抄録
This article aims to reveal the roles of pre-determined negotiating rules, which condition Japan's agricultural liberalization commitments in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement. Specifically, it is hypothesized that the “setting of ex-ante tariff elimination ratio of 95 percent on a tariff line basis” as a cause of substantial progress in Japan's agricultural liberalization, and “assigning the rights to terminate negotiations to the preceding TPP participants” as a source of an early conclusion of the negotiations over Japan's agricultural products. The validity of the former hypothesis is proved by a qualitative analysis, which combines in-depth examination of non-official documents and the confirmation of correspondence between the expected and actual number of agricultural tariff lines in Japan's commitments. The latter hypothesis is supported by a quantitative analysis employing an ordered-probit regression model, which implies that Japan's meaningful concessions in agricultural products are limited to the preceding TPP participants who have the rights to terminate negotiations. This article contributes to the literature by not only indicating the existence of pre-determined rules in the TPP negotiations but also investigating the implications of those rules on the negotiation results through solid qualitative and quantitative analyses.
