ポーランドとEU

抄録

Quo vadis Europa? When the Cold War ended and the EU accession of the East European countries seemed certain, it arose widely this very question in Europe. Now that the EU, having been enlarged eastwards and southwards, consists of twenty-five member states, everyone who is interested in European integration would give much consideration to what would result from the enlargement. This article does that through analysing the European and security policy of Poland, which is the most influential among the ten newcomers.
In Poland people regard the EU as a good organisation for Poland to get a chance for better future, in expectation that it would give Poland a lot, especially economic and financial benefits, so the support of the people for the EU is always wide and solid.
But there exists also a notion that the EU is dominated by two big member states, Germany and France. Accordingly the Polish government seeked in the Intergovernmental Conference 2003/2004 to secure a “strong position” in the Union so as to be able to carry out its demand and not to be voted down easily, and succeeded in the end. Poland holds now a position of a “not easy to handle partner in the Union”, as foreign minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz formulated in the Sejm in January 2004. Consequently, a possibility is stronger than ever that a decision-making in the Council will become still more difficult, as a result of Polish sticking to its standpoint.
Polish security policy is based first and foremost on bilateral relations with and the firm loyalty towards the USA. Looking upon Washington as the only reliable power in the world, Warsaw prefers NATO to CSDP. This inclination roots not only in realism but in precautious mentality against so-called franco-german dominance. In particular Poland tends to look at Germany with suspicion, because of its memories of the past.
As for the future shape of Europe, the dominant Polish view is based on the intergovernmentalism. All the major political parties in Poland define the EU as the organisation of solidarnosc narodów (solidarity of the nations). The definition reminding us of that of Charles de Gaulle implies little supranational integration, so there won't be much initiative or activeness in the deepening of European integration on the part of the Polish government.
That has been the case with the SLD government until recently, and so will be it with a new one led by PiS, the winner of the Sejm election in September 2005. Nevertheless, it must not be ignored that a geopolitical position could play a decisive role. Poland by self-definition, unlike Great Britain, is a European state and its future lies in Europe, which Poles themselves realize. Herein can be seen room for a chang of Warsaw's European policy.
And, what is a noteworthy thing, Polish public opinion on foreign and security policy has been undergoing a fundamental change since the Iraq war began, that is, from enthusiastic Atlanticism to pro-Europeanism. Polish people these days is in favour of an autonomous European security power and Europe's role of a world player. Taking into consideration all the factors mentioned above, a conclusion could be drawn: Poland's accession to the EU would not contribute much to the deepening of European integration in the short or medium terms, but in the long run Poland could help the construction of “strong” Europe, aligning itself with big powers like Germany and France.