国際政治
Online ISSN : 1883-9916
Print ISSN : 0454-2215
ISSN-L : 0454-2215
1999 巻, 121 号
選択された号の論文の22件中1~22を表示しています
  • 宗教と国際政治
    小杉 泰
    1999 年 1999 巻 121 号 p. 1-11,L5
    発行日: 1999/05/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    In recent decades the resurgence of religions in contemporary politics, both domestically and internationally, has caught us by surprise. It was once believed that the modern state system had largely diminished the political role of religious forces and pushed religions into the realm of individual private life, making the public space secular. In the same token, modernization was once considered to secularize developing societies where religious politics had once played a significant role.
    The single most important event which shook our conviction and made international society realize this new dimension in international politics was the Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran. The revolution turned upside down the nationalist and/or socialist premise of revolutions in the 20th century, and substantially changed both international and regional politics in the Middle East.
    While Islamic resurgence of a similar kind has been observed in Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey as well as, more recently, in Indonesia, the revival of religions, or the resurgence of religious forces in politics, is not limited to Islam. Judaism, Christianity and Hinduism, among others, all show their active faces in politics. The end of the Cold War has also begun a new phase of religio-ethnic conflicts in various parts of the world, the most serious case being that of the former Yugoslavia.
    All of these cases require that we not only give more of our attention to phenomenal realities, but also that we devote serious scholarly and theoretical investigation to the question. We ought to reexamine the secular premise of politics, both domestic and international, and to establish frameworks for analyzing the religious dimension of politics.
  • 宗教と国際政治
    落合 雄彦
    1999 年 1999 巻 121 号 p. 12-32,L6
    発行日: 1999/05/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    One of the most significant developments within post-independent African Christianity is the mushrooming of new churches, Pentecostal-Charismatic in nature. David B. Barret, the highly respected church statistician, states that the growth of Pentecostal-Charismatic Christianity is truly global and multicultural, with members found in 8, 000 ethnolinguistic cultures. The aim of the present article is to examine the political roles which the Pentecostal-Charismatic movement plays in Africa's neopatrimonial states.
    The earlier Pentecostal movement is now typically referred to as classical Pentecostalism. On a global basis, it has produced its own denominations such as the Assemblies of God, the International Church of the Foursquare Gospel, and the Yoido Full Gospel Church. Neo-Pentecostalism, which is known as the Charismatic movement, was born in the United States in the 1960s. It includes churches within the established denominations which have been open to Pentecostal influence, along with interdenominational ministries and para-church organizations outside of these structures. The Pentecostal movement and the Charismatic movement share basic characteristics, such as the doctrine of Baptism in the Spirit and the emphasis on speaking in tongues and healing.
    Reinhard Bonnke is a German evangelist who belongs to Pentecostal-Charismatic Christianity. He is well known for his major healing crusades throughout Africa. In the 1970s, Bonnke founded an international ministry called Christ for all Nations (CfaN) and began holding tent meetings in Southern Africa. The main features of Bonnke's crusades include mass baptism in the Holy Spirit and miracles of healing. The crusades have played three socio-political roles in Africa's modern political arena. First, his healing ministry and messages of the faith gospel have turned African people's eyes away from politics. Second, he has directly or indirectly contributed to the maintenance of the neo-patrimonial states in Africa by building and maintaining patron-client relationships with the rulers. Third, his campaigns have intensified religious antagonism. While the first and the second effects of his campaigns have worked as stabilizing factors for the neo-patrimonial regimes, the last is a side-effect of the crusades and may lead to destabilizing the regimes.
  • 宗教と国際政治
    塩崎 弘明
    1999 年 1999 巻 121 号 p. 33-53,L7
    発行日: 1999/05/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The dominant cause of Vatican Diplomacy and its position at the end of the Cold War, or at the collapse of communism in the Soviet bloc, could be found not only in its Ostpolitik of 1963 to 1990, but also in its previous history of the secret contacts with the Soviet government from 1919 to 1929. To the promoters of the Vatican's Ostpolitik, the Cold War brought to conclusion a policy which had existed from the Russian Revolution to the Revolution of 1989.
    During the First and Second World Wars, the Holy See, the international spiritual and moral organization under the leadership of the Popes, resumed an active role in international affairs. The war unexpectedly increased the importance and extent of Vatican Diplomacy. Both World Wars coincidentally ended the Vatican's isolation and ushered in a new phase of Vatican Diplomacy, which dates lasted until reign of Pope John XXIII and encompasses the new enemy, Stalinist communism. This remained the clear and continuing enemy of the Holy See until the 1960's.
