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  • 岡本 洋
    らん:纜
    2000年 48 巻 38-43
    発行日: 2000/06/30
    公開日: 2018/03/01
    解説誌・一般情報誌 フリー
  • ―小説『昼となく夜となく』と『帰郷』その他をめぐって―
    杉山 秀子
    ロシア・東欧学会年報
    1995年 1995 巻 24 号 118-125
    発行日: 1995年
    公開日: 2010/05/31
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 崎岡 光明, 宇張前 弘
    社会科研究
    1974年 23 巻 25-34
    発行日: 1974/11/15
    公開日: 2017/07/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 岩波書店 2002年 x+492+37ページ
    中川 雅彦
    アジア経済
    2003年 44 巻 1 号 115-119
    発行日: 2003/01/15
    公開日: 2023/03/27
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 岡本 洋
    らん:纜
    2000年 47 巻 51-58
    発行日: 2000/03/30
    公開日: 2018/02/25
    解説誌・一般情報誌 フリー
  • 永〓 三千輝
    ロシア史研究
    2008年 82 巻 17-25
    発行日: 2008/05/15
    公開日: 2017/07/25
    ジャーナル フリー
  • ―二つの忠誠心の間で―
    伊東 孝之
    ロシア・東欧研究
    2015年 2015 巻 44 号 5-28
    発行日: 2015年
    公開日: 2017/08/18
    ジャーナル フリー

    When World War 1 broke out, most of the nations in Eastern Europe identified themselves with the existing Empires. Poles were mobilized into the three Empires that divided them. They ran the risk of fighting against each other. Germans in the Russian Empire fought in the Russian army against Germany. As the war progressed, however, they became aware of their ethnic identity. They were discriminated against by the authorities or the populace of the ruling nationality. Or they were manipulated by the belligerent nations against the enemy.

    A lot of new states came into being in Eastern Europe after the war in the name of national self-determination. Most of them, however, were not “ethnic states” in the proper sense of the word. They included many citizens of different ethnicity. On the other hand, as a result of the Russian Revolution a state based on the completely new principle came into being: the Soviet Union. It adopted ethnicity as the constituting principle of the state and formed a federation of ethnic republics. Ethnic republics were, however, just on paper. There were no institutional arrangements that would promote citizens’ allegiance to the given republic. The all-mighty Communist Party of the Soviet Union is the institution that should secure citizens’ allegiance to the federal center. So long as the ideological mobilization worked, they managed to succeed in resurrecting citizens’ civic loyalty to the state as a whole.

    As the international tension mounted in the course of the 1930s, the Soviet leadership started to look with mistrust on national minorities on the periphery which resulted in the mass murder in Eastern Europe. The famine in 1932–33 in Ukraine was the first case. It was no natural, but man-made disaster to which 3.3 million people fell victim. It was caused by the excessive requisition of grain that the authorities forced through for the ambitious industrialization program. Ukraine had to pay a particularly heavy toll for it. Those who tried to resist were blamed for “Ukrainian nationalism” and “actions to serve the interests of the enemy”. Most of the victims of the so-called “Great Purge” in 1937–38 were citizens of national minorities in Eastern Europe. They were suspected to be spies for Japan in the case of the “Kulak operation” and for Poland in the case of the “Polish operation”. 625,000 people were incriminated and shot to death.

    During World War 2 Germans and Soviets did ethnic cleansing in a huge scale in Eastern Europe. Germans considered Eastern Europe as nothing more than suppliers of raw materials, foods and labor forces, and were not interested in integrating peoples there. They starved to death about one million inhabitants of Leningrad and 3.1 million soldiers of the Red Army most of whom were conscripted from Eastern Europe. 5.4 million East European Jews fell victim to the German extermination policy after July 1941. Soviets, on the contrary, were interested in integrating peoples they captured. However, they shot to death most of the elite who cooperated with the previous regime and exiled “enemy nationalities” en masse to Central Asia or Siberia. Beneath the German-Soviet war another ethnic cleansing unfolded: Ukrainian nationalists killed about one hundred thousand Poles and Jews in Volynia.

    (View PDF for the rest of the abstract.)

