抄録
This paper attempts to explain the concept of “purposiveness of nature” as “the
mediating concept between the concepts of nature and the concept of freedom” (V 196)
from the standpoint of the theory of taste in the Critique of the Power of Judgment
(1790).
Kant asserts that “there is an incalculable gulf” (V 175) between two domains of
nature and freedom. In order to make filling up this gulf or transition from the former
to the latter possible Kant needs a mediating concept, namely purposiveness of nature.
Some interpreters construe this concept and transition as based on “supersensible
substratum” (V 196). But this interpretation conflicts with the condition “without regard
to the practical” (ebd.) for acquiring the concept of purposiveness of nature. On the
other hand, according to Kant “the spontaneity in the play of the faculties of cognition”
(V 197) is presupposition of the mediating function of such purposiveness. Now, this
play is also the state of mind when we make the judgments of taste. Therefore, we
cannot understand the mediating concept of purposiveness of nature between nature
and freedom unless we interpret this concept from the standpoint of the theory of taste
without regard to the practical.
