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  • 花谷 守正
    紙パ技協誌
    2013年 67 巻 3 号 300
    発行日: 2013年
    公開日: 2014/02/22
    ジャーナル フリー
  • グローバル・システムの変容
    加藤 順美
    国際政治
    1996年 1996 巻 111 号 51-65,L11
    発行日: 1996/02/28
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    In this paper the movement for autonomy in East Pakistan will be examined with particular attention to the role of the Awami League (1949-1971). Based on that examination, this paper will also examine the factors responsible for the movement from autonomy to secession.
    Based on the old concept of the nation, autonomous groups within the nation were regarded as subordinate to the nation. But it is often the case that the individual autonomous groups relate to the respective nation not as a subordinate, but as an equal.
    Much research focuses on the existence of a common language and religion as the factors which act as the adhensive of any autonomous group. Based on that, they point out that those struggling for autonomy be conscious of their exploitation and oppression by other groups.
    However, even groups which recognize the crisis of their identity do not always relate with their countries as equals, and do not always begin a movement for autonomy. Furthermore, even if a movement to autonomy were to change to a movement for secession, that group would not necessarily gain independent statehood. There are many cases in which emergent countries face a movement to secession but there are not so many examples of success.
    Taking to the above into consideration, especially focusing on the relation between the movement for autonomy and the movement for secession, the following question will occur; Is the nature of the movement for autonomy different from the nature of the movement for secession? And what are the factors which cause an autonomy movement to become a secessionist movement?
    In the case of Pakistan, the groups which tried to gain autonomy became one unit and the autonomy movement became a secessionist movement. That is why examing the transition of the secessionist movement in East Pakistan may suggest an answer to this question.
  • 「分離主義」運動の活発化との関連で
    近藤 高史
    アジア研究
    2004年 50 巻 1 号 24-38
    発行日: 2004年
    公開日: 2014/09/15
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 伊豆山 真理
    国際政治
    2003年 2003 巻 134 号 155-158
    発行日: 2003/11/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • インドから見たソ連
    木村 雅昭
    ソ連・東欧学会年報
    1974年 1974 巻 3 号 24-39
    発行日: 1974年
    公開日: 2010/03/16
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 堀本 武功
    南アジア研究
    1993年 1993 巻 5 号 102-125
    発行日: 1993年
    公開日: 2011/03/16
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 真山 全
    世界法年報
    1988年 1988 巻 8 号 17-32
    発行日: 1988/10/15
    公開日: 2011/02/07
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 国際政治と国内政治の連繋
    森 利一
    国際政治
    1972年 1972 巻 46 号 17-44
    発行日: 1972/10/09
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • スプリングフィールド大学の歴訪の旅を視座に
    水谷 豊
    バスケットボール研究
    2019年 5 巻 75-84
    発行日: 2019年
    公開日: 2020/12/09
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス
  • 吉田 修
    アジア研究
    2016年 62 巻 4 号 33-38
    発行日: 2016/10/31
    公開日: 2016/11/23
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 南アジアの国家と国際関係
    吉田 修
    国際政治
    2001年 2001 巻 127 号 33-49,L8
    発行日: 2001/05/18
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Facing an acute politico-economic crisis in the mid-60's, India embarked on change in its strategy for self-reliance toward the end of that decade. It was a change from the strategy introduced by the late Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri. His government had contemplated massive economic liberalization in order to attract foreign money, which might keep the Central Government's superiority in terms of distribution of the resources to the States, while accepting more participation by the State bosses in central affairs. The process of strategic change started in 1966 with the infamous devaluation of the Rupee, and ended up with more isolation from technological development by international standards. The inability of the Aid-India Consortium to raise aid money to meet the Indian need to import the necessary goods for structural reform was the main reason for India to change course.
    Indian reaction was to balance its imports and exports so as to accumulate its foreign exchange reserves high enough to be a cushion against the lever of the donors. In this context it began to stress import substitution through which some reduction of imports could be expected. India also promoted more exports of traditional goods and raw materials. But what was central in its modification of self-reliance strategy was the role of East European countries and especially of the Soviet Union. The Indian government under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi found its way out in its comparative advantage in the export of light manufactured goods to that region, which was established through the import substitution by having imported capital goods from the developed world till the mid-60's. East Europeans on their side needed to import consumer goods of a certain standard that India was now proud of attaining and did not lag very far behind the international standard at the time of late-1960's. Getting sufficiently confident of its export prospects to them, and finding the availability there of the items India most acutely needed, military weapons, when it decided to save foreign exchange as much as possible, there was established a complementary interdependence between India and East Europe.
    This modification could not be a long-term strategy as it was inherently static because it was based on the technological level at certain point of time and attained through its import substitution strategy till the mid-60's. Although India tried to keep up the international standard, there was a limitation to seek them in the open market. The international standards were kept up by the multinational corporations, from which India decisively departed as a result of failed devaluation incidents. In fact, the oil crisis made all efforts at diminishing the trade deficit come to nothing, and India could not help relying on some external means like the export of laborers to the oil-producing countries in the Middle East or accepting the Soviet offer to add crude oil to the list of Soviet exports of barter trade agreement, thus accumulating a contradiction till the collapse of the Soviet Union.
    The split of the Congress Party occurred in the same year as the change in strategy started. For most of the State bosses, or the Old Guard or the Syndicate, who had lost their seats in the 1967 elections, the split completed the process of the strategic change, as after all their way back by relying on the central government would be blocked by this change. Their criticism against Indira Gandhi and her supporters as Russian agents was off the point as the new strategy was based on the interdependence between India and the Socialist countries. This can also explain India's non-alignment status after its signing of the alliance treaty with the Soviet Union two years later.
  • 吉田 靖之
    高岡法学
    2022年 41 巻 171-186
    発行日: 2022年
    公開日: 2023/02/15
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 永野 和茂
    アジア研究
    2020年 66 巻 3 号 1-19
    発行日: 2020/07/31
    公開日: 2020/09/12
    ジャーナル フリー

