ラーコシ失脚とソ連・ユーゴスラヴィア関係 (一九五五-一九五六年)

抄録

This paper examines the significance of Mátyás Rákosi's removal from the position of the First Secretary of the Hungarian Workers' Party in July 1956, in the political dynamics of the international communist movement after Stalin's death. His downfall was caused by Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia as well as the bankruptcy of his oppressive reign during the Stalin era. The Importance of research on Soviet-Yugoslav relations as the international background of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 was seen in a new light among Russian and Hungarian historians after the collapse of the Soviet and Hungarian communist regimes and opening of the National Archives in the early of 1990s. The author also regards the downfall of Rákosi as important concerning the cause of the deterioration of Soviet-Yugoslav relations, which resulted in the second dispute between the two states and parties in 1958, and analyzes how Soviet-Yugoslav relations influenced the Hungarian situation in 1955-1956.
When Soviet-Yugoslav conflict started in 1948, Rákosi and other Muscovite leaders executed László Rajk, who had engaged in resistance during World War II, who was then the foreign minister, and who was falsely accused of being Yugoslavia's spy. As a result, Hungarian-Yugoslav relations deteriorated rapidly. After Stalin's death, Nikita S. Khrushchev, the First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party visited Belgrade on 27 May 1955 and normalized the governmental relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. A new international situation resulted from Khrushchev's visit to Belgrade. It urged the Rákosi regime to revise its policy toward Yugoslavia. Rákosi had to follow in the footsteps of Soviet foreign policy in order to maintain his power. But he was in a dilemma between following Soviet foreign policy and adherence to oppressive domestic policy, because retrieving Rajk's lost honour meant to him the negation of his reign based on a cult following of his personality. The Rákosi regime did not disclose the truth of the Rajk-trial and couldn't normalize relations with Yugoslavia. The Soviet leaders adhered to Rákosi, although the domestic situation in Hungary became more and more strained after Khrushchev's speech denouncing Stalin at the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February 1956.
After the normalization of the governmental relations, Khrushchev became determined to normalize party relations between the Soviet Communist Party and the Yugoslav Communist League and expected Yugoslavia to return to the Soviet bloc. When Josip B. Tito, the Yugoslav President, visited to Soviet Union in June 1956, he refused to return to the Soviet bloc, although the Soviet leaders recognized Yugoslavia's own road to socialism and succeeded in the normalization of relations between the two parties. In Moscow, Tito did not conceal his feelings that it was unthinkable to make relations with Hungary better as long as Rákosi was in power. Rákosi became an obstacle to Soviet-Yugoslav reconciliation. At the same time, Soviet-Yugoslav reconciliation brought about instability in the communist regimes in Hungary and Poland. So Khrushchev was worried about changing to the offensive by anti-Tito leaders within the Soviet Communist Party Presidium.
In the end, Khrushchev decided to remove Rákosi from power to calm the strained situation in Hungary without deteriorating relations with Yugoslavia. When Anastas I. Mikoyan, the Soviet First Deputy Prime Minister, arrived in Budapest on 13 July and demanded that Rákosi retire, Rákosi resigned his post as the first secretary and a member of Politburo. In spite of Rákosi's downfall, Tito was disappointed with the appointment of Ernõ Gerõ as the first secretary, who was a hard-line communist and a close associate of Rákosi, and with Khrushchev's intention to hinder Hungary's