    John's “Opening to the East” and the subsequent policy of Ostpolitik developed by Agostino Casaroli in the 1960's and 1970's, illustrate the policy of equidistance between the communist world and the west that has characterized Vatican Diplomacy since early 1960's. The election of a Polish Pope, John Paul II, and the emergence of a new Soviet reformer, M. Gorbachev, contributed to accelerate the coming of the Revolution of 1989 that culminated in the end of the Cold War. Vatican Diplomacy, however, still faced great challenges.
    To the Far East, the Cold War is not yet over for the Holy See. The Vatican's Ostpolitik has signally failed to penetrate the “bamboo curtain” around China and some of its neighbors. However, Vatican Diplomacy is, more than anything else, expected to promote the spiritual and human values that will become crucial points in international relations in the near future.
  • 宗教と国際政治
    富田 健次
    1999 年 1999 巻 121 号 p. 54-71,L8
    発行日: 1999/05/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is based on Ayatollah Khomeini's theory of Velayat-e Faqih, explicitly states that Iran has an Islamic and religious mission in the world. This article tries to clarify the character of Iranian foreign policy and its claims of a religious mission in relation to the modern world of nation-states which originated in the West.
    According to the view of Ayatollah Khomeini, the basic unit of political society is not the nation-state but the religious community (Umma), which does not attach importance to the nation, race or territory. However, the reality of this world, and especially of the Islamic world, was its division by the Western colonial powers into nation-states. Muslim people are therefore, by means of puppet governments, subjugated to superpowers governed by human ideologies, and contradicting the divine revelation of Islam. So Iran, as the first and sole Islamic State, has a religious mission to liberate not only Muslims but also all oppressed people of the world from the puppet governments of superpowers (oppressors).
    Khomeini's world view logically leads us to the conclusion that the Iranian government may assist the oppressed people of other countries in revolting against their puppet governments, and to avoid diplomatic relationship with their governments. Indeed, we can verify that Iranian foreign policy strongly reflected this world view from 1981 to 1984.
    However, in 1984 Iran was forced to change this foreign policy of aggressiveness and isolationism because of the tanker war during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88). After that, for the first time since the revolution, Iran started full scale diplomatic activities which included the so-called Iran-Contra Affair. This new Iranian foreign policy has gradually taken Iran towards a nation-state style of foreign policy, with its many twists and turns. This is especially so since the cease-fire of the Iran-Iraq war, the demise of the Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989 and the formation of the Khatami government in 1997.
    Parallel to this movement, several theses which try to coordinate Iran's religious mission and its nation-state interest came into being. For example, one thesis presents 10 Iranian principles of foreign policy, which make the realistic nation state interests superior to those of the idealistic religious mission.
    But this situation does not mean that the foreign policy of Iran exclusively consists of pursuing nation-state interests. The most typical example for Iran's religious missionary policy, which is jeopardizing her nation-state interests, can be seen in the policy to assist the Palestinian people oppressed by Israel, which has a close relationship with the United States. It is possible to say that Iran's anti-Israel policy has become the symbol of its religious mission.
  • 宗教と国際政治
    酒井 啓子
    1999 年 1999 巻 121 号 p. 72-94,L9
    発行日: 1999/05/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The term “long distance Islamists” sounds like “long distance nationalism” which B. Anderson adopted, but its meaning is different. Anderson pointed out the emergence of a new type of nationalism between people spread across various countries, generating a new mood of solidarity and utilizing the most advanced methods of communication, without being bound by territorial boundaries. On the other hand, “long distance Islamists” here means Islamists in exile and under the influence of a culture different from that of their native countries. Islamism basically originated as a transnational concept, but gradually came to be affected by the culture of the country where groups of Islamists reside. This is especially true in Western countries, where the result has been for Islamists to defend their thought against modern Western concepts, or to try to adopt them. This trend sometimes results in substantial transformation of the basic thought of Islamism. In this article I shed light on the Iraqi Islamists in exile, who have mainly settled in Iran, Syria, and Britain, and compare their theological development in each circumstance.
