A Method of Defense against Cache Timing Attack in Non-Volatile Memory

抄録

Attackers of modern computer architecture found that cache access latency difference between cache hit and cache miss is a point where secure data are overlooked. To prevent such data leakage, cache partitioning technique is utilized for defenders via cache hit isolation. Although this approach is effective in increasing resistance against cache timing attack, it is not suitable for emerging memory system, which is based on non-volatile memories, because it overlooks the weaknesses of the write operations. This paper proposes a secure-aware partitioning guide architecture to improve performance and write endurance by removing the necessity of cache flushing. During changing cache partitioning status, the write counts are considered for the new status and no cache lines are evicted in the proposal. As a result, the lifetime is extended by 1.77 times and the penalty of cache flushing is saved by 7.8%.