With the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, the Japanese colonial government in Korea attempted to use statecontrolled operation of the colonial economy to allocate its limited resources preferentially to the war effort and warrelated sectors. The land transportation sector, which had occupied only a secondary position in economic activity in peacetime, became a vital influence on the wartime economy. The Korean National Railways(KNR) had to adjust to wide gaps between supply and demand. This was done not only by reinforcing seasonal and geographical regulation of freight traffic, but also by allocating transportation capacity according to state-defined order of priority. General planning of transportation was promoted with the development of the controlled economy and the sudden increase in military transportation from 1941. An ex ante allocation system of transportation capacity through information exchange between KNR and its distribution control association was established. Simultaneously, state control was extended to the terminal sector of rail transportation and controlled mergers of forwarding agencies were promoted. After the outbreak of the Pacific War, the government emphasized relay land transportation of resources from China via the Korean Peninsula to make up for the decline in marine transportation capacity. The colonial government in Korea established a linked land and marine transportation system through an administrative reorganization that included merging the land and port forwarding agencies. Although transportation planning was extended to the China-ManchuriaKorea-Japan traffic stream, integration of the four railways for planning optimization was prevented by the Korean colonial government's objection to the separation of transportation and administration - an objection grounded in the view that planned transportation was indispensable to the operation of a planned economy. Thus, only a limited degree of unification was achieved in the management of relay transportation. There was a clear need for increased state intervention, given market conditions of excess demand and centralized planning of the economy. This greater state control was in fact achieved, but transportation still ended up becoming a bottleneck of the wartime economy, due to resource shortages and poor coordination between the different areas under Japanese control.

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戦後70年を過ぎ、戦争体験の継承がますます困難になっている。そこで大学と地域が連携して戦争体験を継承するためのワークショップ「雄和で学ぶ暮らしのなかの戦争」を開催し、ライフストーリーをとおして地域の戦争体験を記録するとともに、住民や学生が意見交換を行った。本稿では、ワークショップで紹介された語り手の戦争体験を記録し、参加者にとってどのような学びや気づきにつながったのかを考察する。語り手にとって戦争は、語り難い記憶でもある。個人の戦争体験を継承する取り組みでは、語られたことに焦点が当てられがちだが、聞き手は語り難さからも、言葉にできないほどの記憶や思いを抱えている語り手の存在に気付くことができる。個人の戦争体験としてワークショップで語られたことと、語られなかったことを示したうえで、聞き手が前者だけでなく後者からも戦争の悲惨さを学んだことを明らかにしたい。

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With the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the Korean National Railways (KNR) was confronted by a serious dilemma. Wartime mobilization required an increase in its transport capacity reinforcement, but the necessary material resources were lacking. To solve this dilemma, KNR reorganized its procurement process and established a labor-intensice railroad operation by means of increasing its operation frequency and train units. However, after the outbreak of the Pacific War, these measures ceased to be effective since KNR suffered from an extreme scarcity of management resources. Ultimately, this led to a transport crisis. After Korea was liberated from colonial Japanese rule in 1945, the Korean staff had to take complete responsibility for the operation of the railway network. But this led to a systematic crisis on top of the product-factor crisis because the Japanese staff who had been in charge of the upper strata of the internal organization had been dismissed and the railway network was divided into north and south. KNR had to develop new strata of Korean executives and set up a new procurement network under the command of the U.S. occupation forces. In conclusion, the operation of KNR by Koreans themselves began with the transition-period experiences which followed the 1945 Liberation.

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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the wartime transportation control of Japanese National Railways (JNR) and make it clear that the management of JNR reached the limit, as the lack of JNR's management resources and U.S. Air Force's raid became intense.
Since the Sino-Japanese War broke out, JNR had to cope with the sharply increased transportation demand caused by the industrial development as well as the military operation. In addition to the demand increase, JNR was always requested to supervise and support other companies, especially colonial railways as not only a transportation enterprise but also a regulatory agency to transportation companies. However, JNR was not a passive existence but the one to secure human and physical resources aggressively to some degree in case of negotiations with other ministries as one of the government ministries. As far as the railroad operation was possible, the profit seeking was a subsidiary matter. The persistent cooperation of JNR with Japanese Government and Army was shown by maximum transportation capacity even when JNR had insufficient management resources. Especially, after the breakout of WWII, Japanese wartime economic management could be difficult without the land transportation of JNR which substituted for marine transportation. Nonetheless, JNR resisted Japanese Army's intention to seize the railroad management right, which led to the dissatisfaction of the Army until the end of war.
As a result, an efficient railroad operation system was accomplished according to the evolution of wartime economy and military situation. But, it reached the limit because of the lack of JNR's management resources and U.S. Air Force's raid.

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