経済グローバル化による社会集団の選好への作用

アメリカ通商政策における企業と労働組合を例に

抄録

The progress of economic globalization and preference formation among domestic actors has been increasingly affected by the international economy since the 1980s. Based on these trends, an important question currently in the spotlight is what effect the progress of economic globalization has on domestic social groups and on preference formation among domestic actors.
Among these social groups, this paper focuses especially on the American labor union, the AFL-CIO, and on major companies that have a presence in American trade policy, which in turn has a major impact on the global economy. In particular, the AFL-CIO can not be ignored when we think about the international political economy, by chanting anti-free trade and anti-globalization slogans around the world as, for example, protesters did during the WTO Seattle convention in 1999. This paper considers the effects of globalization on domestic social groups through verifying actor's preference changes regarding trade policy in a time-oriented method.
This paper verifies any preference changes of company and labor unions from the standpoint of the sector-factor controversy by observing eleven American major manufacturing industries and by comparing the 1960's during which there was little movement toward globalization to the 1990's, when there was considerable progress.
In measuring economic globalization, the research uses indicators from trade volume and direct foreign investment. With regard to industrial sector capital and labor preference it uses this congressional hearing records, campaign advertisement pamphlets and investigation into union representation in several labor unions. In this way this paper conducts new research from the point of view of sources.
The results of research clearly show that the 1960s preference during the 1960s which was a cleavage between sector convergences in the 1990s and preference gap of capital and labor is expanding. This shows that the progress of economic globalization creates a cleavage between the trade preferences of capital and labor in American industry. This knowledge theoretically shows cause that the conflict between capital and labor has become more radical in American trade policy. This conclusion is different from the rest in the point of view of not being conventional explicitly pointed out.
This shows that American trade policy has entered an age, in which the preferences of capital and labor are in disagreement and we therefore need to conduct new American trade policy research from the perspective of the labor union.