抄録
The paper argues that the EU and its political system are a special case between a federal system (like the US) and an international organisation (like the UN). This can be exemplified by the interests behind the EU's three main institutions—Council, Commission, and Parliament. It is especially the Council and the veto power each member state enjoys in still many decisive fields that prevents the EU from becoming a federation. The lack of an integrated party system indicates the “unfinished” status of the Union—but at the same time, that lack is one of the reasons why the process towards a deeper Union is not going on faster. The paralysis of the deepening process, caused by the French and Dutch constitutional veto, underlines the contradiction of the EU which is more than a confederation but clearly not (yet?) a federation. The paper argues that the paralysis can be interpreted in a more optimistic way only from the viewpoint of neo-functionalism in combination with the brinkmanship-argument: The integration process will go on—only or especially, when the result of the whole integration, that is the EU itself, is in jeopardy. The lack of a coherent and substantive Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) can provide the Union with such a shocking (and hurting) experience, but also the need to deepen the Union not despite but because of the enlargement of 2004. The Union is a paradox: Hugely popular for those who are still outside but have some reason to hope to join; but less popular for the insiders as could be seen in the referenda in France and in the Netherlands in 2005. Part of this paradox is the unholy alliance between rightist nationalists and leftist anticapitalists united by nothing else but by the EU as a common enemy.