    In Iraq, Islamism has emerged from within, not as imported thought, mainly in the international city of Najaf, a historical center of Islamic thought. During the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War, however, most of Islamists had been deported or exiled as a result of the repression by the Ba'th regime of Islamic political movements. Islamic movements thus moved their base to Iran and other countries, and were forced to ‘export’ their thought from there to Iraq. Residing in countries which were enemies of Iraq, they easily became involved in international conflicts, and were used as tools for interfering in internal Iraqi politics and for meddling in diplomatic negotiation. Islamic political organizations, which used to be mere domestic anti-government bodies, turned to being important actors in international society. With this change of their position, the influence of the host country on the policy-making of each Islamic organization cannot be ignored. During the Iran-Iraq War, for example, the main bodies of Islamists were strictly against the United States and other Western countries which supported the Iraqi regime. During and after the Gulf war, on the contrary, they started making efforts to co-exist in some way with Western governments, which had come to be against Saddam's regime.
    As opportunities to communicate with Western governments and institutions increase, Islamists residing in Western countries find it necessary to deal with the question of “democracy”. Originally, Islamic movements in Iraq attempted to offer a third way to overcome the limits of the Western capitalist-democratic system and the Eastern communist or socialist system. Being exposed to the criticism that their activities were not democratic, Islamists have begun discussing whether they can adopt Western democratic systems. This is especially obvious in the Da'wa Party, whose activity has the longest history and is most deeply rooted in the Iraqi Islamic movement, and it is made clear by its application of democratic institutions such as elections, freedom of will, freedom of thought, and respect for human rights in their political program. Its policy, however, is still controversial and recently resulted in friction between the London and Tehran branches.
  • 宗教と国際政治
    臼杵 陽
    1999 年 1999 巻 121 号 p. 95-107,L11
    発行日: 1999/05/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This article focuses on one of the most controversial questions of politics and religion in Israel, that is to say, on the controversial dispute about conversions to Judaism. These is controversy between Orthodox Jews, who have monopolized such Jewish religious matters as conversions and marriage ceremonies in Israel, and Reform and Conservative Jews who have not been officially authorized to carry out conversions and perform weddings in Israel. While Reform and Conservative Jews are the majority among Diaspora Jewry, especially in the United State, they are a minority among Israeli Jews. Reform and Conservative Jews in the United State are entitled to immigrate to Israel as Jews in accordance with the Law of Return, but they are not recognized as “true Jews” by Orthodox Jews in Israel. The Reform and Conservative Jews are forced to convert again to Orthodox Judaism if they are to enjoy their religious life as equals to the Orthodox brethren in Israel.
    In January 1998, Israeli premier Benjamin Netanyahu appointed then Finance Minister Yaakov Ne'eman as chairman of a committee to try and seek a compromise solution among the three major denominations of Judaism (Orthodox, Reform and Conservative) on the question of conversions of Jews and on other religious matters in Israel. The debate of the Ne'eman committee, which was composed of representatives of the three denominations, poured oil on fire with regard to this decisive question of “Who is a Jew?”, that is to say, who has authority over the question of the definition of a Jew in Israel.
    First, this paper analyzes the monopoly enjoyed by Orthodox Jews in official religious institutions such as Ministry of Religion, the Chief Rabbinate, Rabbi Courts, and Local Religious Councils in light of the relationship between state and religion. Second, the paper discusses, in the context of the relationship between religion and politics, the political roles of a Sephardi orthodox religious party, “Shas (Sephardi Torah Guardians)”, which has tried to propose legislation establishing a conversion law and a local council law to the Israeli Parliament (Knesset). Third, the paper examines the recommendation of the Ne'eman committee and its repercussion among the concerned parties in Israel and the United States. A preliminary unsigned copy of the commitee's recommendation in November 1998 proposed to set up a joint institute for conversion studies at which Orthodox, Conservative and Reform rabbis would all teach, but actual conversions would be performed only by Orthodox rabbinical courts.
    In conclusion, since the recommendation of the Ne'eman committee was vehemently refused by the Orthodox-controlled Chief Rabbinate Council, despite the approval of the recommendation by the Knesset, Reform and Conservative movements continued to struggle for the plurality of Judaism in Israel and against the Orthodox monopoly. They petitioned the High Court of Justice to instruct the appointment of Reform and Conservative rabbis in Local Religious Councils.
