抄録
This paper aims to examine the relationship between “thinking” and “society” from the point of view of Emmanuel Levinas’ philosophy. If we follow the traditional definition of thinking, according to which it would be a silent dialogue of the soul with itself, it would necessarily involve its detachment from the outside world. Such a definition, however, is exactly what Levinas tries to call into question: according to him, thinking occurs precisely through its contact with the exteriority, which is embodied as the thinker’s social relation with the other.
In order to demonstrate such an affinity between thinking and society in Levinas, we will firstly investigate his original concept of “enjoyment.” This concept, which denotes the fundamental mode of human life, will enable us to see that thinking cannot begin as long as everything around one is internalized into one’s enjoyment. After having clarified that the exteriority one finds intervening in one’s enjoyment is that of the other, we will secondly try to elucidate the reason why the exteriority of the other constitutes the basic condition of one’s thinking. Opened by the encounter with the exteriority, thinking is now to be redefined as calling into question the naivety of the ego by accepting the other. Thirdly, by referring to Levinas’ notion of the “third person”, we will show that the ego’s dual relationship with the other implies in itself the ego’s relationship with others, and that, consequently, thinking inevitably takes into account, not only the other person with whom it faces, but also the interpersonal pluralism of society. The paper concludes by suggesting how the type of thinking which is called “philosophy of education” could discover society.
https://ror.org/02hwp6a56 