    From early 1965 to June, armed conflict between India and Pakistan broke out over the Rann of Kutch. Amid mounting international concerns over the spread of the crisis in the subcontinent, the two countries reached an agreement on a ceasefire through Britain’s good offices. Shortly after, both governments submitted the border dispute to the international arbitration tribunal. After two years of deliberation, in February 1968, the arbitration tribunal awarded the final decision for border demarcation and settled the dispute.

    The purpose of this paper is to reconsider the development of resolving the historical and territorial disputes between two countries over the Kutch-Sindh border problem. In particular, focusing on the course of the ceasefire agreement of Rann of Kutch dispute in 1965 and the process of border demarcation by the subsequent arbitration award, this study analyzes how the international relations surrounding the two parties, as well as Indo-Pakistan relations, influenced the final settlement of this border dispute. What was the reason that led to an agreement without expanding the historical confrontation into a massive war? What was the factor that brought the two countries to a territorial conclusion? In response to these questions, this paper addresses the accumulation and its influence of border negotiations between New Delhi and Rawalpindi in the late 1950s, international involvement and its impact, the intersection of international politics of Cold War and regional politics in South Asia, and the domestic acceptance for the award of the arbitration tribunal.

    In conclusion, the decision of border demarcation had the political process of de-escalating conflict and drawing boundaries through consensus building. Under these circumstances, the two governments had worked hard on tough negotiations for border agreement, based on the consideration of lawyers, international organizations, and sometimes its allies.

    The ceasefire agreement in 1965 was a turning point in the history of the Kutch-Sindh border problem. In this background, the efforts of the two countries to negotiate a series of government border agreements since the late 1950s, the possibility that the US-Pakistan alliance had worked to curb the Indo-Pakistan conflict, the information sharing of some military personnel who intended to restrain the expansion of fighting, and the influence of the third country’s mediation ware observed. Also, the strategic decision of political leaders such as Shastri’s sense of crisis for communal disturbances and Ayub’s calculation to favor negotiations in the context of the international community strongly influenced the attitudes of the two countries towards a ceasefire.

    The international arbitration tribunal, which based on the ceasefire agreement, was the judicial manner in nature. Nevertheless, the procedure of the tribunal showed that they played an active role in the political solution with careful consideration of the balance between the two party’s claims. When the UN Secretary-General appointed a chairman of the tribunal, the United Nations formally guaranteed it. Furthermore, India, who was reluctant to confirm the award, did not reject it. It appeared that the government emphasized the standing position of India in the world despite being criticized by the domestic opposition. These points had become crucial prerequisites for the final settlement.

    The award was legally the final decision, but in reality, its implementation required domestic acceptance. Indeed, it was a controversial matter in public opinion. In India, some groups contested the award and attempted to bring a case to the court. All groups are not necessarily accepted diplomatic negotiations for conflict avoidance. The conclusion of the dispute received domestic criticism.

