化學の進歩に伴ひ陸軍の戰法は往時に比し其面目を一新し所謂軍の機械化は近代戰闘の特質を形成するに至れり而して軍の機械化は各種燃料の供給に待つべきもの大にして將來戰争と燃料とは今後盆々重大なる關係を招來すべく軍事當局と燃料關係當局とは互に相提携し以て國防の目的達成に努力するを要す

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To facilitate security assessment and security plan development required by the International Code for the Security of Ships and Port Facilities, various maritime administrations/organizations have published guidelines, which recommend methodologies similar to risk-based safety assessment. However, the recommended methodologies tend to rely largely on subjective evaluations by persons who conduct the assessment, leading to arbitrary judgments. More rational and objective assessment has thus been sought. The purpose of this study is to extract objective facts that are useful for security assessment. For this purpose we have developed the security incident database and analyzed the incidents. Based on the analysis, we point out that bombing has a significant factor in maritime security assessment, as well as in security assessment for shore side facilities.

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When they talk each other about their thoughts and opinions, children will understand more what others think, and try to pursue questions. Once a term, they are required to write a composition for an anthology and have a joint review on it. As a result, they exchange their opinions more willingly and become more eager to write. Also they are required to make a speech by turns every day, and write a column for their class newspaper. Then they are much more willing to find out problems around them.

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The coup d'etat against Cambodian chief of state Norodom Sihanouk in March, 1970 marked a turning point in Cambodian history. This article examines its causes, process, and outcome in the context of the war in Vietnam. Using mainly Vietnamese sources and declassified U. S. materials, the author tries to explain the structural back ground of the coup.
After 1965, the Worker's Party of Vietnam (VWP) needed Chinese arms supplies via the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville due to an adequate supply via the Ho Chi Minh route to the southern theaters especially Nam Bo. The VWP tried to maintain good relations with Sihanouk and opposed the armed struggle policy of Pol Pot's Comunist Party of Cambodia (CPK) against Sihanouk regime.
United State military intelligence recognized the importance of the Sihanoukville arms route as shown by reconaissance operations into Cambodia, although the Johnson administration rejected any military operations there.
The Nixon administration feverd military intelligence angainst State Department and C. I. A.. The American military and diplomatic stalemate led toan aggressive policy towards the Sihanouk regime for its arms transfer to the Vietnamese liberation forces.
As late as January 1970, after Sihanouk had left Cambodia for medical treatment, the White House decided to hatch the coup. Sirik Matak, then acting prime minister of the Cambodian Government, and Lon Nol's younger brother Lon Non acted as agents of the White House. Even before the coup, they had closed the Sihanoukville armes route. After the coup, the Cambodian government severed it's relations with the VWP, and despite Chinese efforts to renew arms transfer for the Vietnamese, Lon Nol never changed his mind.
Nixon's aim for the coup was realized, but it's effects remained temporary. The VWP moved quickly to form an allignment between Sihanouk and Pol Pot, moving its southern main forces into Cambodia to link up with its logistic forces from Laos.
The U. S. failed to gain an advantage either in the battlefields or the negotiation table. As a result the CPK gained wide areas of support both inside and outside Cambodia. The VWP failed to evaluate Pol Pot's nature at that time, the only longterm effect of the U. S. political ambitious initiated coup and the VWP reaction was the unitnentional opportunities it offerd to Pol Pot's.

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