医学哲学 医学倫理
Online ISSN : 2433-1821
Print ISSN : 0289-6427
カプグラ症候群から開始する他者論の試み : 可能世界に住む自己の変異体
新山 喜嗣
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ジャーナル フリー

2007 年 25 巻 p. 99-109

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Patients with Capgras syndrome complain that real persons close to them have been replaced by identically looking imposters. This syndrome is interpreted as the total replacement of the "haecceity" that is distinct from one's attributes. Capgras syndrome suggests that possible worlds around a person come in two different series: one of possible worlds in which the attributes of the real person change in a variety of forms with his "haecceity" unchanged, and the other of possible worlds in which the "haecceity" of the real person is replaced by something else with his attributes unchanged. Possible worlds involving these two series could develop without limitations, and hence impart unlimited diversity to the variants of myself living in possible worlds. Thus, the variants in possible worlds must include some who possess both haecceity and attributes that are identical to those of others in the real world. It can thus be speculated that others in the real world are nothing but variants of myself who have turned up in the real world from possible worlds they originally inhabited. In this context, it may be assumed that I am keeping in touch with my own variants every day here in this real world. In the real world, I myself always create a singular point characterized as "I," "now," and "here". In a certain possible world, however, another person generates this singular point. As a result, I myself become the other to him. Such worlds where I turn up as the other probably include ones whose contents are exactly the same as those of the real world. Because these worlds are perfect mirror images of the real world, we mistakenly assume that they are the same one world. Because of this confusion, we see many generators of the singular points coexisting in the real world.

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© 2007 日本医学哲学・倫理学会
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