東ティモール問題に対するウィルシー豪外相の政策構想―民族自決に基づく解決の模索と挫折、1974–1975年

抄録

This paper examines Australia’s foreign policy towards Indonesia’s invasion of Timor-Leste (then called, Portuguese Timor); more specifically, it focuses on Don Willesee’s foreign policy towards Timor-Leste. Willesee was the Whitlam government’s Foreign Minister between 05 November, 1973 and 11 November, 1975. This study also focuses on Prime Minister Gough Whitlam, whose influence over foreign policymaking was more than Willesee’s. Whitlam nurtured a close relationship with Indonesian President Suharto. Therefore, to make policy recommendations, Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs, which was led by its Secretary Alan Renouf, had to take into account the views of the Foreign Minister and Prime Minister, which were not always harmonious. This study deals with the period between 25 April, 1974, when the Portuguese Revolution and the decolonization of Timor-Leste began, and 11 November, 1975, when the Whitlam government stepped down in less than a month before Indonesia’s full-scale attack against Dili on 07 December, 1975. The military occupation lasted for over two decades and led to the killings of a large number of people in Timor-Leste.

Willesee’s policy towards Timor-Leste deserves close attention for the following reasons. First, Willesee earnestly sought to resolve this crisis through the principle of self-determination. To this end, he considered the possibility of Timor-Leste’s independence and aimed to dissuade Indonesia from forcefully taking over Timor-Leste. On the other hand, Whitlam called for Timor-Leste’s integration with Indonesia, a view he repeatedly shared with President Suharto during their two informal summit talks in September 1974 and April 1975. Despite Willesee’s failure to persuade Whitlam and the Indonesian government, his ethical stance remains laudable. Second, through a speech delivered at the Senate on 30 October 1975, Willesee succeeded in persuading the Australian government to espouse “the view that the people of Portuguese Timor should be allowed to determine their own future.” Third, Willesee’s policy towards Timor-Leste has not received much scholarly attention. Fourth, it is possible to analyse Willesee’s policy by examining (i) documents created by Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and (ii) other materials, including Willesee’s personal recollections.

In sum, this study argues that Willesee’s emphasis on self-determination could be a more viable strategy than Prime Minister Whitlam’s call for Timor-Leste’s integration with Indonesia. The study also argues that Indonesia’s invasion and forceful annexation of Timor-Leste might not have occurred if President Suharto had been persuaded by Willesee’s opinions. This is all the more important as President Suharto was initially hesitant to use military force to address Indonesia’s situation with Timor-Leste.