抄録
It has been questioned whether the single currency system in the EU works without a federal budget and an automatic stability mechanism. To this problem, the EMU has responded theoretically and offered a plan for fiscal integration. The object of this article is to analyze the ideas of the EMU and to investigate the way forward toward European fiscal integration.
This article consists of three chapters. Chapter 1 investigates the way fiscal discipline for the member states is set without losing economic stability. Both fiscal discipline and an automatic stability mechanism are attained by covering structural deficit. The new fiscal pact in the EMU has made use of this theoretical investigation. It is meaningful that this pact links the economic stability of the member states and the common governance of the union to their budgets. On the other hand, it is doubtful whether this pact is able to respond sufficiently to the short-term recession. A fiscal transfer system would solve the problem.
Chapter 2 discusses the way such a transfer system would be established in the EMU. First, a fiscal transfer system is needed because the national fiscal policy of a member state is not able to make the automatic stability mechanism effective in the case of a recession arising from fiscal discipline. This transfer system works as an automatic adjustment mechanism to offset a non-symmetrical shock. Second, the fund to support such a mechanism is formed by the member states which are able to afford to finance it. Financial transfers based on the fund present a centralized system. Third, this kind of fund is the rescue fund in the EMU and designated as the ESM. Besides, the EMU is ready to promote a fiscal union with a banking union.
Chapter 3 discusses the way European fiscal integration should be made to progress from the viewpoint of fiscal federalism. First, cooperative federalism as a model of European fiscal integration should be desired over competitive federalism. The former assumes the equivalence of competence among partners and therefore requires the redistribution of funds. To make such a redistribution possible, a certain centralization is necessary. Second, the EU has executed the redistribution of wealth with a structural fund. The EU has insisted on the reinforcement of so1idarity between regions and directed structural policy. Third, to what degree Germany and France, playing the main role for such a policy, will achieve coordination is investigated.
In conclusion, to promote European fiscal integration, common governance in the EMU should be strengthened with the idea of fiscal federalism. To realize this integration, the political solidarity of the member states must be strengthen with the reinforcement of coordination among them.