  • 宗教と国際政治
    松本 佐保
    1999 年 1999 巻 121 号 p. 108-121,L12
    発行日: 1999/05/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    A common perception since the Reformation in the sixteenth century is that Britain has been resolutely opposed to Catholicism and in particular to the Papacy in Rome. However, in 1846, with the accession of Pius IX to the Holy See, there was a distinct thaw in British hostility towards the Vatican and the hope that this new ‘liberal’ Pope would reform the Papal States, thus helping to restore stability to the Italian peninsula. A threat to Pius's reforms, however, appeared in 1847, due to Austrian fears about the Pope's intentions. In August an Austrian force seized the city of Ferrara in order to put pressure on Rome. In desperation Pius appealed to Britain for assistance.
    The response of the government of Lord John Russell to the Austrian aggression was to decide in August 1847 to send Lord Minto to Rome to demonstrate its support for Pius's reforms and to encourage him to continue on this path. The British interest in the mission, however, went beyond concern for the stability of Italy, for there was also a desire to raise the issue of Ireland with the Pope. 1847 was the worst year of the Famine in Ireland and consequently a wave of unrest was unleashed. The British government believed that elements within the Irish Catholic Church were encouraging Irish nationalism and Daniel O'Connell's repeal movement and it therefore wished to use the Pope's authority to control their activities. In this it was aided by the English Catholics in Rome, such as Dr. Wiseman, who were trying to convince both the Papacy and the British government to agree to the re-establishment of an English Catholic Hierarchy.
    By the time Minto arrived in Rome in November 1847, British fears about Austrian ambitions had subsided and the Irish issue began to increasingly dominate British policy towards Rome. In an effort to demonstrate its good intentions and to counter the Irish College in Rome, Russell and his Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston, introduced a Bill in Parliament to allow for the opening of diplomatic relations between Britain and the Papal States. This, however, came up against two obstacles; first, the dramatic events in Rome in 1848, which eventually led the Pope to flee the city, and second, the opposition of Protestant opinion within Britain. As the result the Bill died.
    After the stormy events culminating in the Roman Republic in 1849, the now reactionary Pius returned to Rome in April 1850. Once more the British sought to raise the Irish issue with him. However, its efforts were again compromised by domestic opinion. In October 1850, Pius announced the restoration of the English Catholic Hierarchy provoking protests all over Britain. This unrest was not just directed against the Catholics, but also against the British government, for it was widely believed that Russell had connived at the restoration in order to win influence in Rome. The furor was so great that issues related to this ‘No Popery’ movement fatally weakened Russell's administration and in 1852 he resigned. This episode is significant because it demonstrates the difficulties that religion poses for “high politics” and diplomacy. The British government in this period had a number of pressing political reasons, including the problem of Ireland, for seeking better relations with Rome, but the fundamentally anti-Catholic nature of British society doomed its overtures to failure.
  • 宗教と国際政治
    李 分一
    1999 年 1999 巻 121 号 p. 122-139,L14
    発行日: 1999/05/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Protest by Korean churches desiring political and social democratization has often led to severe social control by the state government. Both Korean churches and the state government were political actors in violent confrontational politics. In South Korea, there is a serious conflict between Korean churches, which aim to achieve political and social democratization, and the state government, which intervenes in the church to control the political and social life of Christians.
    This article analyzes the trend of confrontational politics in South Korea in the 1980s, when the Korean churches protested most vigorously against the state government. The Korean politics of confrontation shifted from the phase of suppressed churches, through that of heavily confrontational politics, and to the era of dual power. The protests of Korean churches dates back to the struggles of democratic movements against a military-based authoritarian regime in the 1970s, which provided significant impetus for political change.
    But this article provides a political analysis of the protest of Korean churches in the 1980s under the regime of President Chun Doo Hwan. President Chun of South Korea established the Fifth Republic, an authoritarian regime. In fact, political stability was an important precondition for the two paramount national goals—economic development and national security—and provided as a rationale for introducing the system of the Fifth Republic. The Fifth Republic system, however, suffered from chronic instability throughout its existence. The Fifth Republic's continued existence depended on severe social control designed to secure order on its own terms. The regime finally collapsed amidst political turmoil with riots and the disruption of parliamentary politics.
