ASEANの対南シナ海外交の効用と限界―ルール形成の取り組みを中心に

抄録

Since the mid-1990s, in the face of the growing deterioration of territorial disputes in the South China Sea, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has taken the initiative to build regional maritime rules in the aim of promoting conflict prevention and management mechanisms. Their efforts have successfully resulted in the emergence of a number of regional rules involving China. Some of the most notable examples are the Declaration on Conduct for Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in 2002, the guidelines for the implementation of the DOC in 2011, and the framework of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) in 2017. However, in recent years, as competition amongst clamant countries has intensified, the infringement of the DOC has become an increasingly common phenomenon at sea. This is evinced by China’s massive reclamation activities in the Spratly Islands, as well as the strengthening of existing facilities on their occupied islands and shoals on the part of other claimant countries; these include the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia. With the weakening credibility of the DOC, in 2013 ASEAN and China agreed to commence drafting the COC. However, despite the fact that the ultimate goal of ASEAN’s initiative is to produce an enforceable binding code of conduct, the framework of the COC fails to specify the phrase “legally binding”, mainly due to China’s opposition. These recent developments raise serious doubts between regional observers about the credibility of ASEAN’s managerial role in the South China Sea disputes.

Against this backdrop, the article seeks to illuminate the efficacy and limitations of ASEAN’s rule-making initiatives in the South China Sea. Structurally, the article is split into four section. The first section focuses on analyzing the main features of ASEAN’s approach to the rule-making in the South China Sea. The second section engages a historical investigation of ASEAN’s actual diplomacy in the processes of rule-making. The analysis is divided into four phases; 1) ASEAN’s initial diplomacy (1990–1995), 2) the conclusion of the DOC (1998–2002), 3) the making of the guidelines for the implementation for the DOC (2004–2011) and 4) negotiations over the framework of the COC (2012–2017). Based on the above analysis, the article then elucidates the utilities and limitations of ASEAN’s rule-making diplomacy. It is argued that while the “ASEAN way” of rule-making has made significant contributions to the development of conflict prevention measures and the promotion of “self-restraint” behavior among the claimants to some extent by ensuring their long-term commitment to the rule-making processes, it has nonetheless created problems of “definitional vagueness” and “decoupling”. As the power gaps between ASEAN states and China have rapidly grown, these weaknesses that are inherent in ASEAN’s rule-making diplomacy have become more prominent. The concluding section discusses the prospects for the politics of the rule-making in the South China Sea.