This paper is a study of the control exercised over local entities by the Toyotomi Hideyoshi regime during the Bunroku 文禄 era (1592-1595), a period which included the first, unsuccessful invasion of Korea. The research literature to date on this period of peace treaties and negotiations has tended to place Hideyoshi's policies within the context of making preparations for the second invasion of Korea; however, it is the opinion of the author that the events of the Bunroku era did not necessarily anticipate that invasion, which was launched in 1597. Rather, we see the evolvement of political policies aiming mainly at a revival of the early modern state order that was wavering under the collapse of Hideyoshi's plan for expanding his national hegemony. In this sense, the author embarks on an analysis of the regime's interference in local affairs from the viewpoint of the political power structure of the time. For this purpose, the author looks at the Kobayakawa family domain in Najima 名島, Chikuzen 筑前 province and takes up various policies that had continued since the cadastres (taikokenchi 太閤検地) that had begun in 1582. The cadastre of the Kobayakawa domain was carried out by one of its vassals, Yamaguchi Genba 山口玄蕃, in 1595, when the lord of that domain, Takakage, retired and was succeeded by his adopted son, Hidetoshi. The author's analysis of the documents related to this event may be summarized at follows. On the local level, the cadastre was aimed at determining "village" (mura 村) units not on the basis of productivity (kokudaka 石高), but rather on the basis of cultivated land area. With respect to the process by which fiefs were assigned to vassals after this survey, the author finds two stages involved. One he calls the "Najima" stage, which involved a provisional agreement between Yamaguchi and the traditional Kobayakawa vassals; the other is the "Fushimi" (伏見) stage, which involved the final decision made by the central figures in the Toyotomi regime. In the end, the "Fushimi" plan prevailed. Moreover, this plan ignored the results from the 1595 cadastre and was devised on the basis of a formula determined at the center, which in effect reduced all fief allotments to vassals. It is interesting that the documents announcing these new allotments followed a similar process, in which direct orders (hanmotsu 判物) sealed by Kobayakawa Hidetoshi were issued announcing the execution of the "Fushimi" plan, followed by fief allotment notices (ategaijo 宛行状) that contained Hideyoshi's seal. As the result of this decision-making process, Kobayakawa Hidetoshi was able to increase the amount of land under his personal control, while depriving the domain's vassals of their traditional vested rights, thus bringing about in effect a separation of the warrior class in this domain from the soil (heinobunri 兵農分離). The author concludes that this type of cadastre/fief determination process promoted by the Toyotomi regime is representative of what was being done throughout Japan to revive the early modern state order that was being threatened by the collapse of Hideyoshi's plan to exband his hegemony. On the other hand, such interference in local affairs was designed to regain control over politics from Kanpaku 関白 Toyotomi Hidetsugu, and through increasing the amount of land directly controlled by each daimyo 大名, they were able l) to shift their statuses from leaders among vassal confederates to actual power holders, 2) to remove the economic base of vassal autonomy, and 3) to promote the creation of a stable political and social order under the label "pax-Hideyoshi".

