抄録
This paper presents a new mathematical model for robust meter placement against false data injection attacks on state estimation in power grids. It has been recently reported that the false data injection attacks can introduce arbitrary errors into the output of the state estimation without being detected. While one of the most promising strategies against attacks is to protect meters, it may not be feasible to protect all meters due to some reasons such as budgetary constraints. It is important to select a subset of meters to be protected so that, even if any k meters are compromised by attackers, we can detect the attacks with the rest of them. Several algebraic approaches have been proposed to determine the minimum required meter set to detect the attacks even if any k meters fail. However, these approaches have a common problem in that the attacks on both of existing and additional meters are not considered. In this paper, to remedy this problem, we propose a new model for robust meter placement against false data injection attacks. Through the numerical experiments with the IEEE test systems, we investigate the total computation time required to obtain the optimal meter placement and the number of required additional meters. As the results, for the case of k=2 and 3, we succeed in obtaining optimal meter placements up to the 300-bus and the 57-bus systems within one hour of computation time, respectively.
