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  • 吉田 修
    平和研究
    2000年 25 巻 49-58
    発行日: 2000/11/20
    公開日: 2024/06/05
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 花谷 守正
    紙パ技協誌
    2013年 67 巻 3 号 300
    発行日: 2013年
    公開日: 2014/02/22
    ジャーナル フリー
  • グローバル・システムの変容
    加藤 順美
    国際政治
    1996年 1996 巻 111 号 51-65,L11
    発行日: 1996/02/28
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    In this paper the movement for autonomy in East Pakistan will be examined with particular attention to the role of the Awami League (1949-1971). Based on that examination, this paper will also examine the factors responsible for the movement from autonomy to secession.
    Based on the old concept of the nation, autonomous groups within the nation were regarded as subordinate to the nation. But it is often the case that the individual autonomous groups relate to the respective nation not as a subordinate, but as an equal.
    Much research focuses on the existence of a common language and religion as the factors which act as the adhensive of any autonomous group. Based on that, they point out that those struggling for autonomy be conscious of their exploitation and oppression by other groups.
    However, even groups which recognize the crisis of their identity do not always relate with their countries as equals, and do not always begin a movement for autonomy. Furthermore, even if a movement to autonomy were to change to a movement for secession, that group would not necessarily gain independent statehood. There are many cases in which emergent countries face a movement to secession but there are not so many examples of success.
    Taking to the above into consideration, especially focusing on the relation between the movement for autonomy and the movement for secession, the following question will occur; Is the nature of the movement for autonomy different from the nature of the movement for secession? And what are the factors which cause an autonomy movement to become a secessionist movement?
    In the case of Pakistan, the groups which tried to gain autonomy became one unit and the autonomy movement became a secessionist movement. That is why examing the transition of the secessionist movement in East Pakistan may suggest an answer to this question.
  • 「分離主義」運動の活発化との関連で
    近藤 高史
    アジア研究
    2004年 50 巻 1 号 24-38
    発行日: 2004年
    公開日: 2014/09/15
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 横井 勝彦
    国際武器移転史
    2018年 2018 巻 1 号 85-106
    発行日: 2018/01/23
    公開日: 2025/01/21
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス
    The Indian military system was developed under the control of the British Empire. The Indian Navy, Army and Air Force were dependent on the arms transfer from Britain until the 1950s. Postindependence India was also in no position to be ‘self-sufficient’ in defence equipment. India acquired a substantial number of defence weapons and equipment from European countries, mainly from the Soviet Union. Since its independence, the country has faced a hostile security environment externally. It has been involved in several military confrontations with Pakistan and China. To address these challenges and strengthen its military capabilities within a short time, India had to depend on the Soviet Union for licensed production, which was a key component in the development of its indigenous defence capabilities.
     By focusing on the relationships between the military assistance India received during the Cold War, arms transfer to post-independence India and the indigenisation of the Indian defence industry, this paper examines the three following related subjects in sequence: (1)After the Second World War, mainly since the 1960s, the US and the Soviet Union started economic and military assistance to third-world countries on a large scale. First, we examine the aim and scale of such assistance to India. A close relationship existed between military assistance and arms transfer during the 1960s and 1970s.
    (2)The worsening Sino-Indian relations from 1961 onward provided a strong impetus to the military modernisation of India. The natural priority of the new government after independence was to build its industrial capacity and defence industry. We examine how military assistance contributed to the establishment of India’s indigenous defence industry.
    (3)The industrial and military development of Bangalore in the 1960s and 1970s was based on a diverse military–industrial–research complex. From this point of view, it is important to elucidate the relationship between Hindustan Aeronautics Limited and research institutes of aeronautical engineering, including the Indian Institute of Science and the Indian Institutes of Technology.
  • 伊豆山 真理
    国際政治
    2003年 2003 巻 134 号 155-158
    発行日: 2003/11/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • インドから見たソ連
    木村 雅昭
    ソ連・東欧学会年報
    1974年 1974 巻 3 号 24-39
    発行日: 1974年
    公開日: 2010/03/16
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 横井 勝彦
    国際武器移転史
    2016年 2016 巻 2 号 85-89
    発行日: 2016/07/25
    公開日: 2025/01/21
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス
  • 堀本 武功
    南アジア研究
    1993年 1993 巻 5 号 102-125
    発行日: 1993年
    公開日: 2011/03/16
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 真山 全
    世界法年報
    1988年 1988 巻 8 号 17-32
    発行日: 1988/10/15
    公開日: 2011/02/07
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 国際政治と国内政治の連繋
    森 利一
    国際政治
    1972年 1972 巻 46 号 17-44
    発行日: 1972/10/09
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • スプリングフィールド大学の歴訪の旅を視座に
    水谷 豊
    バスケットボール研究
    2019年 5 巻 75-84
    発行日: 2019年
    公開日: 2020/12/09
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス
  • 渡辺 昭一
    国際武器移転史
    2018年 2018 巻 1 号 59-83
    発行日: 2018/01/23
    公開日: 2025/01/21
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス
    This paper aims at surveying the deployment of the British policy of military assistance in South Asia from the post-war period to the end of the 1960s. In the process of decolonisation, the British government kept groping for whether her presence in South Asia could be maintainable in the post-war period. When India and Pakistan separately achieved independence in 1947, Britain had them decide to remain as a member of the Commonwealth succeedingly after independence. The intention was for both the maintenance in the sterling area based on dealings of sterling balances and the Commonwealth’s defense against the expansion of communism.