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  • 天野 健作
    国際政治
    2017年 2017 巻 186 号 186_146-186_158
    発行日: 2017/01/30
    公開日: 2017/04/07
    ジャーナル フリー

    This study considers the conflict-prevention mechanisms over international rivers between India and its neighboring countries (Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal). India is a country where three important international rivers flow. The discussion concerns the Indus, the Ganges and the Mahakali rivers. Conflicts have taken place in the past over water resources between India and its neighboring countries, but India has presently signed treaties and Memorandum of Understandings and established mutually acceptable mechanisms for the development and management of the rivers. Furthermore, they have put in place permanent joint organizations, exchange of data, and river inspections.

    Previous studies have analyzed how the conflict-prevention mechanisms were established in the process; however, no one has examined their effectiveness and weaknesses. In addition, there are no studies comparing policies and diplomatic efforts for all three rivers.

    India and its neighbors have instituted permanent joint organizations to manage the water resources and have kept these organizations far from another politics. The role of mechanism’s factor is important and thus it was also investigated. For example, in the case of the Indus River, the mechanism does not specify the quantity of water allocated as shown in the Ganges River, but it effectively provides for a territorial type of sharing. It does not change the bounders between India and Pakistan, but traces a fictitious line that divides the basin and limits the sovereign rights of use of each state. In the case of the Mahakali River,which is at the border of India and Nepal, both countries benefited equally from the instituted irrigation and flood management policies.

    Finally, this study examined the weaknesses of the conflict-prevention mechanisms. In the case of the Indus River, Pakistan has filed complaints against India to the Permanent Court of Arbitration concerning water resources for India to resolve the conflict. The court favored Pakistan on three out of four points, namely the restriction on India to maintain the minimum flow of the River, environmental protection and the diversion of water. However, the court ruled against and maintained that the instituted mechanisms function well.

    In conclusion, while water supply and demand across the world is tight, considering mechanisms to prevent conflicts over water resources between countries will be significant. Especially, water demand in Asia is even sharply increasing compared to the world. Among them, India is a unique example of a country that shares waterways with more than one country.

  • 南アジア核時代の10年
    伊藤 融
    アジア研究
    2007年 53 巻 3 号 43-56
    発行日: 2007/07/31
    公開日: 2014/09/30
    ジャーナル フリー
    In May 1998, India and Pakistan carried out a series of nuclear tests and declared themselves “nuclear powers” — a move that shocked the international community and added a newdimension to the rivalries between these two neighbors. This article will attempt to analyze what led both to this nuclearization and what kind of influence it had on the whole world as well as on the region.
    From a strategic viewpoint, India had pushed ahead with its nuclear program in order to counter the threat of China, not of Pakistan, whereas Pakistan’s program was aimed at reducing the threat posed by India. That is to say, the power imbalance in the region (China > India > Pakistan) encouraged these two countries to go nuclear. India and Pakistan have faced increased security-related concerns since the collapse of the alliance structure that built up during the Cold War. In addition to these security interests, rising nationalism in the midst of globalization has created a political trend that has encouraged nuclearization.
    Now, in retrospect, we can ask the question: which side has benefited most from nuclearization?Regionally, Pakistan seems to have seized more advantages militarily and diplomatically, especially regarding the Kashmir issue. Globally, however, nuclearization has helped India to rise in the world: most major powers, including the United States, cannot help regarding and treating India as a global player. In contrast, the international community regards Pakistan with suspicion in the wake of revelations about the “nuclear black market.”
    In fact, this nuclearization, which drew international concern about the risk of nuclear war, has not only contributed to sustaining the ongoing peace process since 2003, but has also created aninternational environment in which each side stops short of resorting to war even in times of crisis. “Rising India” will also hesitate to draw a sword. Unfortunately, however, it is difficult to conclude that a stable“ nuclear peace” has been established between India and Pakistan considering their geopolitical and strategic characteristics, lack of a relationship of mutual trust, persistent cross-border terrorism, and the fragile state foundations of Pakistan.
  • 第4回
    拓 徹, 湊 一樹
    アジア経済
    2021年 62 巻 2 号 63-85
    発行日: 2021/06/15
    公開日: 2021/07/03
    ジャーナル フリー HTML
  • 周 生升
    アジア研究
    2018年 64 巻 1 号 56-78
    発行日: 2018/01/31
    公開日: 2018/03/02
    ジャーナル フリー

    In recent years, China has achieved the “rise of economy”, which shows the hegemonic behavior to change the current situation by force in the political and secure fields including the South China Sea issue. Meanwhile, regional integration and free trade is promoted by China’s leadership in economic field. Whether it has been named as hegemony or leadership in above ways, the rising of great power tends to accompany expansionist diplomacy that trying to expand its influence and rules to other countries and regions.