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It is well known that, in the process of Toyotomi Hideyoshi's (秀吉) invasion of Korea, various feudal lords (daimyo 大名) were subjected to a consolidated military service levy based on the annual output in terms of rice (kokudaka 石高) of their domains. In this essay, the author will take up the process of how daimyo, who had not yet dismantled the castles and forts, built within their domains by warlords, during the previous Sengoku period (1467-1568), were able to muster the great amount of men and provisions for the Korean expedition. For this purpose, the Shimazu Family (島津氏) of Kyushu (九州), who played a leading role in the invasion, will be taken as a case in point. Actually, the Shimazu Family was not able to provide a military force for the initial maneuvers involved in the first expedition to Korea (1592-1595), and was, therefore, called upon to carry "Japan's greatest follow-up campaign." For this purpose, a land survey was carried out by a Toyotomi functionary, Ishida Mitsunari (石田三成), with an aim to significantly increase the directly held domains of the Shimazu Family. However, such a plan was nipped in the bud due to the resistance, forthcome from various classes of Shimazu subjects in response to the re-apportionment of fiefs effected by the Ishida survey. As a result, 78,000 koku 石 of the Shimazu holdings, valued at a total 200,000 koku, went into fallow due to an insuffiicience of cultivators. What this all means is that the original intent of Hideyoshi's land surveys (Taiko Kenchi 太閤検地), that is, the creation of direct daimyo holdings capable of satisfying the need for military provisions, as well as the formation of an enfeoffed entourage capable to shoulder the burden of military service, were, in a word, thwarted. Being unable to answer the call to arms, and faced with possible relocation out of Kyushu or even fall from daimyo status, the Shimazu were driven to expediency. Therefore, with promises of fief appropriations, they demanded such groups as locally based samurais (jizamurai 地侍) within their domains and direct vassals desiring additions in their holdings, to stand as the Shimazu force for the invasion of Korea. This demand was answered by a self-provisioned army, composed of such people as the former vassals of families, who had previously opposed the Shimazu and had fallen, vassals who had lost a good portion of their fiefs as a result of the Shimazu's pledge of allegiance to the Toyotomi Family, and local samurais who had been amassing military power while pracficing agricultural management. While, on the surface, the military forces under the Toyotomi regime were to be supported by funds from the public coffers, in the case of the Shimazu Family, whose direct holdings were incapable of provisioning a standing army, it to muster all voluntary self-provisioned force was the only possible alternative. In this very fact lies the proof to negate the conventionally held opinion that the military forces mustered by the Shimazu Family and other families of daimyo status for the Korean expeditions, were standing armies of military men completely separated from agricultural activities (heino bunri 兵農分離). Despite being the object of a thorough cadastre carried out by the central regime, the Shimazu domains still widely maintained local samurai status holders unremoved from agrarian responsibilities ; and rather than daimyo power working to negate these soldier-farmers, it actually strove to garner their support in meeting the military service demanded by the Toyotomi regime. Later, between the years 1611 and 1614, the Shimazu were to carry out their own land surveys and promulgate (in 1611) a set of restrictions ordering the separation of soldier and peasant. However, despite this, some of samurai rank throughout the Tokugawa feudal (bakuhan 幕藩) system still, in rare cases, set up camp in agrarian villages, and took the lead in

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The large body of research literature that has accumulated to date on the direct landholdings (kurairi-chi 蔵入地) of the Toyotomi Hideyoshi regime, which formed its power base, has run the gamut from identifying the locations of those holdings to the role they played in funding Hideyoshi's military forays into the Korean Peninsula. The present article attempts to reexamine this research by focusing on the means by which the regime's leaders who administered kurairi-chi went about settling accounts related to it, and in so doing describe in substantive terms such aspects as the regime's internal structure and the remission of rice (kuramai 蔵米) harvested from its landholdings. The author begins with a review of the various fiscal documents related to kurairi-chi; namely, kirifu 切符, uketori-jo 請取状 and kaisai-jo 皆済状 Kirifu was a document drawn up to indicate how kuramai was to be used, addressed to the manager of a kurairi-chi holding and specifying to whom the rice was to be allotted, while uketori-jo was a certificate of receipt for rice remitted to the regime in the form of cash. Kaisai-jo, which was issued in the settlement of accounts and whose function was assumed in 1590 by the sanyo-jo 算用状, recorded the information contained in the kirifu (allotment) and uketori-jo (receipt) related to any transaction. From these documents and the parts of them written directly by Hideyoshi himself, the author concludes that it was Hideyoshi who held the ultimate authority over the regime's expenditures of rice and cash, as well as the determination of tax exemptions (rates) on kurairi-chi holdings, while his functionaries were charged only with settling related accounts. Next the author turns to changes that occurred in the personnel handling the settlement of accounts, beginning with Ito Yozaemon, a Toyotomi retainer with a commercial background, but later reverting to regime functionaries, called Sanyo Bugyo 算用奉行. The staff first consisted of two members, Nakatsuka Masaie and Mashita Nagamori, to whom Asano Nagayoshi and Maeda Gen'i were added. A document dating back to Asano's removal from office in 1595 verifies the office of Sanyo Bugyo as an important administrative group within the regime. Later Ishida Mitsunari would join the staff, then after Hideyoshi's death, the office's duties were incorporated into the Go-bugyo 五奉行 (Five Deputies) system. Finally, following the Battle of Sekigahara, Katagiri Katsumoto and Koide Hidemasa took over the settlement of accounts. Most of the revenue received from kurairi-chi was spent locally, while the portion remitted to the central government was transferred in gold and silver. However, the kurairi-chi managers were almost always late in their submission of copies of tax exemption (rate) lists (men-mokuroku 免目録) and sanyo-jo, to the extent of being fined by the regime for negligence. In light of such a situation, the author concludes that despite the fact that a system of account settlement was firmly put in place within the Toyotomi administrative bureaucracy, the regime was still not able to gain complete managerial control over its kurairi-chi.

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