公共選択
Online ISSN : 2187-3852
Print ISSN : 2187-2953
特集 立憲的政治経済学
規範的立憲的政治経済学と経済政策論
川野辺 裕幸
著者情報
ジャーナル フリー

2016 年 2016 巻 65 号 p. 128-146

詳細
抄録

 Normative constitutional political economy of Virginia School has achieved to explain modern democracies from individualistic foundations. Starting from the three core premises, namely the methodological individualism, rational behaviors of acting entities and transactions, the establishment of governments are successfully explained using the two-stage social contracts model. In this setting a "veil of uncertainty" is a crucial concept which make a self-interested individual act fairly. But the notion of normative constitutional political economy has several controversial points when applied to policy advices.

 In this paper I investigate the methodological foundation of normative constitutional political economy as well as its underlying social philosophy. When applying it to a policy advice, it has a strong advantage of methodological consistencies to other normative assertions such as the explicit declare principle of value premises. But the normative individualism of normative constitutional political economy will gain its validity in modern democracies only with the unanimous support of individuals involved.

著者関連情報
© 2016 公共選択学会
前の記事 次の記事
feedback
Top