This article introduces the subject of this special issue, “kankei kaifuku,” or restoration of relations in international politics. First, the article presents a detailed explanation of the concept, which has not been analyzed closely in the past. As a concept, restoration of relations is defined as the improvement in the relations between actors who were previously locked in conflictual or abnormal relations. This article elaborates the conditions that should be met if a phenomenon is considered restoration of relations.
Second, this article analyzes an important sub-category of kankei kaifuku: diplomatic normalization (or the restoration/establishment of diplomatic relations). In so doing, it discusses how diplomatic normalization should be understood within the realm of the concept and highlights that various types of diplomatic normalization exist. It then points to the fact that only one type of diplomatic normalization has been emphasized in Japanese academia, implying that one must study cases beyond those involving Japan in order to understand the full scope of diplomatic normalization in international relations. Third, this article provides the summaries of the eight articles that constitute this special issue and discusses the significance of each article.
This article discusses how South Korea’s “cross-recognition” policy influenced the political structure of Northeast Asia during the 1980’s. The “cross-recognition” means that China and the Soviet Union would recognize South Korea in exchange for the United States and Japan recognizing North Korea. With the recent release of official documents from South Korea, Japan and Russia, etc., it has become possible to analyze this subject in more details.
To answer the question stated above, this article especially focuses on the foreign policies that South Korea tried to implement with Japan, China, the Soviet Union, North Korea, and the United States from 1983 to 1987 under the Chun Doo-Hwan Administration.
Many previous studies discussing the transformation of the Cold War structure in Northeast Asia paid to attention to the Northeast Asian history following the Seoul Olympics of 1988. In contrast, this study points out the importance of historical events that occurred from 1983 to 1987. Moreover, after analyzing multilateral relationships among Northeast Asian countries, it highlights that the beginning of the change in the Cold War structure in Northeast Asia can be linked the events in 1986.
South Korea tried to improve relations with China through the Japanese prime minister, Yasuhiro Nakasone, from 1983 to 1986. South Korea aimed to establish its position in the international society through the 86’ Asian Games and the 88’ Seoul Olympics. For the success of these athletic meetings, South Korea viewed the participation of China and the Soviet Union necessary. In 1984, therefore, the South Korean government pursued concrete measures towards successful cross-recognition.
First, Chun Doo-Hwan asked Nakasone to serve as an intermediary vis-a-vis China. China made informal contacts with South Korea. In turn, North Korea was threatened by South Korea’s developing relationship with China, thus tried to strengthen its ties with the Soviet Union. Two international dynamics emerged in Northeast Asia consequently. One was the trend toward closer relations among South Korea, Japan, China and the United States. The other was the development of a more intimate relationship between the Soviet Union and North Korea.
However, M. Gorbachev, the then Soviet Union leader, began to implement a new form of diplomacy toward China and South Korea starting from the end of 1985 to the middle of 1986. As a result, North Korea’s isolation in Northeast Asia became more serious by the end of 1987.
In general, when considering the transformation of the Cold War structure in Northeast Asia, one tends to emphasize the role of Gorbachev. However, this study points out that the new Chinese diplomacy, which had begun before Gorbachev’s new diplomacy, also played a similarly important role in the transformation of the structure.
This article examines the substance and modification of the “One-China” principle, which the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) pursued in negotiations seeking normalization with Canada in 1970. During this period, the PRC tried to converge domestic turmoil since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution and rebuild its foreign policy as a way to improve relations with those Western developed countries which held diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan.
From the beginning of negotiations, the PRC claimed three “constant principles” concerning Taiwan: a country, which wishes to have relations with China, (1) must recognize the government as a sole legal government of the Chinese people, (2) must recognize that Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory and sever all kinds of relationships with the ROC, and (3) must support the restoration of the legitimate rights of the PRC in the United Nations. The government strengthened their claim of the principles as negotiations progressed, and the Canadian government finally recognized the PRC as “a sole legal government” and “took note” that Taiwan was an inalienable part of China in the joint communiqué of the normalization. This result was very different from the Sino-French normalization in 1964.
