言語は規則に支配されているのか

抄録

On the standard interpretation of the later Wittgenstein, it is supposed that he accepts the view that language is governed by rules. Many interpreters, explicitly or implicitly, think that Wittgenstein is committed to the view that the correct uses of words are determined by their rules.
In my paper, I argue that the standard interpretation is incorrect as an interpretation of Wittgensteinʼs later thought on language and rules. First, in my view,Wittgensteinʼs position is that we explain the meaning of a word by rules, when it is necessary. However, when it is not necessary, we do not operate according to rules.Second, the standard interpretation ascribes to Wittgenstein a dogmatic philosophical method, which he in fact tries to avoid. On the standard interpretation, a rule for a word is supposed to be the source of normativity, so that, by citing the rules that Wittgenstein or Wittgensteinians identify, we can reject some philosophical assertions as nonsense. To think that only Wittgenstein or Wittgensteinians can identify the right rules in philosophical discussions is dogmatic, however, and by carefully surveying the text of Philosophical Investigations we can see that he avoids such dogmatism.
In section 1 of my paper, I explain the standard interpretation. In section 2, I review the general points of Wittgensteinʼs discussion of rule-following and argue that the standard interpretation has a problem here. In section 3, I show that the Wittgensteinʼs texts cited by Glock, a prominent supporter of the standard interpretation, as the evidence for his interpretation do not support it. In section 4, by carefully investigating the remarks that concern rule-following in Philosophical Investigations, I argue that the standard interpretation misunderstands the method and aim of Wittgensteinʼs argument. Finally, in section 5, I argue that the standard interpretation has serious flaws as an interpretation of Wittgensteinʼs view of rules.