    Studies of the rising Chinese diplomacy were increasingly well-documented, but some of them just analyzed the reasons of Chinese expansionist diplomacy, which mainly focused on China’s “push factors”. However, it is still poor understood whether neighboring countries react to China’s behavior passively or not. In the present paper, relations between China and Pakistan from the viewpoint of Pakistan side will be further discussed.

    The ambition and willingness of China is a necessary prerequisite in Chinese expansionism diplomacy. Therefore, this paper will discuss the following parts. First of all, existing research has focused on “push factor” of China’s side which explained “why China expands” and “how to expand”. Nevertheless, this approach didn’t take account into the reaction of target countries, which was closely related to the Chinese expansionism diplomacy could be accepted. Secondly, the “push factor” of the China’s side has been reported to play an important role in the development of China’s expansion. And the “pull factor” from the target country’s side may also contribute to its expansion.

    The present paper reviewed the Sino-Pak relations, and then analyzed the “pull factors” of Pakistan side that influenced the development of China’s expansionist diplomacy. Together, unlike the “push factor”, which emphasized China’s diplomatic strategy and hegemonic ambition about Chinese expansionism diplomacy, this paper indicated that we should not overlook the “pull factor”, which Pakistan spontaneously depended on China due to the difficulties of domestic and foreign affairs in the country. Specifically, it was assumed that the “pull factor” led to the expansion of China, and how far target countries accept its expansion as well. Based on the studies about the diplomacy of rising China, it seems reasonable to assume that “push factor” complementing by “pull factor”.

  • 向田 公輝
    アジア・アフリカ地域研究
    2022年 21 巻 2 号 194-228
    発行日: 2022/03/31
    公開日: 2022/04/16
    ジャーナル フリー

    This study aims to explain the cycle of conflict escalation and tension reduction between India and Pakistan during the post-Cold War period. India and Pakistan have reiterated military conflict and diplomatic dialogue since their independence. They have fought three wars against each other and now have the highest risk of nuclear war worldwide. In the post-Cold War period, India and Pakistan have often threatened nuclear war, with incidents including the India-Pakistan nuclear armament in May 1998, the Kargil conflict from May to July 1999, and a military standoff from December 2001 to May 2002. Conflict escalation between the two countries has been explained from two standpoints. First, studies focusing on the structural factors of international politics have explained that the end of the Cold War fostered conflicts between India and Pakistan. Second, studies focusing on the internal political factors affecting India and Pakistan showed that the instability of Pakistan’s democratic institutions and the rise of extreme religious ideologies in both countries facilitated the conflicts. However, such factors are insufficient to explain the cycle of conflict escalation and tension reduction between India and Pakistan during the post-Cold War period.

    First, this paper discusses how the ideology of the Indian regime affects the India-Pakistan relationship. Second, the degree of stability of the ruling coalition in the Indian parliament influences the cycle of conflict and tension reduction between India and Pakistan. Thus, this paper reveals the dynamics of conflict escalation and tension reduction between India and Pakistan.

  • 政治学の可能性の世界
    森 利一
    年報政治学
    1976年 27 巻 121-157,en6
    発行日: 1977/03/31
    公開日: 2009/12/21
    ジャーナル フリー
    This study aims at analyzing the political dynamics of developing countries with the concept of the ‘Third World.’ It seems, however, the analytical method for the study of the politics of the Third World has not yet been established.
    In the past, studies of Asia, Africa, and Latin America in Japan centered around the nationalist movements, internal politics, and the international relations among countries in these areas, while little effort has been attempted to characterize the politics of the Third World seen as a whole.
    One of the features of the political situation of the Third World, as the writer observes it, is instability brought about by various factors—geographical, cultural, historical, ideological—entangled in international settings.
    Another feature can be seen in the political systems being transitional. Many instances have taken place in which the revolutionary council established as the consequence of a military coup proceeds toward a socialist state. The writer assumes that such circumstances will lead the military in power to dictatorship.
    In his analysis the writer shows a critical attitude to the military who are in most cases apt to reinforce armaments. The writer presumes that this attitude has, at the same time, something in common with his standpoint against the military expansion race between the two nuclear-armed superstates.
    The writer presents in this study a new approach to the political analysis of the Third World with an orientation backed up by the definite value judgment which is based on contemporary peace research.
  • 西洋史学
    2019年 267 巻 77-
    発行日: 2019年
    公開日: 2022/05/10
    ジャーナル フリー
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