     When maintaining the Commonwealth’s relationship with South Asian countries, Britain set forth the parity (equal principle) in arms supply, but the arms supplied to India and Pakistan were mainly not the latest, but the used ones. Britain’s influential power, which could secure India as her monopoly market, disappeared in the early 1960s. On the other hand, refraining from the military intervention to South Asia at the end of World War II, the United States sought to strengthen military aid to Pakistan gradually during the military convention. This cooperation also reinforced Anglo-American ties dependent on the formation of the Baghdad Pact in the face of the strained states of the Middle East.
     When the vulnerability of India’s defense system appeared in the course of Indo-China border conflicts, India’s urgent request for arms also became a touchstone of Britain and the United States from both sides of international orders in South Asia and their financial burdens. They could not fully respond to strengthen India’s defense system at the Nassau Conference in December 1962, and then encouraged India to purchase the MIG-21 fighter from the then-Soviet Union. As India’s non-alignment policy urged in the 1950s disappeared, in turn, the logic of the Cold War was strengthened. Finally, when Britain and the United States ceased their military aid at the second Indo-Pakistan War in 1965, it symbolised the breakdown of the British military aid policy in South Asia, the aims of which were to solve Kashmir’s issues by treating India and Pakistan with parity.
  • 吉田 修
    アジア研究
    2016年 62 巻 4 号 33-38
    発行日: 2016/10/31
    公開日: 2016/11/23
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 南アジアの国家と国際関係
    吉田 修
    国際政治
    2001年 2001 巻 127 号 33-49,L8
    発行日: 2001/05/18
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Facing an acute politico-economic crisis in the mid-60's, India embarked on change in its strategy for self-reliance toward the end of that decade. It was a change from the strategy introduced by the late Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri. His government had contemplated massive economic liberalization in order to attract foreign money, which might keep the Central Government's superiority in terms of distribution of the resources to the States, while accepting more participation by the State bosses in central affairs. The process of strategic change started in 1966 with the infamous devaluation of the Rupee, and ended up with more isolation from technological development by international standards. The inability of the Aid-India Consortium to raise aid money to meet the Indian need to import the necessary goods for structural reform was the main reason for India to change course.
    Indian reaction was to balance its imports and exports so as to accumulate its foreign exchange reserves high enough to be a cushion against the lever of the donors. In this context it began to stress import substitution through which some reduction of imports could be expected. India also promoted more exports of traditional goods and raw materials. But what was central in its modification of self-reliance strategy was the role of East European countries and especially of the Soviet Union. The Indian government under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi found its way out in its comparative advantage in the export of light manufactured goods to that region, which was established through the import substitution by having imported capital goods from the developed world till the mid-60's. East Europeans on their side needed to import consumer goods of a certain standard that India was now proud of attaining and did not lag very far behind the international standard at the time of late-1960's. Getting sufficiently confident of its export prospects to them, and finding the availability there of the items India most acutely needed, military weapons, when it decided to save foreign exchange as much as possible, there was established a complementary interdependence between India and East Europe.
    This modification could not be a long-term strategy as it was inherently static because it was based on the technological level at certain point of time and attained through its import substitution strategy till the mid-60's. Although India tried to keep up the international standard, there was a limitation to seek them in the open market. The international standards were kept up by the multinational corporations, from which India decisively departed as a result of failed devaluation incidents. In fact, the oil crisis made all efforts at diminishing the trade deficit come to nothing, and India could not help relying on some external means like the export of laborers to the oil-producing countries in the Middle East or accepting the Soviet offer to add crude oil to the list of Soviet exports of barter trade agreement, thus accumulating a contradiction till the collapse of the Soviet Union.
    The split of the Congress Party occurred in the same year as the change in strategy started. For most of the State bosses, or the Old Guard or the Syndicate, who had lost their seats in the 1967 elections, the split completed the process of the strategic change, as after all their way back by relying on the central government would be blocked by this change. Their criticism against Indira Gandhi and her supporters as Russian agents was off the point as the new strategy was based on the interdependence between India and the Socialist countries. This can also explain India's non-alignment status after its signing of the alliance treaty with the Soviet Union two years later.
  • 吉田 靖之
    高岡法学
    2022年 41 巻 171-186
    発行日: 2022年
    公開日: 2023/02/15
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 永野 和茂
    アジア研究
    2020年 66 巻 3 号 1-19
    発行日: 2020/07/31
    公開日: 2020/09/12
    ジャーナル フリー

