The large-scale transfers of conventional weapons to the Third World have become a matter of growing controversy in recent years. The amount of arms trade by developing countries has grown from less than 2, 700 million dollars in 1968 to 13, 000 million dollars in 1978 (SIPRI Yearbook 1979). In addition to this trend in a decade, a new phenomenon is in existence in the late period of the 1970s.
The new trend in the arms transfers patterns of the Third World that may occur in the 1980s will result from greatly increased indigenous production. The demands of developing countries for indigenous weapons may be supported by the military technology transfers, which are widely diffused from industrialized countries as an instrument of diplomatic, military and economic policy.
The purposes of this paper are several. The first is to describe the major causes of transfers of military technology. It is clear that first and foremost reason among the pressures for indigenous weapon production is a desire to reduce dependence for suppliers. In the 1980s, such recipients will be more independent vis-à-vis the suppliers than they are today. The second purpose is to show the comprehensive process and structure of the military technology transfers into developing nations. They will be able to acquire the method to build up the facilities for equipments through considerable technical assistance by the suppliers. And finally, they will develop and obtain wholly indigenous “R & D” and production capabilities.
Spreading sophistcated technology, and increasing the number of weapon suppliers, it will be impossible for existing international systems to accomplish worldwide arms control and disarmament.

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International treaties such as the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention and the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty came into force after the end of the Cold War. Subsequently, the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and the Fifth Protocol to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons were adopted in 2001 and 2003 respectively. Movements to form or strengthen international regimes have been increasingly visible over the last 10 years even in international security issue areas, where it is believed international cooperation is rarely achieved. Formations of these regimes seem to be related to each other. However, scant attention has been paid to the interactions among various international regimes. This article tries to assess how international regimes are changing and how new international regimes are established by focusing on the dynamic interactions among various international regimes on Conventional Weapons.
International regimes are not independent from each other. The members of the international regimes are constituted from among some 200 nationstates. Quite a few international NGOs are involved in more than one international regime at the same time. Considering the same representatives from those nation states and international NGOs attend a couple of different regime meetings on similar topics, it is natural that changes within one regime or the formation of a new international regime influences the other regimes. This article demonstrates that interactions among international regimes, especially among those on conventional weapons, have become much denser, after the formation of the Mine Ban Treaty in 1997. Inspired by the successful formation of the Mine Ban Treaty, some international NGOs as well as nation states are trying to apply the lessons learned from the treaty formation process, the so-called Ottawa Process, to other issue areas, while others are trying to prevent another Ottawa Process from happening.
This article tries to clarify how the balance between “national security” and “humanitarian consideration” in conventional governance has shifted, due to the interactions among international regimes. Also, this article shows that after the formation of the Mine Ban Treaty, the roles of international NGOs are growing increasingly important in regime formation processes as well as in regime implementation. Although it remains unclear if such a trend will continue, analyses focusing on interactions among international regimes seem viable understanding both changes and developments related to conventional weapons governance.

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This article seeks to understand the aims of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and identify the difficulties with regard to its implementation. It first overviews the post-Cold War history of arms transfer control. It then analyzes the main articles of the ATT, focusing in particular on reporting obligations—one of the most controversial issues of the First Conference of States Parties to the ATT. The article goes on to consider the aims claimed (or presumably claimed) throughout history by human groups that have attempted to control arms transfers either unilaterally or multilaterally. The aims are classified into three types: security, moral-ethical, and economic. The aims propagated by the supporters of the ATT are categorized into these types, and their distinctive features are explained vis-à-vis the aims of past transfer control initiatives.
　In making sense of the claimed aims of the ATT, the article draws attention to the nature of boundary-making between lawfulness and unlawfulness with respect to the nature, use, and transfer of arms. Agreements to control and regulate arms naturally create simultaneously an unlawful as well as a lawful realm. By highlighting three cases of multilateral arms transfer control—the Catholic ban of arms transfers to the Saracens in the 12th–13th century, the Brussels Convention of the late 19th century, and “global” arms transfer control in the post-Cold War era—this article asserts that the claimed aims of arms transfer control should be understood within the overall logic of boundary-making between the lawful and unlawful nature, use, and transfer of arms. It also suggests that, in these three cases, this overall logic seems to have been in consonance with the dominant ideas of order during the same period.
　Finally, the article identifies the difficulties facing the implementation of the ATT and argues that these difficulties signify the key challenges to the ideas of order that have fostered the development of the treaty.

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