印度學佛教學研究
Online ISSN : 1884-0051
Print ISSN : 0019-4344
ISSN-L : 0019-4344
有形象認識論の形象は非真実か?
片岡 啓
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ジャーナル フリー

2018 年 67 巻 1 号 p. 374-367

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When describing the sākārajñānavādipakṣa, i.e., the thesis of those who hold that cognition is endowed with images, Kamalaśīla explicitly states that manifold images (ākāra) are unreal (asatya) and not absolutely true (pāramārthika). His statement can be interpreted as a negation of the theory of citrādvaita common to the Sautrāntikas and the Yogācāras from the higher perspective peculiar to the Yogācāras, particularly in relation to the asallakṣanānupraveśopāya in which grāhya is denied. In other words, this statement should not be taken as an expression of the alīkākāravāda, i.e., the view that images are false. Therefore, we do not have to abandon our common presumption that the sākārajñānavāda is equivalent to what is later called satyākāravāda. Kamalaśīla’s statement is acceptable in the well-established framing of our theoretical understanding. The value of asatya can vary according to whether the contrast is between parikalpita and paratantra, or between paratantra and pariniṣpanna. The issue that Funayama 2007 raised can be solved in this way. Otherwise, we would have to completely give up our common understanding, because what Kamalaśīla calls sākārajñānavāda would correspond to the alīkākāravāda.

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