Seihin Ikeda’s Perspectives on Management and the Actual State of the Reform of the Mitsui Zaibatsu

Hori, Mineo

This study interprets the intentions behind the policies from Ikeda’s perspectives on man-agement, and conducts comprehensive evaluation of the reform of the Mitsui Zaibatsu, opin-ion about which is by no means considered settled. In conclusion, the study essentially sees the start towards the modernization of the Mitsui Zaibatsu management─whereby Seihin Ikeda, with criticism of the zaibatsu as leverage, persuaded the Mitsui group and directed substantial zaibatsu reform, i.e. organizational reform of the Mitsui Zaibatsu based on ‘sepa-ration of ownership and management’─as the actual state of the reform of the Mitsui Zai-batsu.

Whilst there is a ‘theory of reform’ regarding the various Mitsui ‘reform’ policies, when evaluating the significance of the ‘zaibatsu switch’ in terms of business history, this opinion is rivalled by a decidedly strong ‘theory of disguise’ and it is believed that a compre-hensive evaluation has by no means been settled. This is believed to be because the Mitsui ‘reform’ ended incomplete, hindered by the insularity of the Mitsui group and the transition to the wartime regime. There are both sides of situational strategy and ‘reform’ amongst the five Ikeda policies, and opinion may be divided based on how one interprets the inten-tions behind the policies of Seihin Ikeda, who led the reform of the Mitsui Zaibatsu.

抄録全体を表示

　持株会社というのは企業組織の多様なデザインのうちの一つにすぎない．しかし，戦後の日本では持株会社は半世紀の長きにわたって「禁止」され続け，「解禁」をめぐっては政治・社会問題となり，また，2002年には独占禁止法9条からその用語さえ「抹消」された．つまり，つねに特殊な扱いが求められる存在であったように思われる．本論文は，その歴史的背景を戦前の

コンツェルンや新興コンツェルンのあり方にまで遡って分析する．

抄録全体を表示

This paper sheds light on the characteristics of the financial transactions between Furukawa Gomei Kaisha (hereinafter FGK), a holding company, and its two major subsidiaries, Furukawa Bank (hereinafter FB) and Furukawa Mining Company (hereinafter FMC), in the 1920s. FGK was heavily in debt mainly from FB and held its subsidiary companies' stocks. The bank allowed the parent company to suspend payments of principal and levied a preferential rate of interest. FB could not allow suspension of payments of interest, however, because it could not turn profits without interest payments from FGK. More than a quarter of its assets was loaned to FGK. Despite the preferential condition, FGK faced difficulties in paying interest from its revenues. It therefore borrowed short-term money from FMC in order to pay interest to the bank. The holding company could not repay these short-term debts, and offset them by shouldering FMC's own debts. These financial operations enabled not only the holding company but also the bank to continue business, and improved the financial soundness of FMC. The findings suggest the existence of reciprocal transactions rather than a hierarchical power relationship between the parent company and its subsidiaries.

抄録全体を表示

It is the aim of this paper to review the backgrounds and features of corporate restructuring that has been undertaken in Korean big business groups, or chaebol, in 1990's. We can explain the traditional structure of Korean chaebol from two features such as absolutely closed ownership by founder on his family, and highly diversified business structure. Through recent corporate restructuring we can confirm that traditional features in Korean chaebol has been changing. Corporate restructuring can be explained from two aspects such as "inside" factors and "outside" factors. As inside factors, for example, we can point out two major changes, such as the wealth inheritance and distribution among the chaebol families, and aggressive restructuring drive aimed for the world best company. And as outside factors we can consider stepped up the Kim Dae-jung administration's policy for chaebol reform. In the last two years after the onset of Korea's IMF crisis, many chaebols have successfully overcome the worst recession through painful reforms. But among the largest five chaebols, the Daewoo group, which was famous for its "globalization strategy" and "emperor-management style" by chairman Kim Woo-choong, collapsed in the summer 1999. In the top-four chaebol, the Samsung group is undisputedly the best "role model" in Korea's corporate restructuring drive. Samsung's corporate restructuring can be explained from the two aspects above mentioned. Other groups, Hyundai, LG, and SK are also highly estimated in their successful restructuring efforts by President Kim Dae-jung and the government. In early January 1998, President-elect Kim Dae-jung and five tycoons of Korean largest chaebols agreed to drastically reform their business practices. The five-point accord, which became the main targets of President Kim's chaebol-policy, was as follows: to hold chaebol leaders more accountable for their managerial performances, to boost managerial transparency, to improve their financial health, to focus on core businesses and to eliminate loan guarantees among affiliates. And at the end of August 1999, President Kim has started new three reform programs. These new measures are aimed at restricting the chaebol's control of the non-banking financial sector, barring them from circular cross-unit equity investment and inside trading and checking illegal inheritances and the transfer of wealth among chaebol family members. As a whole, these government-pressured policies are very severe. But the most important point is not the government policy but the chaebol's understanding of crisis and their positive attitude for reforming themselves in order to survive intensifying global competition.

抄録全体を表示