    From early 1965 to June, armed conflict between India and Pakistan broke out over the Rann of Kutch. Amid mounting international concerns over the spread of the crisis in the subcontinent, the two countries reached an agreement on a ceasefire through Britain’s good offices. Shortly after, both governments submitted the border dispute to the international arbitration tribunal. After two years of deliberation, in February 1968, the arbitration tribunal awarded the final decision for border demarcation and settled the dispute.

    The purpose of this paper is to reconsider the development of resolving the historical and territorial disputes between two countries over the Kutch-Sindh border problem. In particular, focusing on the course of the ceasefire agreement of Rann of Kutch dispute in 1965 and the process of border demarcation by the subsequent arbitration award, this study analyzes how the international relations surrounding the two parties, as well as Indo-Pakistan relations, influenced the final settlement of this border dispute. What was the reason that led to an agreement without expanding the historical confrontation into a massive war? What was the factor that brought the two countries to a territorial conclusion? In response to these questions, this paper addresses the accumulation and its influence of border negotiations between New Delhi and Rawalpindi in the late 1950s, international involvement and its impact, the intersection of international politics of Cold War and regional politics in South Asia, and the domestic acceptance for the award of the arbitration tribunal.

    In conclusion, the decision of border demarcation had the political process of de-escalating conflict and drawing boundaries through consensus building. Under these circumstances, the two governments had worked hard on tough negotiations for border agreement, based on the consideration of lawyers, international organizations, and sometimes its allies.

    The ceasefire agreement in 1965 was a turning point in the history of the Kutch-Sindh border problem. In this background, the efforts of the two countries to negotiate a series of government border agreements since the late 1950s, the possibility that the US-Pakistan alliance had worked to curb the Indo-Pakistan conflict, the information sharing of some military personnel who intended to restrain the expansion of fighting, and the influence of the third country’s mediation ware observed. Also, the strategic decision of political leaders such as Shastri’s sense of crisis for communal disturbances and Ayub’s calculation to favor negotiations in the context of the international community strongly influenced the attitudes of the two countries towards a ceasefire.

    The international arbitration tribunal, which based on the ceasefire agreement, was the judicial manner in nature. Nevertheless, the procedure of the tribunal showed that they played an active role in the political solution with careful consideration of the balance between the two party’s claims. When the UN Secretary-General appointed a chairman of the tribunal, the United Nations formally guaranteed it. Furthermore, India, who was reluctant to confirm the award, did not reject it. It appeared that the government emphasized the standing position of India in the world despite being criticized by the domestic opposition. These points had become crucial prerequisites for the final settlement.

    The award was legally the final decision, but in reality, its implementation required domestic acceptance. Indeed, it was a controversial matter in public opinion. In India, some groups contested the award and attempted to bring a case to the court. All groups are not necessarily accepted diplomatic negotiations for conflict avoidance. The conclusion of the dispute received domestic criticism.

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  • 橋本 靖明
    日本航空宇宙学会誌
    2024年 72 巻 6 号 200-205
    発行日: 2024/06/05
    公開日: 2024/06/05
    ジャーナル 認証あり

    本稿は,特集「宇宙政策・宇宙法・宇宙安全保障とは何か?」の第3回であり「宇宙安全保障とは何か?」をテーマとして,宇宙空間の安全保障問題を論じようとするものである.世界全体として見ると,宇宙活動や宇宙計画の多くの分野はその開始以来,安全保障部門によって進められてきた.冷戦期に世界の宇宙活動を先導した米ソ両国は安全保障分野においてもまた先導役となっていたのである.冷戦構造終了によってロシア(旧ソ連)の宇宙活動能力が低下する中,代わって米国に拮抗しようと台頭したのは中国であり,安全保障部門と一体化した宇宙活動を急速に推し進めている.日本はこうした米国,ロシア,中国とは異なり非軍事目的に限って宇宙活動を行ってきたが,1998年のいわゆるテポドンショックなどを受けて方針を変更,さらに2008年の宇宙基本法成立以降,安全保障も明白に意識した宇宙活動へとシフトしつつある.