Regarding the process of these negotiations, this article mainly answers the following three questions. First, the reason why the PRC claimed the three principles would deeply relate to the PRC’s internal and external circumstances at that time. As internal circumstances, the conflict between ideologists and realists in the Cultural Revolution led to excessive demand. In the international community, claims of “two-Chinas” or “one-China, one-Taiwan” were more serious than in 1964.
Second, rapprochement by the United States would explain the reason why the PRC strengthened their claim of the principles since the early summer of 1969. Considering military tensions with the Soviet Union and Nixon’s attitude toward China, Mao Zedong solidified his intent to approach Western countries at that time. The negotiations with Canada, therefore, would indicate rapprochements between them.
Third, evaluating this negotiation is controversial. On the one hand, the PRC succeeded in incorporating consent to “Taiwan [as an] inalienable part of China” in the joint communiqué. On the other hand, the agreement remained incomplete, and it was impossible to impose restrictions on any significant relations between Canada and the ROC. Both aspects were handed over to later negotiations with the Western countries.
What kind of roles do private enterprises play in the process of diplomatic normalization? In general, the behavioral principle of private enterprises will be profit pursuit based on rational judgment rather than political values. If so, is it hard to imagine that the private enterprises will be deeply involved in diplomatic normalization? In response to such questions, this paper tried to point out possibility of private enterprises as non-state actors through analyzing the period of diplomatic normalization between Japan and Indonesia.
Economic ties between the two countries that celebrated the 60th anniversary of diplomatic normalization in 2018 are strong. However, looking back the history after World War II, in order to normalize diplomatic relations, these countries had to wait for the signing of the reparation agreement and economic cooperation agreement in 1958. What was the role of the private enterprises when the relationship of two countries was normalized?
In this paper, the author analyzed from the following viewpoint using diplomatic record of Japan, United States, and Australia. First, the author analyzed the factors that Japanese private enterprises were accepted in Indonesia, based on the relationship between decolonization in Indonesia and the cold war in Southeast Asia. Secondly, based on the case of North Sumatra oil development and Sulawesi nickel development, author analyzed the role of the private enterprises as a carrier of the real economy. Third, the author analyzed the interaction between the Japanese private enterprises and the government, focusing on the Nobusuke Kishi administration and the Hayato Ikeda administration.
As a result of these analyzes, the following conclusions were drawn in this paper. In the process of diplomatic normalization between Indonesia and Japan, the Japanese private enterprises generated opportunity and significance of diplomatic normalization for Japanese government. Unifying domestic stakeholder, Japanese private enterprises negotiated with Indonesian government before establishing official bilateral relationship, and the business development was realized with the side support of the Japanese government. These activities of private enterprises made the prototype of Japanese economic cooperation for Indonesia. And economic diplomacy was formed in the interaction of private enterprises and government.
Termination of war is a “bridge” between war and peace. However, comparing with other research topics of the International Relations (IR) discipline, the subject of the end of war remains highly understudied in both qualitative and quantities terms. In fact “restoration” of interstate relationship presupposes “collapse” of them. War termination phenomena deserves more scholarly attentions if understanding the transition process from the collapse to restoration of interstate relations goes at the heart of the entire IR discipline.
This paper purports to answer the question of how wars end. It presents the concept of “the dilemmas between the compromised peace and the fundamental settlement of cause of conflict” and argues that costs, future risks, and relative importance of them are an independent variable that shape the equilibrium point to solve these dilemmas. These are often malleable as an outcome of interactive processes among the belligerents. In order to advance this argument, the paper takes the following steps.
First, in reviewing the existing theoretical literature on war termination, this paper categorizes them into four approaches as: power politics; rational choice; domestic politics; and cognitive psychology, and reviews them systematically.
Second, it claims that the analytical frameworks of war termination as power politics and rational choice approach offer more useful analytical leverage than domestic politics and cognitive psychology approach. As such this article focuses on the relations between compromise and fundamental elimination of cause of conflict, on the top of power. Although the winning belligerent can eliminate fundamental cause of conflict in order to eradicate the root of future trouble by imposing unconditional surrender on its hostiles, entailed costs will increase. On the other hand, if it chooses the compromised peace to avoid increasing its warfighting costs, there would be a problem that it only postpones the rise of an unavoidable battle in the future. So this article presents the following hypotheses: (1) in the case that the level of warfighting cost is high and future risk will be low for winning side, the form of war termination would tend to attain the compromised peace; (2) in the case of the level of costs is low and future risk will be high for prevailing side, the form of war termination would tend to attain the fundamental settlement of cause of conflict; (3) in the case of the level of costs and future risk in ascendant side are balanced, the form of war termination would be indeterminate and strategic interactions among the belligerents would decide the equilibrium point to overcome this dilemmas.
