抄録
In his posthumous work, The Varieties of Reference, Gareth Evans persuasively maintained the incoherence of the concept of "quasi-memo-ry", in favor of the famous circularity objection to the Lockean analysis of personal identity in terms of psychological continuity. Evans' argument against quasi-memory illustrates that the so-called "circularity" is an inevitable consequence of the phenomenon of the identification-freedom (or immunity to error through misidentification) of our thoughts. His conception of this phenomenon implies a plausible interpretation of the circularity objection, which is firmly opposed to the prevailing reductionist theories of personal identity and aims at a sort of non-reductionism. However, it does not entail, and indeed is incompatible with, the current "Non-reductionism", i.e. the view that personal identity is a bare fact completely independent from any kind of continuity and that a person is a pure Ego beyond elucidation.
