The process of nation-state building in Spain, from the beginning of the nineteenth century to Franco's authoritarian regime (1939-75), was sunk into disorder and confusion which was manifested in four civil wars and numerous military revolts. Moreover, during forty three years of this century, Spain had been under dictatorship. One of the principal reasons that nation-state building was not successful in Spain is the absence of a national identity and history resulting from its multilingual and multicultural character. The peripheral regionalisms against the state raised first in Catalonia and next in the Basque country at the end of last century were influential in this respect.
In this article, the author aims to investigate the internal integration of Spain after 1975 through the strategy and movement of the Catalan regionalist party CiU (Convergència i Unió) founded in 1978. During 1980's the CiU did not persist in the framework of nation-state and developed its diplomatic actions as if Catalonia were a state. By contrast, the Socialist Party, which came to power in 1982, repeatedly issued warning to the CiU emphasizing the importance of the existing nation-state system. The latter half of the 1980's marked the climax of the antagonism between the CiU and the Socialist Party.
The general election of 1993, in which the Socialist Party lost its majority, changed the situation completely. To stay in power, ultimately, the Socialist Party had to be supported by two regionalist parties, the CiU and the PNV (Basque Nationalist Party). As a result, both parties used this opportunity to cast votes for their aims. After the general election, the Socialist Party began to negotiate with them to make a blueprint of the new internal intgration of Spain.
Though it is too early to make predictions about the future of the nation-state in Spain, its significance must be diminished as long as the CiU, associating with the PNV, continues to keep gaining votes.

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In a nation where its electoral system and party politics have been stable for a long time, change in voting action can be seen as an index for change in the voter's support for political parties. But in a country like Korea, where its electoral system and party politics are still in flux, the result of an election tend to indicate not only the competition among political parties but also a change in the power structure as well as the voters' reaction toward political reform.
Korea's 14th National Assembly election in March 1992 was not simply the usual process of selecting the nation's diet members. The election was practically a plebiscite for Koreans to evaluate the unification by the leading party and the two oppositions in 1990.
The ruling DLP was massively defeated in the election of the 14th National Assembly in which approximately 28.43 million people voted, posting a voting rate of 71.9%. The DLP failed to maintain the majority of the parliamentary seats it had achieved to acquire through the unification of three parties in 1990. The result was the reemergence of a small ruling party and a large opposition force, the pattern formed after the last general election in April, 1988.
In contrast to the existing political parties which performed poorly in the election, a newly formed United People's Party and independent candidates showed a significant progress. The large amount of votes that rejected the existing parties represent the voter's new move demanding political reform through election.
The nation's regionalism, caused mainly by the political, social and economic imbalances that exist among the different regions of the nation, has been the roots of the diversification of the voters' support for political parties.
The voting action of the Korean electors have, for the past 10 years, indicated the diversification of the parties they support, or the trend for multiparty system. The voters' diversified support for political parties reflect a change in the quality of the peoples' voting action. The change coincides with the change in Korea's social structure that resulted from the nation's economic development.
The unification of the three parties in 1990 was, therefore, an action adversary to the social and economic trend in a sense that it ignored the change in the Korean people's voting action.
The three leaders of the parties involved in the unification performed poorly in each of their home constituencies, or their strongest basis for support. The leaders' retreat means that the voters did not endorse the parties' decision.
The progress of the United People's Party proved that the floating votes created by the voter's protest toward an arbitrary political reform tend to concentrate on the new party, helped by the voters' expectation for the establishment of a new political influence.
Therefore, it can be evaluated, the analysis in this report indicates, that an election in Korea functions as a Kind of “check system” for the Korean voters to reject the political reform which is actually an arbitrary manipulation of the political front.
The diversification of voters' support for political parties is a reflection of regionalism and the social economic class system. This fact should be respected as the peoples' various demand for the nation's new political activity.
Thus, it can be understood, that the Korean politics now has two goals to achieve: diversification of power structure and stabilization of the political situation. Each political party need to establish, along with competition, a basis for cooneration so as to create a stable political system.

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