若手研究助成成果報告書
人工物としての行為
―新しい実践的知識論―
2019 年 52 巻 1 号 p. 113-125
詳細
2019 年 52 巻 1 号 p. 113-125
In this paper, I aim to clarify and vindicate Anscombe's concept of practical knowledge by way of suggesting that some intentional actions are artifacts - i.e. artificial events. Like other artifacts, actions are ontologically dependent upon agents' intention and hence agents can know what they are intentionally doing without any evidence. However, this view comes under attack from skepticism about the reality of artifacts themselves. If artifact kinds are mind-dependent, doesn't it follow that they are nothing but nominal, arbitrary groupings? In reply, I shall argue that artifacts, including actions, are still real in the world we live in because they have characteristic built-in normativity.
