特集 立憲的政治経済学
立憲的政治経済学は公共選択の拡張か？
2016 年 2016 巻 65 号 p. 108-127
詳細
2016 年 2016 巻 65 号 p. 108-127
James Buchanan is well known and praised for his pioneering contributions to Public Choice and also for having launched Constitutional Political Economy, and eventually received the Nobel Praise in economics in 1986. The latter research program is usually regarded as a form, a branch, or an extension of public choice.
On the other hand, though not explicitly pointed out in our country, Buchanan's definition of economics (as catallactics or a science of exchange) and his understanding of market mechanism (as spontaneous order), are not only specific, it is also quite different from the definition of economics that mainstream economists (especially, neoclassical welfare economists) retain and, above all, opposed to the definition of economics that many public choice theorists use. The latter have, in effect, adapted the Robbins 1932 definition of economics as a science of choice that Buchanan criticizes and rejects. Therefore, Buchanan' constitutional political economy does not match well with the common understanding of public choice theory as in the textbook and cannot be a branch of public choice. In order to correctly understand Buchanan's political economy, we must start from knowing exactly the reason why Buchanan has always been, and remains, an outsider.