Third, this article provides the illustration of the above hypotheses through actual historical case studies such as termination of the Gulf War in 1991, the Iraq War in 2003, and the Pacific War in 1945.
This article re-examines the historical process of framing Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan, which is called Renunciation of War Clause, and focuses on its function as reassurance by the loser. Dealing with the function, this research explains the reason why postwar Japan-U. S. relationship could dramatically progress conflict resolution from the total war to the restoration of peace from both theoretical and historical standpoints.
To answer the question mentioned above, this article argues that, in terms of a theory of reassurance by the loser, Postwar Japan intended to treat the victor’s anxiety on its challenge by relying on the normative self-restraint of Article 9 of the Constitution. The argument regards the provision of the Article as a signal justified by an appropriate norm. While the U. S. was concerned about Japan’s challenge and intended to make it impossible by prohibiting armament, Japan dealt with the fear of the U. S. by reassuring its own intention. Japan sent a normative signal of reassurance, which bound itself by denying war and armament. Therefore, it is appropriate to understand that, in essence, Article 9 of the Constitution had practical meaning as a signal of reassurance in order to let the U.S. and other countries know Japan’s peaceful intention, rather than an abstract norm derived from the idea of pacifism, which came from regret for the war.
Tracing the historical process of framing Article 9 of the constitution reveals that it worked as the loser’s reassurance. The process was the opposite direction of the order of the completed text. The U. S. home government decided to disarm Japan at first, and the local commander MacArthur followed the policy. On the other hand, as Japanese leader, Prime Minister Shidehara proposed renunciation of war to MacArthur. However, it was just an ideal promise regarding peaceful intention, and lacked reassurance in terms of the capability. The Japanese government hoped to maintain the provision of armament in the constitution. It was unacceptable for the U.S., so it prepared a draft of the constitution which included renunciation of war proposed by Shidehara as well as the prohibition of arms. The U.S. presented the draft to Japan in order to confirm its peaceful intention. The draft imposed the cost of the prohibition of arms, while it mitigated the impression of burden by referring to the normative legitimacy of renunciation of war. The draft as the U.S. screening set up a hurdle that Japan should clear. Japan reassured the U.S. and other members of the international society by sending a signal which became costly due to the democratic institutional constraint of diet deliberations. It made Renunciation of War Clause a national pledge.
The United States has consistently pursued missile defense since the end of the Cold War. Although some states, such as Russia, continue to oppose it, the U.S. allies and partners, previously cautious or critical, have largely come to terms with it. Why and how has this change taken place? This paper highlights the importance of a change in the balance between the previously prevalent norm and the counter-norm. Since the rise of the “rogue” threats, “deterrence by punishment,” which as an orthodox norm used to make missile defense highly controversial, has been challenged more than ever by “deterrence by denial” as a counter-norm, with the balance tilting toward the latter. This normative change has contributed to the gradual proliferation of missile defense in the post-Cold War world.
Besides, the United States has tried to make use of the counter-norm to mitigate the concerns of other states on strategic implications of missile defense. In proceeding with its Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) programs with higher priority given to Theater Missile Defense (TMD), the Clinton administration tried to ease other states’ concerns by limiting the application of deterrence by denial strictly to the rogue states, albeit largely in vain. When extending the application to the strategic level, as a response to the growing rogue threats rather than potential competitors such as Russia and China, the following G.W. Bush and Obama administrations reinforced and supplemented the counter-norm with the concepts of a “new strategic framework” and a “new triad,” and later the vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world. Missile defense has come to be expected to contribute to reducing reliance on nuclear weapons or promoting burden sharing between the United States and its allies. Although these efforts to mitigate the concerns have produced little effects on emerging competitors, they have made missile defense more acceptable to the U.S. allies and partners. Each state had each motivation for accepting missile defense, but the counter-norm has helped various expectations of the concerned states converge around it.