    The evolution of the Korean churches followed a “practical logic”. Churches grew out of the development experience of society and of Korean political and social reality and of its shifting characteristics. As parliamentary opposition parties were consistently deprived of a full role within the official political system, the opposition gradually came to be dominated by unofficial, extra-parliamentary groups, notably the dissident groups in the Christian churches. Especially the radicalization of some sectors of Christian movement is a significant feature of Korean politics in the 1980s. This study as a whole seeks to understand the political dynamics and issues of justice in the context of the development of political authoritarianism in South Korea.
  • 宗教と国際政治
    三尾 真琴
    1999 年 1999 巻 121 号 p. 140-156,L15
    発行日: 1999/05/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The purpose of this paper is to portray two different aspects of Hizbullah: that of a radical armed organization-some scholars refer to it as a typical “terrorist” organization, and as a “social welfare party, ” especially for Shiite communities. In addition, through the study of relations between the Hizbullah and other actors, this paper tries to point out its effects on Lebanese society and on politics of the Middle East.
    Hizbullah was born in 1982 when Israel invaded Lebanon. It is not always clear by what process it was established and organized. It is estimated, however, that Hizbullah is composed of several independent sects leaded by a collective “Ulama, ” like Iran. At present, members of Hizbullah are around 15, 000 and it has come to share influence on the Shiite population with Amal.
    The basic goals and strategies of the Hizbullah are 1) establishment of a Lebanese Islamic state modeled on Iran, 2) Liberation of south Lebanon (a “security zone” occupied by Israel), 3) struggle against Israel and support for the establishment of a Palestine state, 4) the abolishment of “confessionalism, ” which refers to fixed rights and political power given to each religious sect, 5) support for Shiite communities. In order to complete these objectives, and especially in order to liberate south Lebanon and fight against Israel, Hizbullah took Western foreigners hostage and performed “suicide” bombings against buildings such as the embassy or military compounds of Western powers in Lebanon in the 1980s.
    Since 1992, however, Hizbullah carried out a big change in accordance with the realities of the Lebanese political system and became one of the political parties representative of Shiite communities. Because Hizbullah took great care of agriculture, infrastructure, school education, social welfare in Shiite residences, which the Lebanese government has been ignoring so far, it gained support in Shiite communities and took twelve seats in the Lebanese parliament in 1992.
    It is true that Hizbullah is increasing its political power in Lebanese society. However, the situation surrounding Hizbullah is quite complicated. For example, most of Hizbullah's budget still depends on Iran, and much of the freedom given to Hizbullah is only allowed by Syria. Furthermore, the relation between the Hizbullah and Christian sects, a domestic matter, has remained strained and dangerous. Therefore, this paper concludes that we need to study Hizbullah from the point of view of political relations in the Middle East, and at same time from that of religious balance in Lebanon.
  • 宗教と国際政治
    森戸 幸次
    1999 年 1999 巻 121 号 p. 157-167,L16
    発行日: 1999/05/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    A fundamental change has occurred in the Palestinian Conflict, the most deep-rooted and problematic among the regional conflicts of the twentieth century. As the Middle East peace process for the political settlement of this century-long conflict continues, a gradual creeping from a secular nationalism to an other-worldly religious nationalism shift can be seen inside the Palestinian National Movement. The background of such a shift can be seen in the following facts; 1) an identity crisis coming from the fear of losing the Arab-Palestinian community, 2) fear of losing political and economic independence as in the colonial age, especially as the ongoing peace process is slowly bringing the Palestinian problem to a close, and 3) a sense of the failure of restoring an Arab land such as Palestine.
    In the past 50 years, during which the Arab world had fought against Israel over Palestine, it has failed miserably in achieving the three national goals stated above, whether it be during the Arab Nationalism Age in the 1950's and 60's or during the age of State Nationalism after the 1970's. Therefore, during the 1980's and 90's, the movement has become a combating and defensive revolutionary movement based on violent armed struggles and using Islam as a strong political ideology while, however, still persisting in its originally set goals.
    Bearing these national aims in mind, I will anatomize the historical significance of the Religious National Movement, which sheds light on doubts about the legitimate historical right of a Jewish state, while it simultaneously questions the worldliness of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which agreed to a peace deal with Israel in the Oslo interim self-rule agreements.
