2019 年 2019 巻 195 号 p. 195_92-195_107
The United States has consistently pursued missile defense since the end of the Cold War. Although some states, such as Russia, continue to oppose it, the U.S. allies and partners, previously cautious or critical, have largely come to terms with it. Why and how has this change taken place? This paper highlights the importance of a change in the balance between the previously prevalent norm and the counter-norm. Since the rise of the “rogue” threats, “deterrence by punishment,” which as an orthodox norm used to make missile defense highly controversial, has been challenged more than ever by “deterrence by denial” as a counter-norm, with the balance tilting toward the latter. This normative change has contributed to the gradual proliferation of missile defense in the post-Cold War world.
Besides, the United States has tried to make use of the counter-norm to mitigate the concerns of other states on strategic implications of missile defense. In proceeding with its Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) programs with higher priority given to Theater Missile Defense (TMD), the Clinton administration tried to ease other states’ concerns by limiting the application of deterrence by denial strictly to the rogue states, albeit largely in vain. When extending the application to the strategic level, as a response to the growing rogue threats rather than potential competitors such as Russia and China, the following G.W. Bush and Obama administrations reinforced and supplemented the counter-norm with the concepts of a “new strategic framework” and a “new triad,” and later the vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world. Missile defense has come to be expected to contribute to reducing reliance on nuclear weapons or promoting burden sharing between the United States and its allies. Although these efforts to mitigate the concerns have produced little effects on emerging competitors, they have made missile defense more acceptable to the U.S. allies and partners. Each state had each motivation for accepting missile defense, but the counter-norm has helped various expectations of the concerned states converge around it.
As a whole, this paper tries to illuminate a largely overlooked aspect that norms can play important roles in promoting not only the creation of and the compliance with arms control agreements and regimes, but also proliferation of arms. This aspect, though tends to be neglected, is by no means surprising in that states, which want to maintain stable relations with potential competitors, often require normative justification especially for an inherently controversial and provocative means to national security.