2013 年 12 巻 6 号 p. 277-290
In Japanese companies, most of decisions at first seem to be illogical according to game and decision theories; however, they are in fact logically led by the high future parameter. In a non-zero sum environment, typified by the prisoner's dilemma game, there is no convincing equilibrium or stability. Axelrod's study on the evolution of cooperation states that players who survive are the ones who choose future cooperation over immediate benefits or revenge for past defection. In the repeated game of the prisoner's dilemma, the future parameter is defined as the probability of playing the next move. The future parameter is not simply a theoretical number; a high future parameter gives meaning to the actual behavior of organization members on the shop floor and those in the office. It forms the basis of the day-to-day experiences of Japanese company employees, giving them something from which they can derive a sense of achievement, something for them to feel worthwhile doing, and something to live for.
