本稿の課題は，戦時期に資金計画の一環として形成された地方債計画が，終戦後にどのような経緯を経て，戦後のわが国の地方債制度を支えるシステムとして再形成されることとなったのかを明らかにすることである。戦時期には国家資金計画による地方債計画の下，地方債の全額が政府資金によって引き受けられた。終戦後に戦時期の地方債計画は撤廃されたが，政府資金がインフレにより蓄積不足が続いたため，一部の地方債が民間資金によって引き受けられることとなった。ところが，地方債の消化が困難をきわめたため，大蔵省と日銀により計画的な消化を図る政策が展開されることとなった。こうした過程で大蔵省は，民間資金と政府資金による引受量を把握しつつ，新たな起債許可権限を用いてそれらに見合うように地方債発行額を調整することが可能となった。こうして，終戦後に撤廃された地方債計画は新たな装いをもって復活し，戦後に引き継がれることとなったのである。

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 This thesis intends to explore the rationale behind the adoption and abolition of Yokohama's local development exaction system (“LDE system”). LDE systems were independently and locally formulated by local governments in response to challenges they faced across Japan, and the city of Yokohama provides a leading example of a functional LDE system pursuant to which land developers were required to donate land for public use as a condition of their receiving development approval from the city government.
 In the mid-1960s, as Japan accelerated towards a period of high economic growth, the central government promoted the implementation of new housing developments by the private sector. These housing developments required unprecedented expenditure by local governments in order to build public infrastructure both inside and outside those development areas. At that time, Japan lacked strong national laws on the control of land use, and the city of Yokohama was uniquely vulnerable to the adverse consequences of unplanned housing developments caused by the huge influx of population from neighbouring Tokyo. In 1968 Ichio Asukata, the then socialist mayor, invited Akira Tamura, a young city planner, to the city administration to solve the town planning issues Yokohama was faced with.
 Japan's new Town Planning Act of 1968 did not contain provisions authorising the exaction of land. Therefore, Yokohama became the first big city to adopt an LDE system in 1968. Before its formal adoption, the city government had successfully reached an agreement with the Tokyu railway company about its duty to donate land to the public as a condition of its housing developments. Following this example, Tamura extended this concept of reaching agreements to exact public land donations across Yokohama. The terms of land-use exactions were recorded in bilateral agreements prior to development permission being granted.
 From its inception, the LDE system was used as an administrative guideline which ran the risk of legal challenge by affected developers. Although several lawsuits were filed, most verdicts were favourable towards local governments. However, as the economic situation deteriorated in the early 1990s, the Supreme Court issued verdicts finding in favour of housing developers. After Asukata's term in office, a succession of conservative mayors narrowed and reduced the obligations imposed under the LDE system and finally ended its use in 2004. Nevertheless, using the LDE system, the city government had acquired 307 hectares of public land by the end of the 1993 fiscal year, which was used to accommodate 150 public schools, accounting for 60% of all municipal schools opened between 1968 - 1993.
 The idea of development exactions persisted for nearly forty years, despite the central government issuing administrative orders to local governments instructing that they not make excessive demands of developers. Tamura wrote his doctoral thesis on this subject in 1981. Since then, no study assessing its aftermath and final abolition has occurred. This study is intended to present some idea of how local initiatives can be implemented independently by local governments in a highly constrained fiscal environment without any support from the central government.

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    Based on administrative documents and testimonies of (former) local government officials, this paper examines the relationship between redevelopment and cultural policy in the urban center of Yokohama City. At the center of the discussion in this paper was the idea that the direction of urban space indicated in past urban policies determines the way urban space is organized today. In the Minato Mirai district, high-rise buildings and housing complexes are still being built one after another as of 2021. This scene symbolizes the urban redevelopment based on global competition among cities since the Fordism crisis. This district was created by waterfront development in the 1980s, and was once called a “creative experimental city,” a term that now seems to have been largely forgotten. However, this term reminds us of the creative city policies that have been seen in municipalities around Japan since the 2000s, which link culture and urban policies. The concept of the “creative experimental city” that arose in the 1990s is one of the variations that has been repeatedly created as an image of the city, although it has something in common with contemporary creative city policies. It has been reduced to a discussion of urban design that interprets “culture” as the preservation of historical landscapes. However, this is hardly an attempt to implement the idea of the creative city, which is to revitalize the creative industries of the city. In this way, the Minato Mirai district, which had proclaimed itself a “creative experimental city,” turned into a space where skyscrapers were “concentrated” for the purpose of inducing capital through “selection,” which is different from a creative city.

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 Minato Mirai 21 (“MM21”) is a waterfront redevelopment scheme that blends offices, residential and commercial uses in the center of Yokohama. It is regarded as one of the most courageous attempts at waterfront redevelopment in Japan. It started with a proposal in 1964 by Akira Tamura, an eminent Japanese urban planner. This work was commissioned by Ichio Asukata, a liberal socialist mayor of Yokohama city. They envisaged the relocation of an aging but operational shipyard, harbor piers and railway freight yards in order to create a new site which would connect two existing central districts that had been separated by these industrial estates.
 Besides MM21, Tamura proposed other novel structural plans as “six spine projects” for Yokohama, which was then under population influx pressure from Tokyo. Because of the city government's financial constraints and limited planning power, Tamura initiated a paradigm shift in planning principles towards ceasing reliance on paternalistic support from central government. He strongly advocated a local planning approach with local government initiatives and also the introduction of privatization. Tamura wrote numerous books detailing his peerless experiences as a leader of the new urban planning and coordination bureau of the city for ten years. However, a chronological study of his work based on historical facts has not been attempted previously. This research aims to clarify the detailed process for planning and negotiation of MM21. The roles and positions adopted towards the MM21 scheme of the concerned bodies such as the City, Mitsubishi Group, Japan National Railways (“JNR”), the Yokohama maritime industry, Japan Housing and Development Corporation and national ministries have also been explored.
 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (“MHI”) owned the old shipyard, and Mitsubishi Estate acquired most of the shipyard land, becoming the major landowner in the area. JNR operated huge freight yards within the planned area. As the area was exclusively a harbor district, the maritime industry of Yokohama wished to protect their interests. Tamura prepared a new industrial estate in a newly reclaimed area to relocate the shipyard which made it possible for MHI to expand its production. Tamura negotiated and reached a deal with MHI, but they could not make a decision on relocation due to the extremely volatile economic situation surrounding the ship industry. At the same time, Tamura persuaded JNR to either move or abandon their freight yards, which caused a strong movement of community opposition to the relocation. Tamura envisaged an appropriate size for redevelopment of the Mitsubishi Estate in terms of private investment by minimizing the volume of reclaimed land. By allowing the company to make decent profits from the redevelopment, the construction of public infrastructure and facilities was planned mostly through private contributions rather than public investment.
 Tamura was later required by the new mayor to relinquish control over the second stage MM21's execution, but Tamura's successors were able to successfully execute the second stage of MM21. Regarding the privatization aspect of the project, Keiichi Ozawa as the new chief urban planner made a breakthrough by persuading the Mitsubishi group and the maritime industry to introduce a land readjustment scheme in the area and also provide a new maritime development area within it. After Ozawa left his role, Ryoichi Hirose, as the next chief planner, helped concerned bodies to reach agreement on the final implementation plan in 1983. Both Ozawa and Hirose were reliable staff members of Tamura's group. Although the redevelopment area was eventually expanded due to pressure from concerned parties, the continuity of dedicated chief urban planners made the project successful over a longer term.

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