As a whole, this paper tries to illuminate a largely overlooked aspect that norms can play important roles in promoting not only the creation of and the compliance with arms control agreements and regimes, but also proliferation of arms. This aspect, though tends to be neglected, is by no means surprising in that states, which want to maintain stable relations with potential competitors, often require normative justification especially for an inherently controversial and provocative means to national security.
The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) has gained much support from its sponsor states including Iran and Syria, which has been a cause of deep concern for Israel. The biggest problem for Israel is that Hamas has been launching missiles from the Gaza Strip, which it has controlled since June 2007. Some of these missiles are said to have been supplied by Iran. In response, Israel imposed a land and air blockade on Gaza and attacked Hamas military base in Gaza three times between December 2008 and August 2014. However, in October 2011, Hamas and Israel held a prisoner exchange deal, mediated by Egypt. Why did Hamas climb down to a prisoner exchange deal with hostile Israel? What was Hamas’s logic behind managing its foreign relations in this manner?
Previous studies on Hamas’s foreign relations indicate that the organization behaves according to political expediency rather than ideology and religious solidarity. This means that Hamas acts flexibly in response to the context it finds itself situated in. These foreign strategies need to be verified further, with a focus on a case that changed the relations between Hamas and the involved countries. Therefore, this paper examines the background of prisoner exchange deal between Hamas and Israel in the context of deteriorating relations between Hamas and its sponsor states.
The results of this study are summarized as follows. First, Hamas agreed to a prisoner exchange with Israel to minimize the damage resulting from Iran’s suspension of financial support. When civil war broke out in Syria in 2011, Hamas did not accept Iran’s request to support the Syrian regime and thus weakened its relations with Iran. Harking back to Hamas’s historical background would bear out that they were inclined to support the Syrian people’s aspiration. Thus, Hamas leaders in the Gaza Strip who were most effected by the waning financial assistance from Iran needed Egypt to ease the blockade imposed on the area. For them, an indirect negotiation with Israel on a prisoner exchange presented a good opportunity to reach out to Egypt, which played a mediator role in the negotiation.
Second, Hamas’s rational for entering a prisoner exchange deal with Israel indicates that Hamas exercises flexibility in fostering relations with foreign countries. It is inevitable for a non-state actor such as Hamas to need the support of other countries as much as possible. Factors such as ideology and religious solidarity would not go well with this aim because they limit the number of countries to which Hamas can appeal for support.
The Shanghai Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA) that conducted social work in Chinese society was accused of anti-imperialist, radical actions by the Chinese labor movement after the Shanghai riot on May 30, 1925. While Chinese trade unions endorsed the newly established International Labour Organization (ILO), this international legislation for labor standards could not ensure cooperation between the ILO and the Chinese Government and society; the reason being that any labor condition regulations, both domestic and international, did not exist in the International Settlement as extraterritoriality.
This paper clarifies the coordination between the ILO and Shanghai YWCA to remedy the lack of legislative protection that Chinese workers faced in the International Settlement of Shanghai. Although, the Factory Act was enacted in 1929, its enforcement was postponed because of Chinese industrial conditions’ conflict with extraterritoriality.
Traditional literature has focused on the conflict between national interests and international standards. This approach notes that international organizations’ activities were disrupted by power politics that sought unilateral interests. However, international organizations established after World War I were dysfunctional. I think that international organizations acquired innovative thinking during the Chinese National Revolution in 1920s. The fact is that the ILO and the YWCA aimed to create a Chinese Labour Inspection System as well as transform themselves from euro-centrism to international socialism.
Moreover, we need to consider the connection between Chinese nation building and introduction of ILO standards on both Chinese proper land and extraterritorial areas, particularly Shanghai’s International Settlement. The Chinese government aimed to demonstrate their legitimacy as a nation state by enforcing their labor regulations and inspecting foreign factories.
Historical examining the Chinese labor problem regarding extraterritoriality, this article explains that the Shanghai YWCA and the ILO’s activities indirectly influenced the improvement of the International Settlement’s social administration and attained the endorsement of enforcing Chinese factory inspection there.
Thus, a condition for reshaping multilateral cooperation with the newly established Chinese Government of Nanking in 1928 was created by this international coordination to enforce international labor standards in Shanghai.