  • 終戦外交と戦後構想
    星野 俊也
    国際政治
    1995年 1995 巻 109 号 98-109,L11
    発行日: 1995/05/20
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The establishement in June 1945 of the United Nations, which was conceived as a major international organization for general security of the post-World War II world, was pursued separately from peace conferences and other post-War settlements. It was the second attempt to design an international order based on the principle of collective security, but this time it sought to incorporate all the lessons learned from the earlier failure of the Versailles system of 1919.
    This paper takes up the genesis of the United Nations as an example of an international effort with special attention to the role of major powers. First, it reviews the parallel efforts for war and peace by the “Big Three”-Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston S. Churchill and Joseph V. Stalin-and points out the nature of collaborative diplomacy which, despite different priorities, was only possible “before the Cold War.”
    While stressing that the United Nations is as much a product of realistic calculation as the embodiment of idealistic principles, the paper then considers the prerequisites for post-War peace in general by using K. J. Holsti'study of past major peace efforts of 1648, 1713, 1815, 1919 and 1945 and appraises the current performance of the UN which has survived (with a blend of success and setbacks) the Cold War.
    The study concludes that the role and responsibility of major powers (both the Permanent Five members and the ones formerly defeated but now enjoying inproved status) and their healthy “internationalism” have never diminished, though these are not necessarily the only factors, in managing international peace and security in the post-Cold War world.
  • 東アジアの新しい国際環境
    小島 朋之
    国際政治
    1984年 1984 巻 78 号 10-26,L6
    発行日: 1984/10/27
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    “Independence and Initiative” are now called the “general guideline of our foreign policy formulated by the constitution.” This guideline, as early as 1982, became China's diplomatic strategy. In September 1982, Hu Yaobang, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, officially confirmed it in his report to the 12th Congress of the CCP.
    In the late 1970s and early 80s after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, China continued to hold on to the strategy of anti-Soviet hegemonism. In so doing, China urged the United States, Japan and Western Europe to build a strong anti-Soviet united front.
    This strategy is now fading. Instead, the “Independent and Initiatory” strategy has entered the stage. Such a diplomacy might have been developed as early as late 1978, before and after the Third Plenum of the CCP, though its application to actual diplomacy had to wait until 1982. As a matter of fact, Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian reconfirmed in December 1983, “Ever since the Third Plenum, we have firmly held on to the foreign policy of independence and initiative.”
    The Third Plenum is regarded as the “great turning point throughout the historic period of socialism.” Thereafter, China's domestic political and social changes took place on a full scale. In this context, the “Independent and Inititatory” diplomacy should be closely related with political and social changes. This article sets forth a preliminary analysis of the “Independent and Initiatory” diplomacy in relation to political and social changes within China. The contents, characteristics, and future of this diplomacy are examined.
  • 平和と戦争の研究 II
    吉川 宏
    国際政治
    1969年 1969 巻 38 号 134-147
    発行日: 1969/04/25
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 外交史料館報
    2020年 33 巻 95-116
    発行日: 2020年
    公開日: 2021/10/25
    研究報告書・技術報告書 フリー
  • 満州事変
    毛里 和子
    国際政治
    1970年 1970 巻 43 号 136-154
    発行日: 1970/12/28
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 阪東 宏
    現代史研究
    1968年 22 巻 39-62
    発行日: 1968/11/30
    公開日: 2022/11/08
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 八塚 正晃
    アジア研究
    2014年 60 巻 1 号 37-55
    発行日: 2014/10/15
    公開日: 2014/10/25
    ジャーナル フリー
    Official Chinese Communist Party history simply indicates that Deng Xiaoping launched the open-door policy in 1978, largely discounting international factors, such as China’s joining the United Nations and China-U.S. reconciliation. With regards to the pre-1978 era, most studies focused on inter-Politburo politics, because during the Cultural Revolution power struggles often occurred among the leadership. According to the literature, the political situation after the death of Lin Biao is described as the struggle between Zhou Enlai, who aimed at economic reconstruction, and the radicals such as the “Gang of Four,” but they were under the almost complete dominance of Mao Zedong. Previous studies describe how Zhou’s economic policy was at the mercy of politics, and do not analyze his intention and policy. This article reconsiders the conception and limitation of the open-door policy which was launched as a part of Zhou’s policy, considering the importance of the changing international circumstances through analyzing a project designed to import large industrial plants from Western countries. This project was called the “4-3” development strategy, because its total projected cost was US$4.3 billion.
    Closer examination reveals that the industrial development strategy underlying the open-door policy was formed gradually in the early 1970s, in association with the change in the leadership’s perception towards new international circumstances. Until then, the Chinese leadership had pursued the construction of “the third front” as a preparation for war, which was a massive construction of defense and heavy industries in inland China. However, the change in the international situation in the early 1970s reduced the necessity of preparing for a war. Zhou Enlai and the bureaucrats therefore proceeded with the “4-3” development strategy as a part of a new national strategy, which included the reorganization of the bureaucracy to support the open-door policy and the shift of investment from military industry to agriculture and light industry and from inland to coastal areas. They implemented these policies through modifications of the 4th Five Year Plan.
    However, there was a conflict between the open-door policy and Mao’s revolutionary diplomatic strategies, despite Mao’s support for the former. The conflict came to the surface as the U.S.-Soviet détente emerged, and the pursuit of the opening was hampered. However, the open-door policy was gradually transformed into a comprehensive industrial policy. As a result, Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping were able to launch a systematic open-door policy soon after Mao’s death.
  • 西洋史学
    2020年 269 巻 85-
    発行日: 2020年
    公開日: 2024/05/11
    ジャーナル フリー
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