure her security on the basis of tei ritorialism by bringing out the conception of ‘defensible borders’.
    (5) If Israel wishes to secure the true security, it might be indispensable for her to recognize the Palestinians' legitimate rights of self-determination through peaceful settlement, in stead of insisting the conception of security on the basis of territorialism.
  • ―石油市場の構造変動と「対外石油政策」の形成、1967-1973―
    白鳥 潤一郎
    国際安全保障
    2011年 38 巻 4 号 106-123
    発行日: 2011/03/31
    公開日: 2022/04/14
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 池田 明史
    中東レビュー
    2020年 7 巻 14-19
    発行日: 2020年
    公開日: 2020/03/27
    ジャーナル フリー HTML
  • 舘 葉月 舘 葉月
    日仏歴史学会会報
    2016年 31 巻 63-66
    発行日: 2016年
    公開日: 2020/03/31
    ジャーナル フリー
  • ユダヤ人国家の『内なる脅威』アラブ系市民
    池田 明史
    ユダヤ・イスラエル研究
    2015年 29 巻 41-
    発行日: 2015年
    公開日: 2020/09/18
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス
  • 天野 知恵子
    史学雑誌
    1990年 99 巻 1 号 129-130
    発行日: 1990/01/20
    公開日: 2017/11/29
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 天野 知恵子
    史学雑誌
    1990年 99 巻 1 号 129-130
    発行日: 1990/01/20
    公開日: 2017/11/29
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 山尾 大
    国際政治
    2021年 2021 巻 204 号 204_117-204_125
    発行日: 2021/03/31
    公開日: 2022/03/31
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 日中歴史教科書を比較して
    福島 智子, 伊古田 絵里, 太田 ミユキ
    専門日本語教育研究
    2012年 14 巻 53-58
    発行日: 2012/12/22
    公開日: 2013/07/22
    ジャーナル フリー
    筆者らは、中国人留学生を対象とした現代史用語リスト作成を試みた。このリスト作成には2つの目的がある。第一は、専門科目の講義理解の支援とすること、第二は、中国人留学生が自国で学習した情報と結びつけられる支援とすることである。まず第一の目的のために、現在市販されている高校の世界史教科書の、現代史部分の太字の用語のうち半数以上重なる91語を抽出し、留学生にとって必要な用語として選定した。次に第二の目的のために、その91の重要語の、中国の歴史教科書における出現状況の調査結果をリストに盛り込んだ。調査の結果を踏まえ、91の重要語を、(1)「中国の教科書にない」、(2)「用語としてはないが説明記述はある」、(3)「中国の教科書に用語としてある」の3つにグループ分けした。(3)は、用語として記載されていても、情報の量や内容に違いがあった。(1)の用語は26語あり、これらは用語とその情報を学習する必要がある。(2)は11語あり、用語そのものを導入し、留学生が持っている情報と結びつける学習が必要になる。(3)は54語あり、そのうちの21語は内容や量が同程度であった。また日本の方が情報の量が多いものは3語で、その情報量の差を補う必要がある。日本の方が情報の量が少ないものは22語あった。さらに内容が異なるものが8語あった。これらの語は日中の情報の違いを学習する必要がある。今後はこのような差異を意識した教室活動を行っていきたい。
  • 三浦 美紀
    宗教研究
    2007年 80 巻 4 号 1221-1222
    発行日: 2007/03/30
    公開日: 2017/07/14
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 福士 慈稔
    宗教研究
    2007年 80 巻 4 号 1220-1221
    発行日: 2007/03/30
    公開日: 2017/07/14
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 中東:1970年代の政治変動
    岡倉 徹志
    国際政治
    1983年 1983 巻 73 号 28-43,L8
    発行日: 1983/05/25
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The purpose of this paper is to present a brief account of the political changes in Syria since the Baa'th first came into power in 1963 and the development of inner-politics from the beginning period of the Baa'th regime to the present. It is also designed to offer an interpretation of these developments to help explain the kaleidoscopic character of the changing relationships among power-centers.
    In particular, this paper attempts to elucidate the following points: Firstly, in a major intra-party split that took place in February 1966, the moderate wing of the Baa'th party was purged by radicals; this political coup signaled the party's further turn to the Left in policy. These changes only further alienated conservative and pious Islamic opinion. However, the regime's mounting clashes with the West and Israel have temporarily disoriented Muslim opinion.
    Secondly, after General Hafiz al Asad's rise to power in 1971, the question arises as to how he managed to revise Syria's domestic and foreign policies. By late 1976, however, the regime's policies were faltering and domestic grievances were accumulating; relations between the Baa'th and urban centers of opposition again began to sour, a disaffection that gradually built up into the anti-regime explosions of 1970-80.
    The regime's intervention in Lebanon—in paticular, its drive against the Palestinians and the Sunni Left—required it to suppress domestic opposition, thus weakening its own support base, and antagonizing segments of Sunni opinion, which viewed it as an Alawite suppression of Sunnis in favor of Christians. Most dangerous of all, the intervention seriously exacerbated sectarian cleavages in the army. By the late 1970s, the regime's foreign policy increasingly appeared to have reached a dead end.
    Finally, the political Islam, the main alternative. to the Baa'th, is now trying to undermine the regime led by the Alawites. If a realignment of political forces, pitting the whole Sunni community on the basis of sectarian solidarity, in alliance with all other disaffected elements, against the numerically much inferior Alawites entrenched in the regime can be attained, the Syrian political scene will change completely its impact affecting the politics of the Fertile Crescent. But this would require breaking the cross-sectarian coalition at the center of the Baa'th state; destroying military discipline and party solidarity; and detaching the peasant, worker, and employee elements at the Baa'th base.
  • 栗田 禎子
    史学雑誌
    1990年 99 巻 1 号 128-129
    発行日: 1990/01/20
    公開日: 2017/11/29
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 小池 郁子
    宗教研究
    2011年 84 巻 4 号 1275-1276
    発行日: 2011/03/30
    公開日: 2017/07/14
    ジャーナル フリー
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