  • 天野 健作
    国際政治
    2017年 2017 巻 186 号 186_146-186_158
    発行日: 2017/01/30
    公開日: 2017/04/07
    ジャーナル フリー

    This study considers the conflict-prevention mechanisms over international rivers between India and its neighboring countries (Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal). India is a country where three important international rivers flow. The discussion concerns the Indus, the Ganges and the Mahakali rivers. Conflicts have taken place in the past over water resources between India and its neighboring countries, but India has presently signed treaties and Memorandum of Understandings and established mutually acceptable mechanisms for the development and management of the rivers. Furthermore, they have put in place permanent joint organizations, exchange of data, and river inspections.

    Previous studies have analyzed how the conflict-prevention mechanisms were established in the process; however, no one has examined their effectiveness and weaknesses. In addition, there are no studies comparing policies and diplomatic efforts for all three rivers.

    India and its neighbors have instituted permanent joint organizations to manage the water resources and have kept these organizations far from another politics. The role of mechanism’s factor is important and thus it was also investigated. For example, in the case of the Indus River, the mechanism does not specify the quantity of water allocated as shown in the Ganges River, but it effectively provides for a territorial type of sharing. It does not change the bounders between India and Pakistan, but traces a fictitious line that divides the basin and limits the sovereign rights of use of each state. In the case of the Mahakali River,which is at the border of India and Nepal, both countries benefited equally from the instituted irrigation and flood management policies.

    Finally, this study examined the weaknesses of the conflict-prevention mechanisms. In the case of the Indus River, Pakistan has filed complaints against India to the Permanent Court of Arbitration concerning water resources for India to resolve the conflict. The court favored Pakistan on three out of four points, namely the restriction on India to maintain the minimum flow of the River, environmental protection and the diversion of water. However, the court ruled against and maintained that the instituted mechanisms function well.

    In conclusion, while water supply and demand across the world is tight, considering mechanisms to prevent conflicts over water resources between countries will be significant. Especially, water demand in Asia is even sharply increasing compared to the world. Among them, India is a unique example of a country that shares waterways with more than one country.

  • 南アジア核時代の10年
    伊藤 融
    アジア研究
    2007年 53 巻 3 号 43-56
    発行日: 2007/07/31
    公開日: 2014/09/30
    ジャーナル フリー
    In May 1998, India and Pakistan carried out a series of nuclear tests and declared themselves “nuclear powers” — a move that shocked the international community and added a newdimension to the rivalries between these two neighbors. This article will attempt to analyze what led both to this nuclearization and what kind of influence it had on the whole world as well as on the region.
    From a strategic viewpoint, India had pushed ahead with its nuclear program in order to counter the threat of China, not of Pakistan, whereas Pakistan’s program was aimed at reducing the threat posed by India. That is to say, the power imbalance in the region (China > India > Pakistan) encouraged these two countries to go nuclear. India and Pakistan have faced increased security-related concerns since the collapse of the alliance structure that built up during the Cold War. In addition to these security interests, rising nationalism in the midst of globalization has created a political trend that has encouraged nuclearization.
    Now, in retrospect, we can ask the question: which side has benefited most from nuclearization?Regionally, Pakistan seems to have seized more advantages militarily and diplomatically, especially regarding the Kashmir issue. Globally, however, nuclearization has helped India to rise in the world: most major powers, including the United States, cannot help regarding and treating India as a global player. In contrast, the international community regards Pakistan with suspicion in the wake of revelations about the “nuclear black market.”
    In fact, this nuclearization, which drew international concern about the risk of nuclear war, has not only contributed to sustaining the ongoing peace process since 2003, but has also created aninternational environment in which each side stops short of resorting to war even in times of crisis. “Rising India” will also hesitate to draw a sword. Unfortunately, however, it is difficult to conclude that a stable“ nuclear peace” has been established between India and Pakistan considering their geopolitical and strategic characteristics, lack of a relationship of mutual trust, persistent cross-border terrorism, and the fragile state foundations of Pakistan.
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