  • 荻野 晃
    1999 年 1999 巻 121 号 p. 168-184,L17
    発行日: 1999/05/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper examines the significance of Mátyás Rákosi's removal from the position of the First Secretary of the Hungarian Workers' Party in July 1956, in the political dynamics of the international communist movement after Stalin's death. His downfall was caused by Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia as well as the bankruptcy of his oppressive reign during the Stalin era. The Importance of research on Soviet-Yugoslav relations as the international background of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 was seen in a new light among Russian and Hungarian historians after the collapse of the Soviet and Hungarian communist regimes and opening of the National Archives in the early of 1990s. The author also regards the downfall of Rákosi as important concerning the cause of the deterioration of Soviet-Yugoslav relations, which resulted in the second dispute between the two states and parties in 1958, and analyzes how Soviet-Yugoslav relations influenced the Hungarian situation in 1955-1956.
    When Soviet-Yugoslav conflict started in 1948, Rákosi and other Muscovite leaders executed László Rajk, who had engaged in resistance during World War II, who was then the foreign minister, and who was falsely accused of being Yugoslavia's spy. As a result, Hungarian-Yugoslav relations deteriorated rapidly. After Stalin's death, Nikita S. Khrushchev, the First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party visited Belgrade on 27 May 1955 and normalized the governmental relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. A new international situation resulted from Khrushchev's visit to Belgrade. It urged the Rákosi regime to revise its policy toward Yugoslavia. Rákosi had to follow in the footsteps of Soviet foreign policy in order to maintain his power. But he was in a dilemma between following Soviet foreign policy and adherence to oppressive domestic policy, because retrieving Rajk's lost honour meant to him the negation of his reign based on a cult following of his personality. The Rákosi regime did not disclose the truth of the Rajk-trial and couldn't normalize relations with Yugoslavia. The Soviet leaders adhered to Rákosi, although the domestic situation in Hungary became more and more strained after Khrushchev's speech denouncing Stalin at the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February 1956.
    After the normalization of the governmental relations, Khrushchev became determined to normalize party relations between the Soviet Communist Party and the Yugoslav Communist League and expected Yugoslavia to return to the Soviet bloc. When Josip B. Tito, the Yugoslav President, visited to Soviet Union in June 1956, he refused to return to the Soviet bloc, although the Soviet leaders recognized Yugoslavia's own road to socialism and succeeded in the normalization of relations between the two parties. In Moscow, Tito did not conceal his feelings that it was unthinkable to make relations with Hungary better as long as Rákosi was in power. Rákosi became an obstacle to Soviet-Yugoslav reconciliation. At the same time, Soviet-Yugoslav reconciliation brought about instability in the communist regimes in Hungary and Poland. So Khrushchev was worried about changing to the offensive by anti-Tito leaders within the Soviet Communist Party Presidium.
    In the end, Khrushchev decided to remove Rákosi from power to calm the strained situation in Hungary without deteriorating relations with Yugoslavia. When Anastas I. Mikoyan, the Soviet First Deputy Prime Minister, arrived in Budapest on 13 July and demanded that Rákosi retire, Rákosi resigned his post as the first secretary and a member of Politburo. In spite of Rákosi's downfall, Tito was disappointed with the appointment of Ernõ Gerõ as the first secretary, who was a hard-line communist and a close associate of Rákosi, and with Khrushchev's intention to hinder Hungary's
  • 佐藤 晋
    1999 年 1999 巻 121 号 p. 185-188
    発行日: 1999/05/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 落合 浩太郎
    1999 年 1999 巻 121 号 p. 188-190
    発行日: 1999/05/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 納家 政嗣
    1999 年 1999 巻 121 号 p. 191-193
    発行日: 1999/05/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 上野 隆生
    1999 年 1999 巻 121 号 p. 194-196
    発行日: 1999/05/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • パーヴェル・パエフ著『コーカサスにおけるロシアの政策』
    広瀬 陽子
    1999 年 1999 巻 121 号 p. 197-201
    発行日: 1999/05/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 村田 雄二郎
    1999 年 1999 巻 121 号 p. 201-204
    発行日: 1999/05/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 後藤 春美
    1999 年 1999 巻 121 号 p. 204-206
    発行日: 1999/05/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 湯浅 成大
    1999 年 1999 巻 121 号 p. 207-209
    発行日: 1999/05/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 土田 哲夫
    1999 年 1999 巻 121 号 p. 209-212
    発行日: 1999/05/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 福嶋 輝彦
    1999 年 1999 巻 121 号 p. 212-215
    発行日: 1999/05/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 小杉 泰
    1999 年 1999 巻 121 号 p. 216
    発行日: 1999/05/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
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